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Christiana Ankaasiba Akpilima-Atibil 
INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO PROMOTE LOCAL RESOURCE MOBILIZATION 
FOR PHILANTHROPY IN AFRICA: WHY THE FORD FOUNDATION’S 
INITIATIVES FAILED 
 
The exportation of institutions from developed economies to developing countries 
has been a development strategy that international actors have employed for decades. In 
the 1990s and early 2000s international donors introduced philanthropic foundations into 
African countries. The Ford Foundation was instrumental in setting up a number of 
foundations in African countries to promote the mobilization of local philanthropic 
resources for self-reliant community-driven development. However, more than a decade 
after their establishment the Ford-founded philanthropic institutions continued to depend 
heavily on international funding. This dissertation investigates why Ford’s exportation of 
foundation philanthropy to African countries for the promotion of local resource 
mobilization was unsuccessful.   
Current explanations attribute the local resource mobilization ineffectiveness of 
donor-founded philanthropic institutions to domestic factors --- developing country 
governments’ failure to provide an enabling environment for the development of 
nonprofit institutions. Drawing on quantitative and qualitative data, I go beyond the 
endogenous explanations to examine the role and institutional transplantation strategies 
of the external actor, the Ford Foundation. Based on in-depth interviews with former staff 
and consultants of the Ford Foundation, as well as staff of selected Ford-founded African 
foundations in Kenya, Ghana, and Senegal (namely The Kenya Community Development 
Foundation, the African Women's Development Fund, and TrustAfrica) I contend that the  
viii 
oft-cited domestic “obstacles” are actually the preexisting local conditions that Ford 
should have taken into consideration during the formulation and implementation of its 
philanthropy promotion program in African countries.  
Using institutional transplantation theories as a framework, I argue that Ford 
failed to achieve its local resource mobilization goal in African countries because the 
American-inspired foundation model that it transplanted in those countries for the 
purpose was incompatible with the local African cultures of giving and philanthropy.  
 
                                                                  Lauren Matthews Morris MacLean, PhD., Chair 
  
ix 
Table of Contents 
List of Abbreviations ........................................................................................................ xii 
 
Chapter I: Introduction and Background to the Study…………………………………….1 
 Statement of the Research Question……………………………………………....4 
 Argument………………………………………………………………………….5 
 The Independent Variable: Ford’s Approach and Strategies……………………...6 
 The Dependent Variable: Extent of Ford’s Effectiveness………………………...7 
  Conceptualization of the Dependent Variable: Foundation  
                        Effectiveness……………………………………………………………....8 
  Dimensions of the Dependent Variable………………………………….10 
 Theorizing the Outcome of Institutional Transplantations……………………....11 
  Comparative Law Literature on Institutional Transplantations………….12 
  Civil Society Literature on Institutional Transplantations……………….15 
  Institutional Economics Literature on Transplant Performance…………16 
  Foundation Philanthropy vs. African Giving Cultures…………………..17 
  Differences in Giving Norms and Values………………………………..18 
  Receptivity and Adaptation to the Local Soil……………………………21 
Alternative Explanations……………………………………………………........23 
 Economic Explanations………………………………………………….24 
 Regulatory and Legal Explanations……………………………………...26 
 Tax Incentives Explanation………………………………………………27 
 Lack of Trust in Formal Institutions……………………………………..28 
 Limitations of the Alternative Explanations……………………………..29 
Contribution to the Literature……………………………………………………31 
Research Design: Research Strategy and Case Selection………………………..32 
 Case Study Design……………………………………………………….32 
 Subject Matter Selection: Foundation Philanthropy in Africa…………...33 
Rationale for Selecting the Ford Foundation as the Case for 
Study……..................................................................................................34 
Selection of Ford’s African Foundation Grantees as Subunits  
            of the Case Study………………………………………………………...36 
 Methodology: Data Collection Methods………………………………………....36 
In-depth Qualitative Interviews: Sampling Methods  
and Sample Size……………………………………………………….....37 
  Documents: Archival Records, Annual Reports, Tax Returns, and  
                        Press Releases............................................................................................40 
 Roadmap for the Dissertation…………………………………………………....42 
 
Chapter II: Transplantation of Foundation Philanthropy onto African Soil……………..45 
 Introduction……………………………………………………………………....45 
 The Ford Foundation and International Development…………………………...47 
  Historical Background…………………………………………………...47 
Civil Society-Strengthening in Developing 
Countries…………………........................................................................49 
x 
  Ford’s Diffusion of Institutional Philanthropy in Developing  
                        Countries…………………………………………………………………50 
The Thinking Behind Ford’s Exportation of Foundation  
Philanthropy……………………………………………………………...53 
 Exporting the Foundation Model to African Countries………………………….55 
  Ford’s Foundation-Building in West, East and Southern Africa………...57 
 Ford’s Institutional Transplantation Process in Africa…………..………………58 
  Use of Western Intermediaries to Replicate Formal Structures………….61 
  Using Organizational Incubation as an Instrument of Isomorphism…….63 
  Study Tours of American Community Foundations……………………..68 
  Capacity-Building Initiatives and Infrastructure Organizations…………69 
 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………….72 
 
Chapter III: Ford’s Success at Formalization, Failure at Local Resource  
            Mobilization...........................................................................................................75 
 Introduction………………………………………………………………………75 
 The API and IISP: Brief Background, Goals and Objectives……………………76 
  The IISP as a ‘Second Bounce’ to Boost Local Resource  
                        Mobilization...............................................................................................80 
 Assessment of the Ford Foundation’s Effectiveness…………………………….81 
Board Effectiveness……………………………………………………...............82 
Managerial Effectiveness………………………………………………………...85 
Grantmaking Effectiveness………………………………………………………86 
Resource Mobilization Effectiveness……………………………………………90 
Success at Transferring International Fundraising Skills………………..91 
  Ford’s Inability to Catalyze Local Resource Mobilization……………...92 
  The Ford-Founded Philanthropies’ Failure to Tap into Local  
                        Resources………………………………………………………………...96 
  Lack of Capacity for Local Resource Mobilization……………………...97 
  Ceased Ford Funding and Local Resource Mobilization………………...99 
Endowment-Building Effectiveness……………………………………………101 
 Ford, the KCDF, Challenge Grants and Endowment-Building………...103 
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………...109 
 
Chapter IV: Why Ford Failed to Meet Its Local Resource Mobilization Objective……111 
 Introduction……………………………………………………………………..111 
The Exportation of American Foundation Philanthropy……………………….113 
  Negative Effects of Isomorphism on Local Foundations’ Identity…….115 
Negative Local Reactions to the Imposition of the Foundation  
Form…………………………………………………………………….117 
Easy Transfer of the Formal, Difficulty Impacting the Informal.………118 
Failure to Take Contextual Differences into Account………………………….120 
            Differences in the Social Division of Labor……………………………120 
  Socio-Economic Contextual Differences……………………………….122 
  Differences in Socio-Cultural Context and Philanthropic  
                        Landscapes……………………………………………………………...127 
xi 
Fall Back on Experience with Capacity-Building in the USA…………………131 
  Peer-Learning and Networking as Capacity-Building Mechanisms…...131 
Inadequate Support for Local Resource Mobilization………………………….134 
  Failure to Provide Context-Specific Support…………………………...135 
Failure to Publicize the New Philanthropic Institutions………………………..139 
Availability of International Funds as a Disincentive………………………….141 
  Making Hay While the Sun Was Still Shining…………………………142 
Underestimation of the Complexity of Philanthropy Promotion……………….145 
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………...147 
 
Chapter V: Conclusion and Broader Implications ……………………………………..150 
Summary of Findings…………………………………………………………..152 
Significance of the Study and Findings………………………………………...156 
  Theoretical Significance………………………………………………..156 
  Practical Significance for Development Practitioners………………….159 
   Private Foundations and Other International Donors…………..159 
   Donor-Founded Philanthropies, NGOs, and CSOs…………….161 
Relevance/Insights into Other Cases…………………………………………...162 
Limitations of Research Methodology…………………………………………163 
Policy Recommendations………………………………………………………164 
  Support for Organizational Syncretism/Hybridization…………………168 
  Adaptation to the Local Cultures of Giving……………………………176 
  Rendering the Foundation Model Meaningful to Local Donors…….....176 
  Need for Public Awareness, Communication, and Learning…………..178 
Future Research………………………………………………………………...180 
 
Chapter VI: Tables……………………………………………………………………...182 
 Table 3.1 Grants Awarded by AWDF from 2002-2010 (US dollars)…………..182 
            Table 3.2 Grants Awarded by TrustAfrica from 2006-2010 (US dollars)……...182 
 Table 3.3 Resource Mobilization by AWDF from 2005-2010  
            (US dollars)……………………………………………………………………..182 
 Table 3.4 Resource Mobilization by TrustAfrica from 2006-2010 
            (US dollars)……………………………………………………………………..183 
 Table 3.5 Resource Mobilization by KCDF from 2004-2010  
            (in 000’s of Kenyan Shillings)………………………………………………….183 
  
Appendices……………………………………………………………………..............184 
             Appendix A……………………………………………………………………184 
       Appendix B……………………………………………………………………189 
       Appendix C……………………………………………………………………190 
 
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………...191 
 
Curriculum Vitae 
 
 
xii 
List of Abbreviations 
 
AGN       African Grantmakers Network 
Akuapem CF      Akuapem Community Foundation 
API       Africa Philanthropy Initiative 
AWDF      African Women’s Development 
                                                                                    Fund 
CEO       Chief Executive Officer 
CIVICUS      World Alliance for Citizen 
                                                                                    Participation  
CS MOTT       Charles Stewart Mott Foundation 
CSO       Civil Society Organization 
GFCF                             Global Fund for Community  
                                                                                    Foundations 
HNWI       High Net Worth Individual 
IISP       International Initiative to Strengthen  
                                                                                    Philanthropy 
KCDF       Kenya Community Development  
                                                                                    Foundation 
LP       Leadership Program for Community  
                                                                                    Foundations 
NGO       Nongovernmental Organization 
RDCFI      Rural Development and Community 
                                                                                    Foundation Initiative 
 ROSCO      Rotating Savings and Credit  
                                                                                    Organization 
SAGA       Southern Africa Grantmakers’  
                                                                                    Association 
SIA       Special Initiative for Africa 
UNDP       United Nations Development 
                                                                                    Program 
xiii 
USAID      United States Agency for  
                                                                                    International Development 
WARF       West African Rural Foundation 
WINGS      Worldwide Initiative for Grantmaker  
                                                                                    Support 
990-PF      IRS Tax Returns for Private  
                                                                                    Foundations 
 
 
  
 
 
 1 
Chapter I: Introduction and Background to the Study 
The exportation of institutional models from developed economies to developing 
countries to speed up the latter’s advancement is not new (Heydemann and Hammack 
2009). In fact, the European colonization effort in African (and other developing) 
countries in the 19th century culminated in the largest imposition of institutions on the 
African continent, of which the modern state model is the most enduring example. 
Studies have found that these transplanted institutions, notably the state, have turned out 
to be ineffective, weak, and dysfunctional in the receiving African environment 
(Englebert 1997; Migdal 1988; Herbst 2000; van de Walle 2007).   
In the 1980s and 1990s, as part of the post-Cold War democratization effort in 
developing and transitional countries, international funders (including the Ford 
Foundation) transferred other kinds of Western-inspired institutional models, namely 
professionalized non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations 
(CSOs) (Salamon 1993; 1994; Katz 1994b). Also transplanted at this time was the 
American-inspired philanthropic foundation model, a process of institutionalization 
which McCarthy (1988: 89) referred to as “the dissemination and internationalization of 
the foundation movement.” Just like most of the other institutional models transferred 
over the course of time from developed to developing economies, the transplantation of 
the foundation model by the Ford Foundation and other international donors to stimulate 
local institutional philanthropy in African (and other developing) countries also failed to 
produce the desired outcomes. However, whereas donor-founded NGOs and CSOs in 
Africa have received a lot of scholarly attention as to their performance, donor-founded 
philanthropic foundations have attracted very little interest.   
2 
Some of the foundation officials interviewed for this study used agricultural terms 
to describe the transplantation of the foreign philanthropic institutional models onto 
African countries. Publications on the worldwide propagation of philanthropic 
institutions did likewise. In fact, the CS Mott Foundation’s1 2000 special report on its 20 
years of work in the community foundation field was titled “Sowing the Seeds of Local 
Philanthropy: Two Decades in the Field of Community Foundations.”2 Inspired by the 
concept of philanthropy promotion as planting and harvesting,3 I devised the horticultural 
analogy below to capture the puzzle that this dissertation set out to investigate.  
To boost local production and self-reliant economic development in selected sub-
Saharan African countries, an international donor exported an exotic variety of tree crop 
(native to temperate climates in North America). The donor provided the resources (to 
mostly foreign horticultural experts familiar with that exotic variety) to transplant the tree 
crops at the selected sites in collaboration with local partners trained to nurture and grow 
the transplants. Many of the latter suffered “transplanting shock” 4 and either died right 
away or became stunted. More than a decade afterwards, few of the surviving transplants 
had grown well in their new African tropical habitat. Though some of them turned out to 
be structurally strong and healthy, they had difficulty drawing the nutrients needed for 
their growth from the local soil; only bearing fruit with the aid of imported fertilizer. 
                                                 
1The CS Mott Foundation was one of the international private foundations that propagated community 
foundations and community philanthropy in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s.  
2Available online at CSMFPublication19.pdf  
3One of the chapters of the CS Mott Foundation special report is titled “Planting Seeds, Harvesting 
Results.” 
4According to Jeffrey H. Gillman and Gary R. Johnson (n.d) “trees and shrubs should be selected for a site 
based on the ability of the plant to tolerate the soil, light, climate, and …conditions present at that location.  
… Soil type and… available water, … must be considered. Attempting to match the requirements of the 
plant to the site increases the survivability, performance, and longevity of the plant selected. “Planting and 
Transplanting Trees and Shrubs” https://www.extension.umn.edu/garden/yard-garden/trees-shrubs/pla... 
Accessed July 27, 2017 
3 
Unlike the foreign variety, the local species sprouted naturally, did not need expert 
management, and were nurtured with local organic manure. Though smaller in structure 
than the imported variety, the local species were hardy, drought-tolerant and resilient; and 
continued over time to produce enough harvest to meet the basic (and not-so basic needs) 
of the local people.  
The above horticultural analogy is illustrative of the Ford Foundation’s 
exportation and institutionalization of foundation philanthropy in African countries in the 
1990s and early 2000s. Like the other international funders5 involved in the promotion of 
institutional philanthropy in developing countries, Ford set up its foundation grantees to 
not only channel international funding to local community development organizations 
(The Ford Foundation Annual Report 1989) but to also attract large-scale local giving to 
formal philanthropic institutions (The Ford Foundation 2000 Annual Report; the Ford 
Foundation 2006).6 This was meant especially to develop local philanthropic giving to 
ensure the availability of sustainable locally-generated philanthropic resources to fund 
community development, civil society development, and the strengthening of democratic 
institutions (Johnson et al. 2004; The Ford Foundation 2006).  
Unlike most home-grown7 African philanthropic institutions (including faith-
based organizations and churches) which have been raising the bulk of their resources 
locally for a long time (Little1965; Ngondi-Houghton 2005; Kanyinga et al. 2007; Kiljian 
2013; Wilkinson-Maposa et al. 2005; Honey and Okafor 1998; McCarthy 1988) none of 
the philanthropic foundations that Ford established in African countries were mobilizing 
                                                 
5These included the CS Mott, Kellogg, and Rockefeller Foundations, as well the UNDP and USAID.    
6One of the most important functions of philanthropic foundations is the mobilization of local resources.  
7Driven by local initiative, as opposed to being driven by external influence and funding. 
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the bulk of their resources locally (Moyo 2013; Sy and Hathie 2013) as expected, almost 
two decades into Ford’s philanthropy-promotion program in Africa. They were unable to 
do so, notwithstanding Ford’s capacity-building efforts through the Africa Philanthropy 
Initiative (API) and the International Initiative to Strengthen Philanthropy (IISP).8 In 
other words, by the time the Ford Foundation abruptly terminated its philanthropy 
promotion program in developing countries in 2010, none of the foundations that it had 
established in African countries in the 1990s and early 2000s was mobilizing up to 10% 
of its resources from within its own country or the continent of Africa (The Ford 
Foundation 2006; Kanyinga et al. 2007) as Ford had expected.9 In fact, one of the reasons 
that Ford president Luis Ubiñas gave for terminating the foundation’s philanthropy 
promotion program in developing countries in 2010 was that its foundation grantees had 
failed to mobilize local resources to become financially self-sustaining, and had become a 
financial burden on the Ford Foundation.10 
Statement of the Research Question 
By terminating its global philanthropy promotion program due to the failure of its 
foundation grantees to develop into locally-supported and financially self-sustaining 
institutions, the Ford Foundation was acknowledging the failure of its global program 
with respect to local resource mobilization. The question this research sought to answer, 
therefore, was: “Why did the Ford Foundation fail in its attempt to use the American-
                                                 
8The API and the IISP were initiatives that the Ford Foundation launched in 1998 and 2005 respectively to 
try to build the capacity of its foundation grantees in developing countries. While the API was limited to 
new foundations in African countries, the IISP was open to selected foundations from many developing 
countries.  
9Also, Participant Y, phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013. 
10As Participant F, a former Ford official, described it: “Luis Ubiñas came in as the new president… There 
is the famous quote that [Ubiñas] looked at the IISP (International Initiative to Strengthen Philanthropy) 
and he said: ‘All I see are triple overheads’ and he pulled the plug [on the global philanthropy promotion 
program].” (Phone interview with the author, June 18, 2013) 
5 
inspired philanthropic foundation model to catalyze the mobilization of large-scale 
philanthropic resources in African countries?”   
Argument 
 The study’s argument is that Ford’s institutional imposition approach to 
philanthropy promotion in African countries, and the resultant top-down strategies and 
tactics that it employed, contributed towards its failure to attain its local resource 
mobilization goal in those countries. Derived from its experience in the United States,11 
Ford’s philanthropy promotion approach in African countries was based on the 
assumption that the foundation model had universal applicability and would be as 
successful at attracting local resources in African countries as it had been in the US, 
irrespective of the different African institutional context and the various local giving 
cultures in place. It turned out, in fact, that the philanthropic concepts, structures, values, 
and expectations inherent in the American-inspired foundation model that Ford exported 
to African countries were incongruent with those of the local informal institutions of 
social exchange12 embodied in African economies of affection and caring (Hyden 2006; 
Wilkinson-Maposa et al. 2005; Feierman 1998; MacLean 2010). Ford’s neglect of the 
contextual differences between the American institutional and philanthropic landscape, 
on the one hand, and that of African countries, on the other, led to its use of capacity-
building strategies and tactics13 that had been successful in the US, but were inapplicable 
to its African foundation grantees.  
                                                 
11The two previous capacity building initiatives Ford had implemented on US foundations were the 
Leadership Program (LP) and the Rural Community Foundations Development Initiative (RCFDI).  
12Chen et al. (2013) state that there is a relationship between organizational form (formal or informal) and 
organizational values.  
13Ford instituted the Africa Philanthropy Initiative (API) to provide capacity building support to the new 
foundations that Ford had established in African countries in the late 1990s, many of which were 
floundering. Ford then went on to institute the International Initiative to Strengthen Philanthropy (IISP) in 
6 
 I, therefore, attribute Ford’s failure to meet its local resource mobilization goal in 
African countries14 to its imposition of the foreign (formal) philanthropic foundation 
model, and the foundation’s failure to address the incompatibility between that model and 
the prevalent informal philanthropic/giving cultures in African countries, to facilitate the 
local adaptation of its foundation grantees.    
The Independent Variable: Ford’s Approach and Strategies 
The independent variable in this study is, therefore, the philanthropy promotion 
approach that Ford employed in African countries. It was top-down,15 disconnected from, 
and uninformed by, the local socio-economic and cultural environment and norms in 
African countries. The Ford-founded African philanthropies’ lack of local roots and 
social embeddedness, and their subsequent lack of local resource mobilization 
effectiveness can be explained by that approach, which consisted of transferring and 
transplanting the American-inspired foundation philanthropy model to African countries 
with little consideration for the existing local philanthropic practices, values and 
institutions in place.16 It also consisted of applying some techniques of institutional 
isomorphism during the transplantation process. The institutional isomorphism ensured 
the transplants’ conformity with formal organizational requirements and standards but 
                                                 
2005 to build on its earlier efforts, this time to support the capacity of many of its funded philanthropies 
around the developing world. Both of these were modeled on two previous initiatives in the US.  
14As indicated by the failure of its African foundation grantees to attract the expected large-scale local 
financial support; failure to mobilize at least 50% of their resources from local sources 
15“Top-down” here means that Ford brought the ideas for developing institutional philanthropy in Africa 
from its US experience and transplanted the foreign institutional model without recourse to the already 
existing local African philanthropic structures and practices on the ground.   
16The CS Mott Foundation, which propagated the community foundation concept in South Africa and other 
parts of the world, stated in a special report titled “Sowing the Seeds of Local Philanthropy: 20 Years of 
Experience in the Community Foundation Field”: “Our experience has given us some insights…We have 
discovered, through trial and error, that you can’t take an American idea, export it and replicate it exactly. 
It must be shaped by the local community, values, traditions and needs.” p. 3 Available online at 
CSMFPublication19.pdf  
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left little room for local adaptation and constituency-building for local resource 
mobilization.  
The Dependent Variable: Extent of Ford’s Effectiveness 
The dependent variable to be explained is the extent of the Ford Foundation’s 
effectiveness (across various dimensions) in achieving its philanthropy-promotion 
objectives in sub-Saharan African countries during the period under consideration.  Ford 
did succeed in transferring formal institutional structures and logics to the African 
foundations, thus equipping them to run according to acceptable international standards 
and to attract huge grants from international donors. The structures and skills included 
governance/board structures, managerial/leadership skills, grantmaking structures, and 
proposal writing skills for fundraising from international donors. These features were 
easily transferred through training because they were formal and were not shaped by or 
attached to local cultures and individual beliefs and values. 
In contrast, Ford was unsuccessful in helping its African foundation grantees to 
position themselves in the local philanthropic landscape to mobilize the bulk of their 
resources from within their countries, though that was a key reason for establishing them. 
It failed to provide funding for the context-specific capacity-building that its foundation 
grantees needed to acquire organizational social capital, to be able to attract substantial 
local giving. It did not consider the fact that charitable giving habits are embedded in 
informal socio-cultural and socio-economic norms (Smith and Grønbjerg 2006; Katz 
1994; Hammack and Heydemann 2009) that are inaccessible to foreign-inspired 
philanthropic foundations with a lot of formal training, but few local roots. 
8 
The variation in the outcome consists, therefore, of Ford’s relative effectiveness 
in developing its African foundation grantees into well-managed and well-governed 
grantmaking institutions, on the one hand, and, on the other, its ineffectiveness in 
developing them into locally-supported self-sustaining institutions able to attract local 
charitable resources on a large scale.   
Conceptualization of the Dependent Variable: Foundation Effectiveness 
Organizational effectiveness is not a monolithic concept (Lecy et al. 2012). 
Likewise, effectiveness in the nonprofit sector is a complex issue around which there is 
no consensus (Slater et al. 2004; Frumkin 2006). Lecy et al.’s (2012) review of the 
literature on nonprofit organization17 effectiveness concluded that there is hardly any 
adequate definition of effectiveness as a measure of organizational success in the field.  
Indeed, Ostrower (2007) argues in her work on philanthropic foundations that foundation 
effectiveness is context-dependent, as the different types of foundations18 have different 
functions and goals, and, therefore, define their success or effectiveness differently. 
Another problem with measuring effectiveness in the nonprofit sector is the 
question of whose effectiveness is at issue --- the funding agencies/donors’ (such as the 
Ford Foundation) or their grantees’ (McIlnay 1998; Frumkin 2006). While some 
definitions focus on the efficiency and effectiveness of the programmatic work of the 
recipient organizations/grantees, others focus on the quality of grantmaking, and how 
well donors themselves are doing at achieving their stated goals (Frumkin 2006). To 
                                                 
17Philanthropic foundations are regarded as civil society organizations (CSOs) as they are often vehicles for 
individuals and corporations to mobilize and distribute resources for public purposes (Prewitt 2009; 
Frumkin 2006) 
18Philanthropic foundations can be classified broadly into two categories: private independent foundations 
such as the Ford Foundation or the Lilly Endowment (which are usually endowed by individuals, families 
or corporate entities) and community foundations (which raise their funds from a variety of sources and 
may or may not have an endowment).   
9 
determine why the Ford Foundation’s philanthropy promotion efforts fell short of 
producing the expected local resource mobilization outcomes in African countries, this 
study employs both definitions of effectiveness: that of the founder/donor (the Ford 
Foundation) and that of its grantees (the selected Ford-founded African foundations). I 
use its foundation grantees’ effectiveness along key dimensions as the indicator for 
assessing the extent to which the Ford Foundation itself has been effective at using its 
capacity-building initiatives to develop its foundation grantees into the locally-supported 
self-sustaining African philanthropic foundations that it had set out to build in the 1990s 
and early 2000s. I base my assessment of Ford’s effectiveness on its foundation grantees’ 
assessment of their founder/donor’s performance in the key areas. This follows 
Stufflebeam (2001:18) who suggests that objectives-based studies “can be strengthened 
by judging project objectives against the intended beneficiaries’ assessed needs… and 
studying the process as well as the outcomes”. 
Despite the “elusiveness” of the concept (Ostrower 2007; Lecy et al. 2012) 
scholars have developed approaches for determining organizational effectiveness, 
including the goal attainment/objectives-based approach (Stufflebeam 2001) and the 
system-resource (survival and organizational growth) perspective (Lecy et al. 2012).  
Under the goal attainment perspective, organizational effectiveness is determined by 
progress towards the organization’s stated goals. The system-resource approach links 
goal attainment to organizational survival by assuming that organizations achieving their 
goals are also likely to receive continued financial support. This study adopts both the 
goal attainment perspective and the system-resource approach. The former framed the 
measurement of Ford’s effectiveness at attaining its stated local resource mobilization 
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goal in African countries in the 1990s, while the latter helped frame how effective Ford’s 
foundation grantees were in attracting support (local and international) as per the system-
resource approach.  
Dimensions of the Dependent Variable  
Five dimensions that scholars have developed for measuring foundation 
effectiveness include managerial effectiveness (Lewis 2001), board effectiveness 
(Herman and Renz 1999), grantmaking effectiveness (Ostrower 2007; Ford Foundation 
2006), resource mobilization effectiveness (Ostrower 2007; Ford Foundation 2006), and 
endowment-building effectiveness (Ostrower 2007; Fleishman 2007; Frumkin 2006). 
Broadly speaking, therefore, foundation effectiveness includes good governance and 
effective management, organizational survival19, attractiveness to international donors, as 
well as the mobilization of local resources. In all of this, the ability of an organization to 
mobilize its resources from the local environment is the most critical for effectiveness, 
survival, and long-term sustainability (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). However, because 
studies on resource mobilization in the nonprofit sector have mostly focused on 
philanthropic institutions in developed economies (Froelich 1999; Moulton and Eckerd 
2012) there has been little differentiation in the nonprofit sector literature between 
resource mobilization per se, and local resource mobilization. 20 I make that distinction in 
                                                 
19Some the former Ford Foundation officials interviewed for this study were quick to point at the continued 
existence of the Ford-founded African philanthropies and their effective grantmaking (channeling donor 
funds) as a sign of success. When asked about local resource mobilization, though, they admitted that that 
did not work out as expected.  
20Nonprofit organizations in developed economies, such as the US, tend to mobilize all their resources from 
within their own countries. 
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this study and highlight local resource mobilization as a critical dimension for measuring 
the effectiveness of philanthropic foundations in developing economies.21 
Without downplaying the other dimensions of foundation effectiveness, I 
conceptualize and highlight local resource mobilization as the most important measure of 
effectiveness for the African philanthropic institutions under study. In the same vein, the 
key indicator of Ford’s success (or otherwise) in its philanthropy promotion and 
foundation-building program in African countries is the local resource mobilization 
effectiveness of its foundation grantees. This is measured by the extent to which the Ford 
Foundation (1) equipped its foundation grantees with context-specific capacity to 
mobilize the bulk of their resources locally; (2) helped them to “cultivate the field” 
through local constituency-building; (3) assisted them with resources to hire local fund 
development professionals; and (4) the actual amount of local resources its foundation 
grantees mobilized as a proportion of total revenue  
Theorizing the Outcome of Institutional Transplantations 
Whereas there is a rich literature on institutional transplantations in other areas of 
academic endeavor, scholarly work on the effectiveness of transplanted institutional 
models in the philanthropic foundation literature is limited.22 To understand, therefore, 
                                                 
21Scholars have found that the credibility, legitimacy, and long-term survival of civil society organizations, 
including philanthropic foundations, hinges on their ability to embed themselves in their local societies, 
gain trust and organizational social capital, and attract local financial support (Parks 2008; Edwards 2009; 
Schneider 2009; Fowler 1992; Ottaway 2000. Hager et al. 2004). This is especially true in the context of 
developing countries where the concept of philanthropic foundations was new in the 1990s and early 2000s 
and where the legitimacy of imported/transplanted philanthropic organizational models was problematic 
(Johnson et al. 2004).   
22The few works on the transfer of foreign philanthropic institutional logics to developing countries have 
focused more on the use of philanthropy as a foreign policy and ideological tool than on the effectiveness 
of the exported institutional models. See, for example, Berman (1983) and Arnove (1984). Heydemann and 
Hammack’s (2009) edited book, though a great attempt at filling the gap, focuses on NGOs and CSOs in 
general; and does not tackle the transfer of the philanthropic foundation model to developing countries in 
the 1990s.  
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how transplanting an institutional model from one context to another affects the 
transplant’s effectiveness in the recipient society, I relied on theoretical perspectives from 
areas outside the philanthropic foundation literature, including comparative law, policy, 
civil society, and institutional economics. This literature (combined) provided a 
framework for gaining insights into the Ford Foundation’s introduction of the 
philanthropic foundation model from an industrialized context (America) to non-
industrialized African countries with socio-cultural environments where informal forms 
of social exchange are prevalent. More importantly, this literature helped to explain why 
Ford’s transplanted foundations in African countries could not perform as expected23 and 
were ineffective at local resource mobilization in the selected African countries.   
Comparative Law Literature on Institutional Transplantations 
One group of legal scholars24 posit that legal precepts and institutions can be 
easily (and successfully) transplanted across cultures (Watson 1974). These “law as 
autonomous of society” proponents argue that laws are just sets of bare propositional 
statements that are autonomous from historical, social and cultural structures, with no 
attachment to any particular society (Dowdle 2008). Legal transplants can, therefore, 
thrive and perform well in any social context. This argument coincides with the 
assumptions behind international donors’ transplantation of the American-inspired 
professionalized foundation model in developing (including African) countries in the late 
1980s and 1990s. It helps us appreciate the international donors’ reasoning that, in a 
                                                 
23Ford had expected that these foundations would be able to mobilize the bulk of their resources from 
within African countries, just as foundations in the US mobilize the bulk of their resources from within 
their own country.  
24In comparative law, legal transfers “are generally understood as the movement of laws and institutional 
structures across geopolitical, cultural or religious borders” (Gillepsie 2008: 27).   
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globalized world, models of philanthropic institutions that have been successful in the 
industrialized world could be introduced into developing and transitional societies and 
expected to produce similar outcomes as in the country of origin (Katz 1994b; The Ford 
Foundation 1998; 2006).  
On their part, the “law in context” scholars have argued that law (like other social 
institutions) is culturally embedded in societal beliefs (Legrand 1997; Sharlet 1998; 
Berkowitz et al. 2001). They espouse the mirror theory of law which posits that laws 
mirror/reflect the environment from which they emerge, that they have limited autonomy 
from societal economic, political, and moral influences, and are closely bound to 
particular cultures (Legrand 1997).  According to this school of thought, laws transferred 
across borders cannot have successful outcomes in the new environment, where they lack 
the socio-cultural context from which they originally emerged. Such transplanted laws, 
therefore, end up diverging from the original model (Legrand 1997; Pistor and Wellons 
1999; Teubner 1998).  
Empirical studies on the transfer of constitutional models from the West to 
Eastern Europe (Russia and the Newly Independent States) in the 1990s concluded that 
the transfer failed because the American Constitution (which was the preferred 
transferred model) came out of specific historical circumstances in America and could, 
therefore, not be successfully transferred to the different historical and institutional 
environments in Eastern and Central Europe (Sharlet 1998; Katz 1994).  As Robert 
Sharlet (1998) explains:  
The reception of Western constitutional ideas did not proceed as smoothly 
as anticipated…, by either donors or donees… It had been assumed -- in 
retrospect, naively -- that new, liberal post-Soviet constitutions could be 
put in place relatively quickly and easily … Forgotten in the mutual rush 
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to borrow and lend were the indigenous cultural scrims, and even more-
opaque barriers through or over which liberal constitutional concepts 
would have to pass in order to enter each society (Sharlet 1998:59). 
 
However, notwithstanding their stance on the “impossibility” of successful legal 
transfers, Legrand (1997) and others admit that some laws may be successfully 
transferred, but only under certain conditions. There needs to be congruence or a “fit” 
between the exporting country’s political, legal, economic, and cultural institutions, and 
those of the recipient country (Legrand 1997; Kahn-Freund 1974). In other words, the 
exporting and importing countries must belong to the same “family”25 (De Jong & 
Mamadouh 2002). Given the differences in their historical trajectories and socio-
economic development (which are context and path dependent), the US and African 
countries do not belong to the same “family.” The concept of “families of nations” 
provides insights into why institutional models exported from the United States and 
transplanted into African or Central and Eastern European countries would, for example, 
be expected to encounter local difficulties and perform poorly in the recipient countries.  
Berkowitz et al. (2001) also found that countries that have a population that was 
already familiar with the basic legal principles of a transplanted law (i.e. whose previous 
laws were similar to the transplanted one) go on to build effective legal systems and 
display higher overall institutional quality. Alternatively, countries that receive foreign 
legal systems (transplants) without similar pre-dispositions in their local environment (i.e. 
countries that are not members of the same family) are much more constrained in their 
ability to develop the formal legal order; and will have greater difficulties in developing 
                                                 
25Nations sharing common historical and institutional features are deemed to be members of the same 
“family” who could successfully borrow and transplant institutional models from one another (De Jong and 
Mamadouh 2002) 
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effective legal systems. In the public policy arena, De Jong and Mamadouh (2002:20) 
also found that “newly introduced policies copied or adopted from elsewhere have 
unforeseen consequences.” They emphasize that the compatibility of the policy transplant 
with its new institutional environment is vital to its success.  
The above theoretical perspectives suggest that since philanthropy, like law, is a 
socio-cultural construct, transferring a philanthropic institutional model into a country 
where the people are not predisposed towards the values and structures of the new model 
could be fraught with difficulties for the transplant’s performance.  
Civil Society Literature on Institutional Transplantations  
Scholars writing about international funders’ establishment of nongovernmental 
(NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs) in developing and transitional countries 
have also employed variants of the “goodness of fit”/compatibility argument to explain 
the inability of the donor-founded/funded organizations to attract local financial and 
moral support (Ottaway 2000; Johnson et al. 2004; Holmén 2010). They point to 
transplanted institutions’ lack of organizational social capital, connectedness with their 
local constituents, and minimal embeddedness in their local socio-economic and socio-
cultural environment (Ottaway 2000; Quigley 2000; Edwards 2009; Nezhina and 
Ibrayeva 2013; Brown and Kalegaonkar 1999; Baum and Oliver 1992). Given that 
philanthropic foundations are also civil society organizations (Prewitt 2009) and are 
reflective of the institutional environments out of which they emerge, it is conceivable 
that the transfer of American-inspired philanthropic foundations to African countries 
would result in a lack of social embeddedness in the recipient countries; and difficulty 
attracting financial support from the local populace.  
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Institutional Economics Literature on Transplant Performance 
Finally, scholars in the field of Institutional Economics also offer a variant of the 
“goodness of fit” argument which focuses on the formal/informal dimensions of 
institutions and their contextual environments. They ascribe the failure of institutional 
transfers to the fact that the formal framework transplanted onto recipient societies does 
not ﬁt well with the corresponding prevalent informal institutional framework (North 
1991; 1994; Mukand and Rodrik 2002; Roland 2004; Greif 1998). Institutions, according 
to these scholars, consist of both (1) informal constraints, such as customs, traditions, and 
codes of conduct; and (2) formal rules, which include constitutions, laws, etc. Together, 
formal and informal institutions make up the institutional complex, which then creates 
the conditions for the emergence of new organizations. Since existing informal norms 
and customs must undergird formal institutions for them to perform as expected, the latter 
will not work well if taken from their original institutional context and transposed on 
informal institutions (customs, norms and codes of conduct) in a different environment 
(North 1991; 1994).   
North’s position on this is worth quoting as it encapsulates one of the clearest 
explanations for the non-performance of transplanted institutional models, and helps 
illuminate the case under study:  
It is the admixture of formal rules, informal norms, and enforcement 
characteristics that shapes economic performance… It is the [informal] 
norms that provide "legitimacy" to a set of [formal] rules … And 
economies that adopt the formal rules of another economy will have very 
different performance characteristics than the first economy because of 
different informal norms and enforcement. The implication is that 
transferring the formal political and economic rules of successful Western 
market economies to third-world and Eastern European economies is not a 
sufficient condition for good economic performance (North 1994:366).  
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All in all, the above theoretical viewpoints and perspectives from the legal, policy, civil 
society and institutional economics literature on institutional transplantations suggest that 
the quality of transplants’ performance in a new environment will fail to meet 
expectations when (1)  there is no congruence or “goodness of fit” between the 
transplanted institution and the political, socio-economic, and socio-cultural structures of 
the recipient country; (2) the originating country and the recipient country do not belong 
to the same “family”; and (3) formal institutions from one context are superimposed on 
the informal ones of a different institutional environment.  
Foundation Philanthropy vs. African Giving Cultures 
While the legal, civil society and institutional economics literature on institutional 
transplantations provided insights into why transplanted institutions fail to perform well 
in recipient societies, I drew on the nonprofit and philanthropy literature to help show 
how much “fit” or incongruence to expect between the formal institutional (foundation) 
philanthropy model that Ford exported to African countries, and the prevailing informal 
institutions of African philanthropy.  
Studies show that institutional philanthropy in the United States, including the 
modern philanthropic foundation, emerged out of the country’s historical, economic, 
political and social evolution (Prewitt 1999; Karl and Katz 1981; Hall 2006), implying 
that it is context specific. Smith and Grønbjerg (2006) have also argued that the nature of 
nonprofit and philanthropic institutions in any given country depends on the nature of 
existing institutional relations in the country. Where large formal bureaucratic institutions 
dominate, such as in the US, the nonprofit and philanthropic sector will tend to be 
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characterized by large, bureaucratic, “impersonal, formal structures” (Smith and 
Grønbjerg 2006: 223) such as the modern American philanthropic foundation.  
In the same way, philanthropic organization, practices, and values in other 
countries (including sub-Saharan African countries) have emerged from, and been shaped 
by, their own history, culture, political past, religions, as well as their socio-economic 
circumstances (Atingdui; James 1987; Smith and Grønbjerg 2006; Anheier and Salamon 
2006; Kanyinga et al. 2007; Darkwa et al. 2006). In societies that are dominated by 
“more intimate social institutions and primary relationships, such as those found in tribal 
groups or village societies” nonprofit and philanthropic institutions are expected to 
correspond to the institutional structure of their wider society; and will be small and 
informal, rather than large and bureaucratic (Smith and Grønbjerg 2006: 223). Since 
many African countries are still dominated by “intimate social institutions and primary 
relationships” we should expect the philanthropic institutions that emerge organically in 
those countries to be small and informal. Based on the context-specific nature of its 
original institutional environment in the US and its formal organizational structure, the 
American-inspired philanthropic foundation that Ford introduced into African countries 
would be expected to differ from the informal philanthropic structures prevalent in 
African countries.  
Differences in Giving Norms and Values  
The literature on indigenous African philanthropy and social exchange indicate 
that Africans’ ways of giving and “doing charity” are different from the formalized, 
bureaucratized, and professionalized forms of organized philanthropy that the Ford 
Foundation introduced into African countries in the 1990s. Unlike the formal, 
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impersonal, unidirectional, and  nonreciprocal grantmaking processes of professionalized 
foundations, the norms and values that undergird African philanthropic practices include 
(but are not limited to) interpersonal relationships between givers and recipients, 
interdependence, reciprocity, solidarity, and a strong attachment of donors to their own 
community and/or place of origin (Hyden 2006; Feierman 1998; Honey and Okafor 1998; 
MacLean 2010; Ngondi-Houghton 2005; Komter 2005).   
One important characteristic that differentiates traditional African forms of giving 
from the formal giving and grantmaking processes associated with philanthropic 
foundations is disintermediation (a preference on the part of African givers for direct 
exchanges between benefactors and beneficiaries). The mediation of professionalized 
philanthropic institutions separates the original donor from the beneficiaries, fosters 
donor anonymity, and leads to the loss of personal gratitude, which is necessary for the 
reciprocity that is so important in African philanthropy (Atibil 2013). The interpersonal 
relationship-building values in African cultures that motivate charitable giving in those 
countries are incompatible with the impersonal mediated giving associated with the 
formal philanthropic foundation form that Ford exported to African countries.  
Another difference is the tendency for philanthropy in African societies to involve 
resource-pooling in voluntary associational settings, rather than resource mobilization in 
professional organizational settings (Little 1965; Honey and Okafor 1998; Kanyinga et al. 
2007). Examples of this volunteer-led resource-pooling include harambees in Kenya, 
mutual aid mechanisms like the susu26 in West Africa, as well as stokvels and burial 
societies in Southern Africa (Kuljian 2013; Hyden 2006; Ngondi-Houghton 2005). 
                                                 
26These associations are also known as Rotating Savings and Credit Organizations (ROSCOs) 
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Furthermore, unlike formal philanthropic foundations that need to be established and 
regulated by law (formal rules), the informal institutions of African philanthropy are self-
organized and self-regulating, emerging in an un-designed (but not disorganized) way 
through structured interactions between agents (Hodgson 2006).   
Moreover, unlike modern foundation philanthropy which emerged from wealth 
accumulation27 in the US and is sustained by huge sums of money, philanthropic practice 
in African societies is not dependent on wealth. It involves most people in the 
community, regardless of their level of wealth (Copeland-Carson 2005; Johnson et al. 
2004; Kuljian 2005; Everatt et al. 2005). This is because both instrumental and 
expressive giving are valued in the African context (Frumkin 2006). Whereas giving to 
philanthropic foundations is mostly instrumental (giving cash or in-kind donations for a 
defined tangible public purpose); there are many opportunities for expressive giving in 
African societies that do not involve cash exchanges (Wilkinson-Maposa et al. 2005; 
Payton and Moody 2008).   
Lastly, Wilkinson-Maposa et al.’s (2005) distinction between “horizontal 
philanthropy” and “vertical philanthropy” in their study of Southern African 
philanthropic practices is useful in distinguishing between the various types of informal 
exchanges within African societies/communities (horizontal) and the formal philanthropy 
embodied by philanthropic foundations (vertical). In view of their professionalized and 
bureaucratic set up (as well as their foreign origins), donor-founded philanthropic 
                                                 
27The modern philanthropic foundation emerged in the United States in the era of massive wealth 
accumulation in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Industrialists such as John D. Rockefeller and Andrew 
Carnegie wanted to rationalize and institutionalize their giving to make their wealth go farther to improve 
the human condition. Foundation philanthropy, as a variant of organized philanthropy, has therefore 
necessarily been dependent on having access to huge sums of money. The literature shows that this is not 
the case with the prevalent philanthropic structures in African societies.  
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institutions tend to be viewed as external institutional actors mobilizing resources from 
elsewhere to help poor local communities in a top-down manner. In “vertical” (formal) 
foundation philanthropy, the communities become grant recipients, but fail to become 
donors; as they hardly identify with the logic of the benefactor foundations; or see them 
as appropriate vehicles for reciprocal giving in true African fashion.  
Overall, the literature suggests that the organizational structure, norms, and values 
of indigenous African philanthropic institutions are distinct from the formal bureaucratic 
structures and institutional logics of the American foundation model (Chen et al. 2013). 
The philanthropic practices and traditions (institutions) in the recipient African countries 
were thus unrelated to the formal structures of the imposed American philanthropic 
model. It should be expected, therefore, that the latter would be incompatible with the 
former; and that it would be challenging for the prevailing informal philanthropic systems 
and structures in African countries to provide the kind of support (financial and 
otherwise) that the transplanted formal American-inspired foundations required.   
Receptivity and Adaptation to the Local Soil 
The literature identifies local receptivity28 and adaptation as solutions to the 
challenges associated with cross-cultural institutional transfers. Again, I draw on the 
comparative law, policy, and civil society/NGO literature for insights. According to 
scholars, the transplanting process itself29 and local actors’ ability to adapt the formal 
transplant to local conditions, are critical for successful outcomes (Berkowitz et al. 2001; 
Teubner 1998; De Jong and Mamadouh 2002). In order for the transplanted institution to 
survive and perform well in its new environment, it must be carefully adapted to the 
                                                 
28They define “receptivity” as the recipient country’s ability to give meaning to the imported concept.  
29How it was carried out and whether the transplanting agent made room for local adaptation or not.  
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underlying socio-economic and political structures (Katz 1994; Teubner 1998; Sharlet 
1998; Gillepsie 2008; Berkowitz et al. 2001). 30  
Gillepsie (2008) underscores the importance of locals imprinting their beliefs and 
understandings on new concepts to make the latter work effectively in the new 
environment. He states that the way transplants appear to a recipient community is 
conditioned by how the recipients interpret them from their own sets of beliefs, practices 
and goals. The recipients’ deeply-held beliefs determine “what ideas, arguments, and 
facts members find compelling” and adoptable (Gillepsie 2008:42). De Jong and 
Mamadouh (2002: 30) also emphasize the critical role of the adjustment and adaptation 
process in the successful receptivity of new concepts by new hosts: 
When local actors have less opportunities to adapt models to their 
situation, the transplantation process is likely to lead to resistance, non-
compliance and/or ineffective outcomes. When local actors have more 
opportunities to adjust the transplant the process is facilitated. 
 
Dowdle’s (2008:172) emphasis on the necessity for “careful implantation and 
cultivation” of transplants in local soils aptly summarizes the thinking of scholars from 
the various disciplines on the pre-conditions for successful implementation and adoption 
of new institutional transplants in recipient societies.   
 In the specific context of African countries, scholars who have investigated the 
transplantation of legal and various types of economic and social institutions in African 
countries have also documented the need for local adaptation as a prerequisite for the 
effectiveness of transplants in new environments. Whether it was the imposition of 
foreign legal systems on colonized African peoples (Merry 1988), the imposition of 
                                                 
30In the short to medium term it is much more difficult to try to modify the informal local cultures and 
traditions to suit the formal imported models/transplants (Hodges 2006).  
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foreign land tenure and property tax systems on the Siin region of west-central Senegal 
by the French colonial powers (Galvan 1997), or the establishment of NGOs, CSOs and 
new systems of NGO governance in African countries (Ottaway 2000; Swidler 2006; 
Galvan 2007) these scholars found that when transplanted models were infused with local 
values, meanings, and logics, and adapted to the relevant local cultural environment, they 
proved to be more successful than imported institutions and logics that resisted local 
adaptation. 
Just like the “goodness of fit” perspective, the above scholars’ take on 
institutional adaptation is applicable to Ford’s transplantation of the American-inspired 
philanthropic foundation model in African countries.  Philanthropic foundation models 
exported to African countries from the US (or other Western contexts) without much 
adaptation to the local institutional environment are likely not to find congruence or “fit” 
with the prevalent African philanthropic traditions. Continuing the horticultural analogy 
stated at the beginning, the American-inspired transplants will most likely not find fertile 
soil in the African socio-economic, socio-cultural, and political landscape to be able to 
perform effectively unless they adapt to the local environment. This dissertation argues 
that the Ford Foundation failed to do what was needed during the transplantation process 
(and afterwards during its capacity-building initiatives) to facilitate local receptivity and 
adaptation of the foreign model to the African socio-cultural environment.  
Alternative Explanations  
In contrast to the above “goodness of fit” literature which attributes the 
ineffectiveness of transplanted institutions to the tension or incongruence between 
foreign-inspired transplanted models and existing norms and cultures in recipient 
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countries, the current explanations in the CSO and NGO literature revolve around the 
failure of recipient countries to replicate the formal structural and institutional conditions 
that govern the transplanted models in their country of origin. These explanations are 
often state-centric (what the state needs to provide to encourage the development of 
institutional philanthropy). They tend to ignore the effect of the local indigenous 
philanthropic institutions and practices in place, hardly touching on the challenges of 
trying to develop institutional philanthropy by transferring institutional models (with their 
own logics and values) from their original context to a completely different one. 31 
Economic Explanations 
One of the oft-cited explanations for the inability of donor-founded/funded 
philanthropic institutions to attract substantial local philanthropic support in African 
countries is the poor economic conditions in many of the countries (McCarthy 1984; 
Johnson et al. 2004; The Ford Foundation 2006). This argument points at (1) high levels 
of poverty among the population, and (2) the lack of a middle class, both resulting in few 
individuals having disposable income to participate in philanthropic giving. This 
argument presupposes that philanthropic giving in African countries is based on being 
wealthy and having disposable income. It also presupposes that philanthropic giving has 
to go through formal philanthropic institutions; so that if people are not donating to 
foundations or other such organizations, then they are not participating in philanthropy.  
Other scholars have, however, rejected the notion that philanthropy in African 
countries is somehow dependent on individual wealth (Ngondi-Houghton 2005; 
                                                 
31Unlike the alternative explanations which fault the recipient countries for not providing an enabling 
environment, “the goodness-of-fit” literature implicitly holds institutional transplanting agents --- 
international donors and other global actors --- responsible for ensuring that there is a fit between the 
institution they are transplanting and the recipient society in order to enhance the success of the transplant.  
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Wilkinson-Maposa et al. 2005; Kuljian 2005). Kuljian (2005) cites a survey in South 
Africa which found that the ‘poor and non-poor respondents were equally likely to have 
given in the month prior to being interviewed;” and concludes that “giving is not the 
domain of the wealthy: it is part of everyday life for all South Africans, rich and poor 
alike’ (Kuljian 2005:7). MacLean’s (2010) work on informal networks and reciprocity in 
Ghana found that individuals of all levels of wealth gave informally to support their 
neighbors and their communities. Ngondi-Houghton (2005) also points out that while 
there is little local giving to donor-founded CSOs, Kenyans do give directly to their 
communities for public purposes through harambees, and to their places of worship. She 
suggests that “with greater and better organized cultivation of individual philanthropy, 
local civil society [organizations] could mobilize larger sums from among individual 
Kenyans” (Ngondi-Houghton 2005:72). The issue, therefore, is not that Kenyans, 
Ghanaians, and other Africans, are not able to participate in charitable giving due to 
poverty (as this explanation claims), but that donor-founded/funded philanthropic 
institutions have not been successful at attracting their generosity.  
On the lack of an African middle class with sufficient money to make substantial 
donations to donor-founded philanthropies (Johnson et al. 2004), the literature shows 
otherwise. Lukham et al. (2005) have documented the existence of a Ghanaian middle 
class from early in the country’s modern history, and Ghanaian elites’ creation of 
associations for philanthropic purposes. Kenneth Little (1965) documented the 
philanthropic activities of such associations, including those formed by urban elites in 
many West African cities. In East Africa Ngondi-Houghton (2005) describes the 
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emergence of a Kenyan middle class in the 1980s that is capable of giving substantial 
amounts to philanthropy: 
Since the emergence of a middle class in Kenya in the mid-1980s, the 
number of people who are in a position to donate money to charitable 
causes has grown steadily. …There is a good deal of wealth held by 
individuals who would like to share it with compatriots but who need to be 
aware of effective methods of doing so (Ngondi-Houghton 2005:71). 
 
Though the economic explanations are not without merit, their explanatory 
power is somehow limited. They would be most useful for explaining the amounts 
of money that individuals are able to give to donor-founded philanthropic 
institutions but would not be that useful in explaining why individuals would (or 
would not) be moved to contribute to donor-founded philanthropic organizations 
or CSOs. For example, if large numbers of individuals in African countries gave 
to donor-founded philanthropic institutions but were able to give only small 
amounts, high levels of poverty or the lack of a large middle class would be a 
good explanation. However, if only a few individuals gave anything at all to these 
organizations, economic factors alone would not be an adequate explanation. 
Whereas people’s level of wealth affects how much they are able to contribute to 
charity, it rarely determines whether or not to give, and to whom (or to which 
organization) to give.  
Regulatory and Legal Explanations 
 Another alternative explanation argues that the lack of laws and regulations 
germane to the registration and establishment of NGOs and CSOs (including 
philanthropic foundations) has hampered the development of organized philanthropy and 
local sources of funding in many African countries (The Ford Foundation 2006; Johnson 
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et al. 2004; McCarty 1988; Malombe 2000). The legal and regulatory argument is, 
however, weakened by the fact that charitable giving by individuals in African countries 
is, for the most part, informal (Feierman 1998; MacLean 2010; Wilkinson-Maposa et al. 
2005; Hyden 2006; Moyo 2013). The lack of an enabling formal legal and regulatory 
environment would impact the establishment, registration, and functioning of donor-
founded/funded organizations.  
The lack of laws ensuring the accountability of formal philanthropic organizations 
to donors could affect local giving to such organizations; but in the informal giving 
environment prevalent in African countries such a situation would hardly have much of 
an impact on who gives, to whom (or to which organization), and how much. This is seen 
in the fact that self-organized volunteer-led philanthropic organizations in African 
countries attract and mobilize the bulk of their resources locally in the same “weak” legal 
and regulatory environment (Honey and Okafor 1998; Ngondi-Houghton 2005; 
Wilkinson-Maposa et al. 2005; Kanyinga et al. 2007; Kuljian 2013). There must, 
therefore, be stronger explanations for why donor-founded/funded institutions have 
difficulty attracting local giving where homegrown philanthropic organizations and 
associations have been successful.  
Tax Incentives Explanation  
The lack of fiscal policy and tax incentives for individual and corporate giving in 
many developing countries has also been cited as an obstacle to donor-founded 
philanthropies’ local resource mobilization effectiveness (The Ford Foundation 2006; 
Johnson et al. 2004; Ngondi-Houghton 2004; 2005; Fowler 1992). These scholars 
observe that (unlike the US) many developing countries offer no tax deductibility to 
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donors. There is, however, a lack of empirical support for the efficacy of tax incentives as 
a stimulant for charitable giving in developing and developed economies alike (Frumkin 
2006; Johnson et al. 2004). While tax incentives may influence the amount to give, they 
hardly influence the initial decision to give, and whom to give to. As Johnson et al. 
(2004:10) explain, “… there is limited evidence supporting, or agreement about, the 
correlation between a favorable legal and tax environment and an increased volume of 
philanthropic giving.”  
Moreover, in developing country environments where only a small proportion of 
the population (those in formal employment) pay taxes to the state and/or prepare tax 
returns, the existence of tax incentives would not necessarily steer local donors towards 
philanthropic foundations or other foreign-inspired formal philanthropic institutions. 
Nevertheless, while tax incentives may not necessarily increase the number of 
rank and file givers to donor-founded philanthropic institutions, incentives for tax 
deductibility could be attractive to wealthy individuals and corporate donors in 
developing countries who are most likely to prepare tax returns. Like other alternative 
explanations discussed above, the fiscal explanation does have some merit, but is 
inadequate by itself to explain why donor-founded philanthropic institutions attract little 
local funding in African (and other developing) countries.  
Lack of Trust in Formal Institutions   
One alternative explanation that comes close to acknowledging the importance of 
givers/donors’ values in the giving relationship (Ostrander and Schervish 1990) is the one 
about the lack of trust in formal institutions due to prevalent corruption in public places 
(McCarthy 1988; Fowler 1994; Hodges 2013; Lukalo-Owino 2008; Johnson et al. 2004). 
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According to this view, locals are wary of making charitable donations to 
professionalized philanthropic institutions for fear that their money will go towards huge 
salaries and emoluments; rather than towards the execution of programs (McCarthy 
1988). This explanation does have merit but does not go far enough. Other scholars go 
further to attribute the lack of trust in formal political, administrative, and other 
institutions in African countries to the fact that these institutions were external 
impositions that have been incongruent with the informal political and social institutions 
that many Africans are still connected to (Ekeh 1975).  
The distrust for public institutions argument (though a viable explanation for the 
lack of local financial support for unfamiliar foreign-inspired philanthropic institutions) 
is, therefore, also inadequate. It does not address the fact that this distrust itself goes back 
to the tension between foreign transplanted formal institutions, on the one hand; and the 
prevalent indigenous informal ones, on the other. In other words, the current formulation 
of this argument fails to address the tension between the civic and “primordial” publics in 
African countries (Ekeh 1975).  
Limitations of the Alternative Explanations 
The alternative arguments are not entirely without merit and could provide 
varying degrees of explanations for the lack of local financial support for donor-founded 
philanthropic institutions and charitable organizations in developing economies. 
However, focused as most of them are on the need for formal governmental rules and 
regulations, they fail to factor in the interaction (and tensions) between the values and 
practices associated with the formal transplanted philanthropies, on the one hand; and 
those of the existing informal philanthropic institutions and giving cultures of the host 
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societies, on the other. They also fail to address the context-specific institutional 
framework in host countries.  
The state-centric perspectives are also limited in assuming that the creation of a 
formal “enabling environment” for institutional philanthropy (like what pertains in the 
US) 32 would make the transplanted foundations attractive to African donors, regardless 
of the differences in giving values and practices (especially the informal nature of local 
giving). Unlike the “goodness of fit” and local adaptation theories which emphasize the 
need for compatibility between the transplanted and the local institutions as a prerequisite 
for transplant effectiveness, the alternative explanations are weakened by their silence on 
the predominant informal institutions that govern most philanthropic giving in contexts 
outside the US.33  
Ultimately, though the alternative perspectives have a certain level of explanatory 
merit, the perspectives that I use --- the “goodness of fit”, formal/informal institutional 
tensions, local receptivity of transplanted institutions, and the institutional adaptability 
perspectives --- together provide the most appropriate theoretical framework for 
explaining the case under study. They help explain why the Ford Foundation’s attempt to 
use the American-inspired philanthropic foundation model to catalyze large-scale local 
(philanthropic) resource mobilization in African countries failed.  
 
 
                                                 
32For the proponents of these arguments, the enabling environment for institutional philanthropy in the 
United States has been the reference point for what is needed in developing countries to strengthen 
institutional philanthropy in those countries.   
33Studies have found that informal ways of giving exist among African -Americans, ethnic minorities, and 
immigrant communities within the United States (Copeland-Carson 2005; Chao 1999)  
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Contribution to the Literature 
While there is a rich literature on institutional transplantations in other fields 
(including institutional economics, comparative law, constitutional law, public policy, 
and international relations) there is not enough scholarly discourse on cross-cultural 
institutional transplantations in the field of nonprofit and philanthropic studies. This 
despite the attempt by international donors to export American-inspired professionalized 
philanthropic institutions to developing and transitional countries in the 1990s. The 
available work has been rather descriptive (Malombe 2000; Sacks 2000; WINGS 2008; 
2010) with little analytical work on the effectiveness of the transplanted philanthropies 
over time. 34   
There is even less scholarly work on philanthropy (formal and informal alike) in 
African countries. This in-depth analytical study of Ford’s transplantation of 
philanthropic institutions in African countries in the 1990s and early 2000s will 
contribute to the literature on cross-cultural institutional transfers, in general, and to that 
on philanthropic transplantations in non-Western contexts, in particular. It hopes to fill 
the gap in the current state of knowledge on the local resource mobilization effectiveness 
of donor-founded philanthropic transplants in African countries. The overall objective is, 
therefore, to contribute to knowledge-building on the phenomenon of institutional 
transplantations (in this case the transplantation of philanthropic models) from developed 
economies to non-Western landscapes. 
 
                                                 
34These works (usually funded by international donors such as the Ford Foundation) have tended to 
downplay the transplanted/imposed nature of the foundation concept in developing countries. They have 
focused more on promoting the concept than trying to explain why they may not be working as expected.  
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Research Design: Research Strategy and Case Selection 
Case Study Design  
This dissertation is a qualitative case study of the Ford Foundation’s 
philanthropy-promotion and foundation-building program in African countries in the 
1990s. Since an in-depth understanding of Ford’s philanthropy promotion program was 
needed to determine the foundation’s success or failure in catalyzing local resource 
mobilization, the case study design was deemed most suitable. The case study design 
allows for an in-depth exploration and understanding of the complexity of organizations 
and phenomena from multiple perspectives (Starman 2013; Simons 2009; Thomas 2011; 
George and Bennett 2005). One other reason for using the qualitative case study approach 
was because of its suitability for conducting explanatory studies (George and Bennett 
2005; Stufflebeam 2001), and its flexibility in allowing for multiple data collection 
methods. Data triangulation was necessary to minimize data loss and increase data 
accuracy.  
The dissertation was also designed as an embedded single case study (Yin 2003). 
Explaining why Ford was unsuccessful at using the American-inspired foundations that it 
established in African countries to catalyze large-scale local resource mobilization in 
those countries required two steps: (1) an investigation of the foundation’s philanthropy 
promotion approach (the main unit of analysis), and (2) an assessment of the impact of 
this approach on the local resource mobilization effectiveness35of its foundation grantees 
(the subunits of analysis). The embedded single case study design was the most 
appropriate for accommodating the two levels of analysis within the single case (Yin 
                                                 
35As measured by the amount of local resources mobilized as a percentage of total revenue.  
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2003). As Yin (2003:42-43) explains “though a case might be about a single 
organization…the analysis might include outcomes …which would then be the embedded 
units.” The embedded subunits (Ford’s African foundation grantees) provided 
opportunities for greater insights into the main case, the Ford Foundation’s philanthropy 
promotion program in Africa.  
The embedded case study design also made it possible to examine Ford’s 
philanthropy promotion program in Africa not only from the perspective of the Ford 
Foundation itself, but also that of its African foundation grantees. This was important for 
getting a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon from multiple perspectives --- 
that of the donor as well as the grantees.   
Subject Matter Selection: Foundation Philanthropy in Africa 
The transplantation of American-inspired philanthropic institutions in sub-
Saharan Africa in the 1990s was not an isolated phenomenon; it was part of the ongoing 
global phenomenon of international donors and other global actors transferring various 
types of institutions to developing countries, ostensibly, to speed up development in those 
countries. In fact, during the same period that it was establishing foundations in African 
countries, Ford was creating foundations in Latin America, Asia, South America, Central 
and Eastern Europe, the Caribbean, and the Middle East (Johnson et al. 2004; Ford 
Foundation Annual Report 1998; 1999; 2000). Since colonial times African countries 
(like their counterparts in other non-industrialized parts of the world) have been the 
recipients of various transplanted legal, political, economic, and educational institutions 
and concepts that have failed to work as effectively as had been hoped. Was the 
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transplantation of “modern” philanthropic foundations in African countries going to be 
any different?  
While there has been some scholarly interest in the local resource mobilization 
effectiveness of donor-founded NGOs and CSOs in Africa (Fafchamps and Owens 2006; 
Holmén 2010; Fowler 1992; Ottaway 2000) that of the donor-founded/funded 
foundations has received little attention from scholars. Indeed, there has been little 
scholarly work on philanthropy in Africa, and even less work on foundation philanthropy 
and the donor-founded philanthropic institutions on the African continent. The gap in the 
literature presented an opportunity for scholarly inquiry.  
As African countries are characterized by institutional contexts and philanthropic 
institutions and cultures that are distinct from those in the United States, Ford’s African 
foundation grantees looked perfect as subunits for investigating the impact of 
international donors’ exportation of yet another category of Western-inspired institutions 
into African countries. The stark differences between the philanthropic foundation form 
and the local informal African philanthropic norms and practices provided a window of 
opportunity for studying the consequences of transferring philanthropic institutional 
forms from one context to another.  
Rationale for Selecting the Ford Foundation as the Case for Study 
The transplantation of American-style foundations in sub-Saharan African and 
other developing countries was a trend among international donors in the 1990s and 
2000s and was by no means unique to the Ford Foundation (Aksartova 2009; Johnson et 
al. 2004; Henderson 2003). However, I selected Ford for examination rather than the 
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other international funders because, unlike them36 Ford was more consistent in its efforts 
to establish philanthropic foundations in various parts of the world. It had regional field 
offices in Eastern, Western, Northern and Southern Africa. Few other international 
funders had as long a history in institutional philanthropy promotion in developing 
countries as Ford. The foundation, therefore, had a track record that potentially lent itself 
to the systematic study of the phenomenon in question.  
Moreover, though Ford was just one among a core group of international 
funders37 promoting the foundation model in developing countries, its massive 
resources,38 as well as its investment in global capacity-building strategies and initiatives, 
put it ahead of its peers.  Unlike the others, Ford made a long-term commitment (in terms 
of operational, institution-building and grantmaking support) to some of the foundations 
that it established, for up to ten years (Ford Annual Report 2006). Given its long-term 
focus and more elaborate global capacity-building strategies and initiatives, Ford’s effort 
at transplanting American-inspired philanthropic foundations in sub-Saharan African 
countries provided the right long-term timeframe within which to determine the 
effectiveness of such transplantation strategies.  
Ultimately, my selection of Ford as the case for study was based on the potential 
of its philanthropy transplantation program in African countries to provide the best 
opportunity for successfully investigating the phenomenon of interest. As George and 
                                                 
36Some of the other international funders operated in just one or two African countries. The CS Mott 
Foundation, for example, operated only in South Africa.  
37These were mostly major American private foundations (Johnson et al. 2005) 
38Until the Gates Foundation was established in 2000 the Ford Foundation was the largest private 
foundation in the world in terms of assets size.  
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Bennett (2005:83) state, “case selection is an opportunistic as well as a structured 
process…” 
Selection of Ford’s African Foundation Grantees as Subunits of the Case Study 
 The three Ford-founded/funded grantees selected as subunits for the case study 
were the Kenya Community Development Foundation (KCDF), The African Women’s 
Development Fund (AWDF) located in Accra, Ghana, and TrustAfrica, in Dakar, 
Senegal. This was based on their participation in Ford’s signature international 
philanthropy initiative, the International Initiative to Strengthen Philanthropy (IISP). 
Their participation in the IISP signified that they had relatively better organizational 
strength, were active, and had the potential for future growth. Compared to other Ford 
foundation grantees that had not benefitted from participation in Ford’s initiatives, these 
three benefitted most from Ford’s long-term support in terms of strengthening their 
managerial abilities, their grantmaking skills, their governance structures, and their 
fundraising skills. They would, therefore, have more information (than less engaged 
Ford-founded grantees) about how Ford’s transplantation strategies impacted its local 
foundations’ effectiveness in local resource mobilization over the years. The KCDF, 
having participated as well in the Africa Philanthropy Initiative (API), would also 
provide information on the earlier Ford Africa-based initiative.  
Methodology: Data Collection Methods 
As there had been no previous analytical studies on the local resource 
mobilization effectiveness of transplanted philanthropic foundations in African countries, 
original data had to be collected for this study. The data collection methods included in-
depth interviews of former Ford Foundation senior officials as well as current senior 
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officials of the selected Ford-founded African philanthropic institutions. I also conducted 
archival research and analyzed internal documents and public records. The qualitative 
case study design was chosen precisely for its flexibility in allowing the use of a variety 
of data collection methods. The multi-method approach of data collection helped me to 
get at multiple perspectives of the phenomenon under study.  
In-depth Qualitative Interviews: Sampling Methods and Sample Size 
The main source of data for this research was the in-depth, semi-structured, open-
ended, one-on-one interviews that were conducted over a 9-month period from February 
2013 to October 2013, in the US as well as with respondents in Africa and Europe. For 
the purposes of this research, it was more important to interview the right individuals 
with the most knowledge about the topic than to interview a large number of individuals 
with little of the relevant knowledge. That consideration determined the number of 
people I sought out for interviewing. A total of twenty (20)39 senior-level officials were 
interviewed, including former Ford officials and consultants, as well as officials of the 
Ford-founded/funded African foundations. Also interviewed were officials of a 
homegrown Ghanaian foundation to allow for some contrast with the Ford-founded 
philanthropic institutions.  
Why in-depth semi-structured qualitative interviews? As there had been little 
previous research on this topic it was important to use the interviews as both an 
exploratory and explanatory tool. It was necessary to allow the research participants to 
                                                 
39Though the respondents were 20 in number, one of them had served in two capacities --- as a senior Ford 
official in Africa in the 1990s when Ford began to propagate its institutional philanthropy concept in 
African countries; and later as a senior official of a Ford-founded African foundation in the 2000s. He 
therefore provided information on the Ford Foundation’s program in Africa from (1) the position of a Ford 
Program Officer and Africa Representative as well as (2) from the position of the executive of a Ford-
founded African foundation. He was interviewed twice.   
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answer the questions in their own words, and to share their experiences, knowledge, and 
their opinions about the topic in all its complexity, without being restricted to a structured 
format. It was important to understand the philanthropy promotion and foundation-
building process from the perspective of the individual actors themselves. I needed to 
understand what it meant to (1) the Ford Foundation officials who helped to build the 
African foundations; and (2) the African officials who were running the foundations and 
striving to raise local resources with difficulty. Denzin and Lincoln (1998) emphasize 
that researchers should endeavor to make sense of phenomena in terms of the meanings 
people bring to them. The semi-structured format helped to accomplish that. Interviewees 
pointed me in directions that I would not have otherwise considered if I had used a 
structured format based on preconceived ideas about the topic. The archival and other 
documents provided insights into the administrative and decision-making processes that 
went into the formulation and implementation of Ford’s philanthropy promotion 
initiatives in the relevant African countries.  
Two non-probability sampling techniques (criterion and snowball sampling) were 
employed to carefully select a total of twenty (20) Ford and non-Ford expert interviewees 
who were among the small number of individuals who had the information that I sought. 
As the interviewees had to meet certain criteria, criterion sampling was employed first. 
They had to be individuals who had been responsible for, or were intimately involved 
with, the Ford Foundation’s global philanthropy promotion program in the 1990s and 
early 2000s. They, therefore, had to possess in-depth knowledge about Ford’s foundation-
building activities in sub-Saharan Africa. In the same way, the non-Ford interviewees, 
including the officials of the Ford-founded/funded philanthropic institutions, had to be 
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knowledgeable about their own foundation’s establishment, as well as its participation in 
the Ford capacity-building initiatives (the API and/or the IISP), where applicable. In the 
case of interviewees from other international foundations, they had to be knowledgeable 
about their foundation’s philanthropy promotion activities in African countries as well as 
the Ford Foundation’s global philanthropy promotion program.  
The selection was thus based on the individuals’ functions in their organizations 
and/or their expert knowledge of the issues under study. This limited the pool of 
knowledgeable interviewees to a few former Ford senior staff, former Ford consultants, 
and a few of the high-level officials of the Ford-founded/funded grantee foundations in 
sub-Saharan Africa. While criterion sampling helped to decide who to interview, 
snowball sampling was the strategy for gaining access to many of the interviewees, as the 
category of people with the information that I needed was not easily accessible to people 
outside foundation philanthropy circles. For instance, almost all the relevant Ford 
Foundation officials had left the organization by 2013 when I conducted the interviews 
and it would have been difficult to find them otherwise, without the help of an insider. 
Based on the criteria established and recommendations from insiders, twenty-two 
(22) prospective interviewees were contacted and twenty (20) were ultimately 
interviewed. Ten (10) were former Ford Foundation senior officials, with one of them 
interviewing twice to share his experience and expert knowledge, first as a former Ford 
senior official in sub-Saharan Africa, and then as the executive of a Ford-founded African 
foundation. Though twenty (20) might come across as a small number, it included most 
of the senior officials who had been directly involved in (and had managed) the 
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philanthropy transplantation program at the Ford Foundation 40 (in New York and at the 
Ford Africa regional offices) between 1990 and 2010. It also included those among the 
staff of the three Ford-founded African foundations who had in-depth knowledge about 
their own foundation, its history with Ford, and had participated in the IISP.41 In order to 
protect the identity of my research participants, their names have been replaced with 
randomly selected letters of the alphabet.  
Documents: Archival Records, Annual Reports, Tax Returns, and Press Releases  
The interview data was supplemented with data from the Ford Foundation 
archival records held at the Rockefeller Archives Center in Sleepy Hollow, New York. 
The archival records, examined in May 2013, included memoranda, concept and program 
papers, and some evaluation reports. These internal Ford Foundation documents were 
important for providing background information on the Africa Philanthropy Initiative 
(API) and the International Initiative to Strengthen Philanthropy (IISP), including the 
decision-making process that went into the creation of these global philanthropy 
promotion initiatives. Access to recent documents on the philanthropy promotion 
program, that would have included those of the termination of the IISP by 2010, was, 
however, limited.42 Nevertheless. the data loss due to inaccessibility was mitigated by the 
fact that I interviewed the senior officials who were intimately involved with the relevant 
programs and events, as well as the consultants who worked on the IISP.  
                                                 
40This information was based on the recommendations received from those who participated in the events 
and knew who else was involved in New York and in sub-Saharan African countries 
41Some of the officials of the African foundations had little knowledge about the events under study as they 
were hired after the events in question.  
42According to the Archivist, documents had to be 10 years old after their production before becoming 
accessible to the public. By 2013, when this archival research was conducted, certain documents associated 
with the IISP were not yet accessible.  
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The Ford Foundation’s annual reports and its form 990 PFs were examined to find 
information about grants made to the Ford grantees under study, and for what purpose. 
Ford’s 990 PFs43 during the relevant years were used to cross-check and supplement the 
relevant information from the annual reports. The annual reports of the African Women’s 
Development Fund (AWDF), TrustAfrica, and the Kenya Community Development 
Foundation (KCDF) (where these were available) were also examined to determine how 
much money they had succeeded in raising from local sources, as opposed to funds from 
international donors. Where the information in the annual reports was presented in a way 
that made it difficult to differentiate between local and foreign funds the interview data 
were used to supplement the documentary evidence. Press releases provided 
contemporaneous information about important events such as the foundation’s leadership 
and policy changes, its foundation-building activities at home and abroad, and other 
relevant Foundation programs. This was useful for understanding how the foundation 
presented its global philanthropy promotion program to the world.  
Collecting data from all the sources discussed above allowed for data 
triangulation, as the multiple sources of evidence provided multiple and complementary 
measures of the phenomenon under study. Data that could not be found at the Ford 
Foundation archives were sought during the interviews; and the archival data were often 
used to verify and substantiate some of the interview data. The use of the various 
techniques of data collection and the multiplicity of data sources was meant to increase 
the trustworthiness of the data and to strengthen the internal validity of the study. Every 
research design and methodology decision made was aimed not only at gathering the 
                                                 
43IRS Annual Tax Return for Private Foundations 
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right information needed to answer the research question, but also at minimizing data loss 
and enhancing the completeness and accuracy of the data. 
Roadmap for the Dissertation 
This chapter provided a roadmap for the dissertation. It introduced the puzzle to 
be explained and presented the main argument I make in the rest of the dissertation to 
support my thesis. It provided the theoretical and analytical framework for explaining 
why the Ford Foundation failed in its bid to use the transplantation of American-inspired 
philanthropic institutions to catalyze the large-scale mobilization of local philanthropic 
resources in African countries. The chapter provided the framework for explaining why 
Ford was ineffective at equipping its foundation grantees for attracting local resources 
(which was their raison d’ȇtre), whereas it was successful in transferring managerial, 
governance, grantmaking, and proposal writing skills.44 I argue that the variation in goal 
attainment was due to Ford’s philanthropy promotion approach, which did not account 
for the lack of fit between the formal philanthropic structures it introduced, and the 
informal African philanthropic cultures and systems within which local charitable 
resources were embedded. To strengthen the “goodness of fit” socio-cultural argument 
that I make, I present the prevalent (state-centric) alternative explanations and point out 
their explanatory weaknesses. I end the chapter with my research methodology, the 
rationale behind my research strategy, case selection, and my data collection methods and 
sources. The rest of the dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapters II, III, and IV 
highlight and illustrate various aspects of the dissertation’s argument previewed here in 
                                                 
44Proposal writing skills were targeted at helping the foundations to solicit funding from international 
donors and corporate entities. They were not well suited for soliciting donations from local individuals and 
groups.  
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Chapter I. Chapter V concludes the dissertation, while Chapter VI contains the tables 
referred to in Chapter III.   
Chapter II tackles the independent variable. It provides the background to Ford's 
1990s’ philanthropy promotion and foundation-building program in developing countries 
(in general) and in sub-Saharan Africa (in particular).  It describes the philosophy behind 
Ford’s exportation of the American-inspired philanthropic foundation model to African 
countries. It analyzes the strategies and techniques that went into the foundation’s 
institutional transplantation process (foundation-building) in African countries and sets 
the stage for demonstrating the disconnect between Ford’s local philanthropy promotion 
goal in African countries, and the transplantation (as well as isomorphic) approach that it 
employed to try to attain that objective.  
Chapter III analyzes the dependent variable along the relevant dimensions of 
foundation effectiveness discussed in Chapter I. It takes each of the key dimensions of 
effectiveness and analyzes the extent to which the Ford Foundation, through the Africa 
Philanthropy Initiative (API) and the International Initiative to Strengthen Philanthropy 
(IISP), provided what its African foundation grantees needed to build the internal 
capacity necessary for developing local funding bases, mobilizing and managing large-
scale local philanthropic resources. This chapter highlights the fact that Ford’s efforts 
were successful at transferring formal organizational development skills to its African 
foundation grantees; but failed to enable local “field cultivation” to facilitate adaptation 
to the relevant African countries’ institutional landscapes. 
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Chapter IV explains why Ford’s attempt to foster large-scale local (philanthropic) 
resource mobilization in African countries in the 1990s and early 2000s failed.45 Without 
dismissing the state-centric explanations altogether, this chapter attributes the failure of 
Ford’s local philanthropy promotion program in African countries to the mismatch 
between the transplanted formal philanthropic form, on the one hand, and the values and 
practices of the informal African philanthropic institutions, on the other. Chapter IV 
explains that Ford’s attempt to use a non-African philanthropic organizational form to 
promote local giving failed because the exported institutional model had difficulty 
developing deep enough roots in the local African soil to tap into local resources. 
Chapter V summarizes the findings of the dissertation, draws conclusions and 
makes policy recommendations. It also discusses the study’s relevance to areas beyond 
sub-Saharan African countries and suggests where future research will be needed.  
                                                 
45As measured by the failure of its African foundation grantees to mobilize the bulk of their resources from 
local philanthropic sources. 
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Chapter II: Transplantation of Foundation Philanthropy onto African Soil 
 
Introduction 
 
Ford’s decision in the 1990s to build American-inspired foundations in sub-
Saharan African countries had a number of objectives. To a large extent, it was aimed at 
improving and strengthening local philanthropy by catalyzing large-scale charitable 
giving in African countries for public purposes. This was to support the strengthening of 
civil society, community development and socio-economic advancement, and the 
reduction of donor dependency. The foundation had several options for improving and 
strengthening local philanthropy in African countries. One option would have been to 
build on the existing African philanthropic structures, values, and cultures of giving, and 
helped to scale them up for wider and greater impact. Another could have been to “graft” 
some aspects of the American-inspired foundation model onto the African philanthropic 
“root stock”1 to produce an improved hybrid with the desirable attributes of both. 
Thirdly, the Ford Foundation had the option of transplanting and trying to replicate the 
American institutional philanthropic model as a parallel to the local African institutions 
of philanthropy. It chose the third option of institutional transplantation and replication.   
Chapter II addresses the independent variable, namely the Ford Foundation’s 
approach to philanthropy promotion in African countries in the 1990s. In this chapter I 
argue that (1) by using isomorphic2 organizational development techniques, the Ford 
                                                 
1This horticultural image emanates from the analogy used in chapter 1 to illustrate the process and outcome 
of Ford’s transplantation of the American-inspired foundation model in African countries.  
2DiMaggio & Powell (1983) describe three types of institutional isomorphism: (1) normative isomorphism; 
(2) mimetic isomorphism; and (3) coercive isomorphism.  Normative isomorphism takes place when 
organizations (especially new ones) adopt certain features and characteristics because these have become 
the norm in their industry. In mimetic isomorphism organizations voluntarily imitate certain organizational 
behaviors and models from their peers. In the coercive type, superordinate organizations in the institutional 
field coerce their subordinate counterparts to conform by adopting certain institutional features to achieve 
institutional homogenization. In this case study, the Ford Foundation took steps to ensure that its African 
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Foundation built its African foundation grantees into formal professionalized institutions 
that were structurally comparable to similar institutions elsewhere, but were very 
different from the existing informal (and semi-formal)3 philanthropic institutions and 
structures in place in African countries; (2) that while it aimed at promoting local 
philanthropic giving in African countries, Ford’s institutional transplantation processes 
demanded conformity with (international) industry standards, and discouraged adaptation 
to the local culture and institutional context. I also argue that Ford conceptualized its 
philanthropy-promotion task in African countries as foundation-building and the transfer 
of expertise, formal technical skills, and generally-accepted organizational norms, 
ignoring the role of the informal philanthropic institutions and the local people’s giving 
cultures and values.4  
The chapter begins by briefly describing the Ford Foundation’s history from the 
1930s, its foray into international development in the 1950s, as well as its involvement 
with civil society strengthening and the promotion of institutional philanthropy in 
developing countries in the 1990s. It goes on to analyze the prevailing thinking that 
framed Ford’s approach to global philanthropy promotion, notably its decision to 
transplant an American institutional model as its philanthropic vehicle for catalyzing 
large-scale local giving in African countries. In the main, the chapter analyzes the 
institutional transplantation process that Ford employed to create and institutionalize its 
                                                 
foundation grantees acquired the formal organizational features needed to make them meet international 
standards in the foundation field (and also to become attractive to other international donors).   
3I use this to describe the many home-grown philanthropic institutions in African countries that are formal 
in the sense that they have been registered with the authorities as nongovernmental organizations to be able 
to open bank accounts, etc., but are informal in their governance and management structures.  
4The appropriate alternative would have been to approach its philanthropy promotion task as a socio-
cultural intervention (beyond the transfer of formal skills and competencies) that involves local people’s 
customs, beliefs, values, and longstanding giving practices.   
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African foundation grantees. It contributes towards answering the research  question by 
showing how Ford’s transplantation processes created and reinforced formal American-
inspired Africa-based philanthropies that were incongruent with, and unconnected to, the 
local philanthropic cultures, values, and practices that were expected to provide local 
resources and sustenance to the former.5  
The Ford Foundation and International Development 
 
Historical Background 
 
The Ford Foundation was established by Edsel Ford, son of Henry Ford of Ford 
Motor Company fame, in Detroit, Michigan, in 1936. This was reportedly done in 
response to the Revenue Act of 1935, which raised the estate tax rate to seventy percent 
for estates valued above $50 million, but exempted bequests to charitable, religious, and 
educational organizations (Sutton 1987). The 1935 estate tax hike reportedly pushed the 
Ford family to establish the Ford Foundation so as to avoid paying the steep estate tax 
upon the deaths of Henry and Edsel Ford. With its close ties to the Ford family fortunes 
from the Ford Motor Company, the Ford Foundation started as a local foundation focused 
on local issues, with most of its grants going to organizations in the Detroit area. The 
Edison Institute (now the Henry Ford Museum) and the Henry Ford Hospital (both 
located in Detroit, Michigan) were among its largest grantees at the time. Upon the deaths 
of Henry and Edsel Ford in the mid-1940s, however, their bequests tremendously 
increased the resources available to the Ford Foundation and transformed it into the 
                                                 
5See Ottaway (2000) for a discussion of what she calls “free-floating” donor-created charitable institutions 
in African countries, and local people’s lack of interest in supporting them financially. 
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largest US foundation, and, also the largest philanthropic foundation in the world at the 
time (Magat 1987).6 
With greater resources came great responsibilities, so the foundation’s Board of 
Trustees commissioned a study to help it explore and determine the best use of its 
increased resources. The Gaither Report, published in 1950 as the Report of the Study for 
the Ford Foundation on Policy and Program recommended that “the Ford Foundation 
become an international philanthropy dedicated to the advancement of human welfare 
through reducing poverty and promoting democratic values, peace, and educational 
opportunity.”7 The Gaither Report marked the beginning of Ford’s expansion into 
international philanthropy in the early 1950s. Ford opened its first office outside the 
United States in Delhi, India, in 1952. The Ford Foundation operationalized the Gaither 
Report’s recommendations by expanding its programs beyond local mid-western 
problems and issues to “enhance the prospects of peace, strengthen democracy, 
education, and economic development in the United States and globally” (Atwater and 
Walsh 2011:11).   
During the first couple of years the Ford Foundation’s programs outside the 
United States were concentrated in South and Southeast Asia, notably in India, Pakistan, 
and Indonesia; and were focused mainly on providing development assistance to the 
governments of these countries (Magat 1987). Around the same time, in the early 1950s, 
Ford began to carry out some programs in sub-Saharan African countries as well.  
 
                                                 
6Until the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation was established in 2000 the Ford Foundation was the largest 
foundation in the world in terms of asset size.  
7http://www.fordfoundation.org/about-us/our-origins/ Accessed May 2017 
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Civil Society-Strengthening in Developing Countries  
Prior to the late 1980s, Ford’s grantmaking support to developing countries in 
Asia, Latin America, and Africa focused on poverty reduction, economic growth and 
development, as well as urban and rural development. This was in such areas as higher 
education, agricultural production, micro-enterprise, the preservation and management of 
natural resources, as well as the provision of employment opportunities and better 
housing for the urban poor (The Ford Foundation Annual Report 1989; 1994). It was in 
the late 1980s that (in addition to supporting socio-economic development) Ford began to 
support the promotion of good governance and the strengthening of civil society 
organizations in developing and transitional countries (The Ford Foundation 1989 Annual 
Report). With the resurgence of the concept of civil society in association with the 
political turmoil in Central and Eastern Europe in the mid to late 1980s, Ford embraced 
the idea that the development and sustainability of civil society were essential for the 
development of social capital and democratic values in the newly independent nations of 
Eastern Europe and other developing countries in transition:   
Civil society --- forms of communal and associational life that are 
organized neither by the self-interest of the market nor the power of the 
state --- is a growing interest of the foundation.8 [Civil society is] essential 
to maintaining cooperation, trust, altruism and other values essential to the 
health of democratic society (The Ford Foundation 1997 Annual Report: 
82). 
This support for civil society organizations in developing countries was part of the larger 
phenomenon of rolling back the public sector (the state) and strengthening the private 
                                                 
8See Civil Society and Development: A Critical Exploration by Jude Howell and Jenny Pearce (2001, 
Lynne Rienner) for an exploration of how donor agencies and foundations took up the concept of civil 
society; and how some, like the Ford Foundation, restructured their programs to reflect the new emphasis 
on the role of civil society in the democratization process.  
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(nonprofit and for-profit) sectors in these countries. Philanthropic, bilateral, and multi-
lateral donors turned away from the state as a preferred partner in the execution of 
development programs (Holmén 2009; Hyden 2006; Henderson 2000; Aksartova 2000). 
They invested instead in building and strengthening civil society organizations (including 
philanthropic foundations) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)9 to lead the 
development effort in those countries. 
Ford’s Diffusion of Institutional Philanthropy in Developing Countries 
 
  By 1989 the Ford Foundation had begun to consider supporting the development 
of foundation philanthropy in developing countries.10 That year Ford started to explore 
the possibility of promoting institutional philanthropy in East and Southeast Asia through 
a grant to Columbia University (The Ford Foundation 1989 Annual Report). The grant 
was to support a symposium in Bangkok “to examine new forms of organized 
philanthropy in East and Southeast Asia” (The Ford Foundation 1989 Annual Report: 
74). It was also for planning a follow-up conference in the Philippines to consider 
“opportunities to increase corporate philanthropy in the region” (The Ford Foundation 
1989 Annual Report: 91). In other words, by 1989 Ford had made the decision to invest 
in the promotion of institutional philanthropy outside the United States and declared its 
                                                 
9Donor-founded philanthropic institutions in developing countries are distinguished from donor-founded 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in that technically (if not always in actuality) the former are 
established to mobilize philanthropic resources from various sources (especially local sources) and to 
distribute these resources as grants to local NGOs or use the resources to implement their own programs if 
they are an operational foundation. Philanthropic institutions are also expected to develop local 
philanthropy/private giving to support their local resource mobilization efforts. In contrast donors create 
local NGOs to provide services closer to recipients, with little expectation that they mobilize local 
resources or encourage local giving. 
10Barry Gaberman, one-time Ford Senior Vice-President, indicated that it was Ford’s successful 
establishment of the Puerto Rico Community Foundation (PRCF) in 1985 that encouraged it to consider 
launching a philanthropy- promotion and foundation-building program in the developing world (The Ford 
Foundation 2006).   
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intention to propagate the (community) foundation model as its means for philanthropy 
promotion and community development. As Ford explained, “The funding of local 
support systems through community foundations will be an increasingly important part of 
the foundation’s community development efforts” (The Ford Foundation 1989 Annual 
Report: 7). 
  One of Ford’s objectives for the creation of, and support for, philanthropic 
foundations in African and other developing countries in the 1990s was to provide 
resources to local organizations to boost civic engagement, self-help, and community-
driven economic development (Laird 2007) in these countries. As the foundation 
explained:  
[The foundation-building] initiative will endow newly created foundations 
at home and abroad to increase the resources available for local economic 
development, women's rights, the arts, and other concerns (The Ford 
Foundation Press Line 1997).   
 
This meant the creation of efficient philanthropic institutions that would channel 
international resources to grassroots organizations for rural socio-economic development 
in developing countries. This was expressed in Ford’s 1993 annual report, the year that it 
established the West Africa Rural Foundation (WARF) in Senegal and the Nigeria 
Community Development Trust Fund, its first foundations in sub-Saharan Africa: 
The foundation believes that in many countries local philanthropies, such 
as community foundations, can help expand economic opportunities in 
rural areas by assuming a key role in channeling financial and technical 
assistance to community-based organizations (The Ford Foundation 1993 
Annual Report: 18).  
Around 1996, however, under the new leadership of Susan V. Berresford as Ford 
president, the foundation added the promotion of local philanthropy to its foundation-
building objectives. 
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 From then on, alongside the creation of pass-through mechanisms for channeling 
financial and technical support to local communities, an equally important objective of 
Ford’s foundation-building program in developing countries was to encourage local 
giving to the Ford-founded philanthropic institutions. This was ultimately to help reduce 
the prevailing heavy dependence of donor-founded CSOs and NGOs on international 
donors (Johnson et al. 2004; Pinter 2001). A former Ford Foundation senior official 
interviewed for this study explained how support for civil society development through 
local (philanthropic) resource mobilization was a strategic objective of Ford’s:  
Most [civil society and philanthropic] organizations don't want to be 
dependent on foreign resources forever, partly because it hurts their 
legitimacy, [as] they could be seen as pawns of Western powers.  And so, 
generating more financial independence for civil society on the ground in 
Africa and elsewhere was one of our strategic objectives, and we saw 
expanding local philanthropy as one way of answering that need.11 
 
Barry Gaberman, a former Ford Senior Vice-President also emphasized Ford’s 
philanthropy development and local resource mobilization expectations in 
developing countries thus:  
Local or community-rooted philanthropy is necessary to a community’s 
self-determination and development. In this conceptualization, 
philanthropy cannot only be the introduction of resources into a 
community from the outside, but the ability for a community to invest in 
itself. Outside investors can reinforce this vision, as the Ford Foundation 
has done when it helps communities not only to define their own needs but 
meet them with their own resources (The Ford Foundation 2006:4) 
 
Ford’s philanthropy promotion program in developing countries, 
therefore, had a dual objective: to create philanthropic institutions capable of 
efficiently channeling resources from international donors to local communities 
for development, but more importantly for the development of local philanthropy, 
                                                 
11Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013 
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to mobilize large-scale local resources for development. As stated by the Ford 
Foundation, the philanthropy promotion program in developing (including 
African) countries was “to encourage the growth of indigenous philanthropy 
abroad” (The Ford Foundation 1991 Annual Report: 75). 
The Thinking Behind Ford’s Exportation of Foundation Philanthropy 
 
Unlike the proponents of the mirror theory of institutions who posit that 
institutions reflect the societies from which they emerge and can therefore not be 
successfully transplanted in different societies, actors that support the exportation of 
institutional models from one country to another tend to believe that institutions are 
autonomous of society and can be transplanted successfully across borders. 12 One 
important phenomenon that encouraged Ford’s transplantation of the (community) 
foundation model in developing countries in the 1990s was the increasing inter-
connectedness among nations brought on by globalization (Pinter 2001). The boundary-
spanning ideas that became popular with globalization in the 1990s undergirded Ford’s 
philanthropy promotion and foundation-building program in developing countries. The 
foundation conceptualized globalization as the “diminishing importance of national 
borders and the strengthening of [cross-cutting] identities that stretch beyond those rooted 
in a particular region or country” (The Ford Foundation 1997 Annual Report: 9).  
The foundation’s 1997 annual report also stated that globalization not only 
implied that local identities and cultures had been weakened, but also that many parts of 
the world were experiencing an “increasing openness to ideas from afar” (The Ford 
                                                 
12These theoretical perspectives were discussed in Chapter I 
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Foundation 1997 Annual Report:11) that facilitated the cross-border transfer of new 
concepts:  
This increasing openness to ideas from afar enables the Ford Foundation 
to connect men and women working to improve conditions in their own 
communities with people elsewhere who have similar goals. …We are 
doing this in fields as diverse as development finance…and the creation of 
new foundations (The Ford Foundation 1997 Annual Report: 11).  
 
Besides the idea of people across the world being open to new ideas13, the 
globalizing trends of the 1990s also engendered the notion that all countries 
(whether developed or developing) had more in common than they had 
differences; and that institutions and solutions that had been effective in one 
country could be successfully transferred to another country.14 That this was the 
thinking at Ford is seen in the 198915 annual report:   
The United States and many other nations were wrestling with many of the 
same problems, however different they might appear on the surface, and 
approaches and solutions conceived in one place might be relevant in 
other places. We believed there was a great deal to be learned across 
national boundaries --- certainly between the United States and developing 
countries, but also among the countries of the developing world (The Ford 
Foundation 1989 Annual Report: xvi).   
 
As a result, Ford Foundation officials responsible for the philanthropy 
promotion program believed that communities in developing countries were open 
to new concepts and ideas and would be quick to adopt the new American-
inspired philanthropic institutions that it was transplanting in those societies. The 
                                                 
13Invariably, these new ideas are usually concepts and institutions from the developed world that 
international donors transfer to developing countries believing that they will boost the development of the 
latter.  
14This idea is contrary to the theory (discussed in Chapter 1) that institutions and concepts can only be 
successfully transplanted when the exporting and importing countries belong to the same “family” and 
share a common history and socio-cultural development (De Jong & Mamadouh 2002).  
15This was precisely when Ford was beginning to expand its philanthropy promotion program to developing 
countries 
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Ford Foundation assumed that the (community) foundation concept was near-
universal and no matter where Ford transplanted such philanthropic institutions, 
they would flourish and produce the desired results, including the large-scale 
mobilization of local philanthropic resources. One of the former Ford senior 
officials interviewed for this study summarized the boundary-spanning thinking at 
Ford:   
The idea of a community foundation on the surface [sounded] pretty damn 
good; ‘Yes, let's put the ownership of local resources in local hands to 
support the development of that community, whatever that kind of 
community is. Whether it’s in Cleveland, Ohio or Nairobi, Kenya, it 
doesn't matter. If you build an institution like that, it will do … good 
things’. And, you know, with hindsight we look back and say, ‘Oh, my 
God! That was so naïve!’16 
 
Ford believed, therefore, that local populations, regardless of their socio-cultural 
background, would welcome the new (but unfamiliar) institutions with open arms 
and minds, and provide them with the needed local support (financial and 
otherwise). 
Exporting the Foundation Model to African Countries 
Despite the Ford Foundation’s ideas about the importance of supporting 
community-rooted, indigenous philanthropy for the self-determination of communities in 
African countries (The Ford Foundation 1991 Annual Report; the Ford Foundation 2006) 
it did not model its foundation grantees on an African philanthropic form. It chose instead 
to build philanthropic institutions modeled on the American grantmaking endowed 
foundation. Ford’s exportation of the foundation form to African countries is an example 
                                                 
16Participant H. Phone interview with the author, Feb. 8, 2013 
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of what Heydemann and Hammack (2009) refer to as the West’s “projection of 
institutional logics abroad.” 
For example, when the Ford Foundation had the opportunity in the early1990s to 
help Kenyans mobilize their own resources and manage their national development 
through local philanthropy,17 the foundation turned to the philanthropic foundation model 
that it already knew from the US and hired the founder of the East Tennessee Community 
Foundation18 to help create African foundations similar to the one she had created in East 
Tennessee. The assumption was that what had worked to raise local resources in East 
Tennessee would definitely work in the Kenyan philanthropic terrain. As she described it, 
she was hired as Ford’s East Africa Regional Representative expressly to apply the 
experience that she had acquired from the Rural Development Community Foundation 
Initiative (RDCFI) in the US19 to the creation of the Kenya Community Development 
Foundation (KCDF): 
[My coming to East Africa) was with the notion that the experience of the 
Rural Development Community Foundation Initiative and my own 
experience [would be relevant in the Kenyan context]. …The time was 
ripe, the ground was fertile,20 and I just happened to be the person that had 
had that kind of experience.21  
 
                                                 
17This is in contrast to Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) which was deemed to perpetuate 
dependency on external funders. Ford built its African foundations around the same period that 
international donors were holding conversations about aid effectiveness.  
18Katharine Pearson Criss, former Executive Director of the East Tennessee Community Foundation, was 
hired by Ford in 1998 to support the creation and development of community foundations in African 
countries.   
19The RDCFI was one of two initiatives that Ford launched in the US to help build the capacity of select US 
foundations for resource mobilization and endowment-building. Ford subsequently modeled its 
international initiatives --- the Africa Philanthropy Initiative (API) and the International Initiative to 
Strengthen Philanthropy (IISP) --- on key aspects of the RDCFI.   
20Like many of her colleagues, this former Ford senior official used agricultural terms to describe the 
transplantation of the foundation model in African countries.  
21Participant B. Phone interview with author, April 17, 2013 
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Because they were initiated by an external actor --- the Ford Foundation --- and modeled 
on a foreign institutional form, Ford’s foundation grantees were regarded as foreign 
philanthropic institutions by the local populations. The Ford-founded African 
philanthropies were an example of philanthropy in Africa as opposed to philanthropy of 
Africa or African philanthropy (see for example Wilkinson-Maposa et al. 2005).  
As one former Ford Foundation senior official acknowledged, “…Just because [we] 
launch a foundation in Africa doesn't mean it's [going to] be seen as an African 
institution.”22  
Ford’s Foundation-Building in West, East and Southern Africa 
 Following the Ford Foundation’s declaration in its 1989 Annual Report that the 
establishment of community foundations was going to be an important part of its 
community development efforts internationally (The Ford Foundation 1989 Annual 
Report: 7) Ford established two foundations in West Africa in 1993. These were the West 
Africa Rural Foundation (WARF) in Senegal23 and the Nigeria Community Development 
Trust Fund.24 Unlike the Nigeria Community Development Trust Fund whose area of 
operation was national, the West Africa Rural Foundation (WARF) was set up to cater to 
the needs of community-based agricultural organizations in five francophone West 
African countries (Malombe 2000). Ford went on to create, and to support the 
establishment of, many other professionalized community foundations in other African 
                                                 
22Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013 
23 Senegal and Nigeria were the two countries where Ford had field offices in West Africa at the time.  
24An online search showed that the Nigeria Community Development Trust Fund has changed its name to 
the Community Development Foundation. However, the organization is still focused on channeling 
resources to local development organizations and associations for individual and community development, 
rather than mobilizing local resources.  
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countries including Kenya and South Africa.25 In 1998 it established the Kenya 
Community Development Foundation (KCDF) in Nairobi, Kenya. The Uthungulu and 
Greater Rustenburg Community Foundations were the two Ford-founded philanthropic 
institutions that survived at the end of Ford’s foundation-building efforts in South Africa. 
 After establishing national-level foundations in the 1990s, Ford supported the 
establishment of two Africa-wide (pan-African) foundations in the 2000s to help address 
issues of cross-national and continental import. The African Women’s Development 
Fund (AWDF), headquartered in Ghana, was founded in 2001.26 That same year Ford 
established the Special Initiative for Africa (SIA) and incubated it at its New York office 
until 2006, when the SIA was renamed TrustAfrica and relocated to Dakar, Senegal, as 
an independent foundation. TrustAfrica was the last foundation that Ford built in West 
Africa. The Ford Foundation ended its support for foundation-building and institutional 
philanthropy promotion in developing countries in 2010. 
Ford’s Institutional Transplantation Process in Africa 
 Contrary to Ford’s thinking (discussed above) that countries across the world had 
similar problems (whether they were developed or developing) and that solutions (and 
institutions) devised in one country could successfully solve problems in another country, 
the reality was that there were significant contextual differences among countries 
                                                 
25According to Kuljian (2013) and several participants in this study, most of the foundations that Ford and 
other international funders attempted to establish in Southern Africa in the 1990s did not survive the initial 
transplantation shock. The few that survived from that period are in Kenya, Senegal and South Africa.  
26The AWDF was established by three African women with a small (but symbolic) contribution of 
seed money from a few African women who met in New York (Participant P. Interviewed on July 
17 & 18, 2013). But the large amounts that the AWDF needed in seed money and institutional 
development to make it functional came from the Ford Foundation, with some support from Match 
International, and the MacArthur Foundation. Ford supported the AWDF’s establishment in 2001 
with a grant of $500, 000 for institutional development and grantmaking (The Ford Foundation 
2001 Annual Report: 120). Ford went on to make grant after grant over the years to the AWDF in 
operational and endowment challenge funds.  
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affecting the effectiveness of exported philanthropic (and other nonprofit sector) 
institutions. In fact, a former Ford Foundation Program Officer at the headquarters in 
New York acknowledged these contextual differences when she noted in an exit memo to 
the foundation that “… in practice...the issues affecting the US nonprofit sector have little 
or nothing in common with those driving global civil society.”27  
 Acknowledging the importance of local contexts in institutional transfers, scholars 
such as Berkowitz et al. (2001) have contended that the successful performance of an 
institutional transplant in a recipient country is highly dependent on the transplantation 
process. If the transplantation process takes local conditions into account and facilitates 
local adaptation, the chances of the transplant performing effectively in the recipient 
country are increased. In contrast, if the transplantation process tries to reproduce the 
original model without regard for local conditions or local adaptation, the chances of 
success in the recipient society are limited. In the case under study, the Ford Foundation 
neglected the local contextual differences between the United States and the relevant 
African countries and tried to replicate the foundation model in the latter. A former Ford 
Africa Regional Representative, comparing the Ford Foundation’s philanthropy 
promotion process to that of the Global Fund for Community Foundations (GFCF), noted 
that unlike the GFCF that had an “organic approach” to local philanthropy promotion, 
Ford lacked regard for the local philanthropic landscape:  
[There was] a kind of zeal [on Ford’s part] to try to create community 
foundations [in African countries] without a recognition that there was 
something very strong already on the ground [in terms of philanthropic 
organization]. If you look at what's happening with, for example, the 
                                                 
27Rockefeller Archives Center, the Ford Foundation records, Peace and Social Justice Program (PSJ), 
Governance and Civil Society, Office Files of Michael Edwards, Program Management Files, Batliwala, 
Srilatha, Exit Memo (p. 4) November 2000  
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Global Fund for Community Foundations;28 it has a much more organic 
approach to helping support the growth of [local philanthropy] and is less 
ideological. [It does not say (as Ford did)]: ‘Oh…we have the answer in 
the [United] States, let's try and do exactly the same in South Africa’.29  
 
Ford’s approach was to try to impose a foreign philanthropic model, as if what 
worked in the US would work similarly in African countries. 
In order “to set up mini African versions of the Ford Foundation”30, Ford 
employed specific isomorphic organization-building mechanisms to ensure that its 
African foundation grantees conformed to its “particular vision”31 of a formal 
professionalized philanthropic institution. The major ones included (1) the use of 
foreign intermediary organizations well-versed in foundation-building to help 
create its African foundation grantees in “Ford’s image”32; (2) the use of 
institutional incubation to ensure that the incubating institutions inculcated the 
requisite formal skills and capacities into the African philanthropic institutions; 
(3) the use of site visits to selected community foundations in the United States to 
demonstrate to African elites how to manage and govern the new foundations 
according to generally accepted standards; and (4) the use of capacity building 
workshops, initiatives and peer-learning networks to impart institutional norms 
and organizational best practices to ensure efficiency as well as conformity. 
Overall, Ford used these mechanisms to ensure that the formal aspects of 
                                                 
28The Global Fund for Community Foundations (GFCF) was created by a number of international funders, 
including the Ford Foundation, to support the development of sustainable community foundations across 
the world. Now headquartered in South Africa, the GFCF has apparently learned from its experience on the 
ground in developing countries and has developed a more organic approach to foundation-building and 
local philanthropy promotion than Ford did in the 1990s and early 2000s.  
29Participant I. Phone interview with the author, Oct. 1, 2013 
30Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013 
31Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013 
32Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013 
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organizational development were inculcated into its foundation grantees in 
African countries.33  
Use of Western Intermediaries to Replicate Formal Structures 
As Ford had chosen to use professionalized philanthropic foundations as 
the vehicle for promoting local philanthropy in African countries, it made grants 
to foreign intermediary organizations that had expert knowledge about the 
foundation model to establish many of the new foundations and to provide 
capacity-building training for their management, governance and grantmaking.34 
This ensured that the Ford-founded African philanthropies were established with 
formal institutional features that made them similar to foundations in the US or 
Western Europe. Being similar to philanthropic institutions in the Western world 
meant that they were dissimilar to local African philanthropic institutions and 
associations, and, therefore, incompatible with the local informal cultures of 
giving.  
The European and American intermediary organizations with which Ford 
worked to establish its foundation grantees in Africa include Development 
Innovations and Networks, a Swiss organization which established the West 
Africa Rural Foundation (WARF) in 1993 (The Ford Foundation 1993 Annual 
Report: 18), and Technoserve, an American organization which was contracted to 
                                                 
33Ford had tried to help establish more than ten (10) foundations in Eastern and Southern Africa in the 
1990s, but most of them floundered and died (Kuljian 2005). The few foundations that survived the initial 
“transplantation shock” are the general subject matter of this dissertation.   
34Even the non-Ford-founded philanthropic organizations that Ford supported in Eastern African countries 
received their capacity-building training from the same foreign intermediaries. As many of these non-Ford-
founded philanthropic organizations were informally run by the founding families, Ford’s support was 
directed at “modernizing” their management, governance and grantmaking structures; and encouraging 
them to build endowment funds. The whole idea was to formalize philanthropy in Africa.  
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establish the Nigeria35 Community Development Trust Fund (The Ford 
Foundation 1993 Annual Report: 18).36 Other international organizations that 
received grants to support Ford’s foundation-building in African countries 
included the Aga Khan Foundation (Switzerland), Synergos Institute (USA), and 
the Charities Aid Foundation (CAF)(England).37 A local philanthropy 
intermediary, the Southern Africa Grantmakers Association (SAGA), which was 
established by a group of American funders (including the Ford Foundation) to 
promote the community foundation concept in South Africa and to build 
foundations, collapsed after a brief existence due to a lack of local demand and 
support.  
Ford also used international intermediary organizations to provide the necessary 
skills training to the new foundations. The Aga Khan Foundation (Switzerland) was also 
one of the institutions that Ford funded to promote resource mobilization among the 
emerging African philanthropic institutions (The Ford Foundation Annual Reports 2001; 
2002). Resource Alliance, Inc., a US-based organization, received Ford grants to train the 
African foundation grantees in formal fundraising techniques (The Ford Foundation 2003 
Annual Report: 99). However, the fundraising skills that the African foundations 
acquired from the expert (but foreign) foundation-builders and capacity-building 
consultants were more suitable for raising funds from institutional donors in the US and 
                                                 
35Senegal and Nigeria were the two countries where Ford had field offices in West Africa at the time. 
36The Nigeria Community Development Trust Fund is now known as the Community Development 
Foundation.  
37For example, between 1997 and 1999 the Aga Khan Foundation (Switzerland) received a total of 
$2,100,000 to provide “endowment and program support for a Kenyan intermediary institution to advance 
community development and philanthropy” (The Ford Foundation 990-PF 2000). The Kenyan intermediary 
in question was the Kenya Community Development Foundation (KCDF). In 2002, the Synergos Institute, 
Inc. (New York) received a grant “to strengthen emerging and established foundations and associations of 
foundations in Southern Africa” (The Ford Foundation 2000 Annual Report: 90). 
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elsewhere than they were for mobilizing local philanthropic resources from individuals 
and groups in African countries (Ngondi-Houghton 2005).  
In the end, Ford’s use of foreign intermediary organizations with foundation-
building expertise to establish its foundation grantees ensured that the Ford-founded 
African philanthropies were set up as formal institutions, equipped with the formal 
institutional features (including managerial, governance, and grantmaking skills) that 
they needed to become efficient in their operations and grantmaking. The foreign 
intermediary organizations advanced one aspect of Ford’s philanthropy promotion 
approach, the building of formal grantmaking foundations with the capacity to deliver 
services (grants) to community development and civil society organizations, efficiently 
and effectively. But the foreign foundation-building experts could not advance Ford’s 
local resource mobilization objective, which had to do with the informal philanthropic 
landscape prevalent in the relevant African countries; as well as the local people’s 
motivations for giving, their giving values and practices.  
Using Organizational Incubation38 as an Instrument of Isomorphism 
Besides the use of foreign intermediary organizations to establish its African  
foundation grantees, Ford also used institutional incubation to further its reinforce the 
formalization and bureaucratization of the new foundations. The foundation used 
incubation as a means to effect institutional isomorphism and harmonization. Institutional 
isomorphism results from the tendency of superordinate institutions to ensure that smaller 
organizations in their organizational field (especially those dependent on them for 
                                                 
38Just like business incubators are companies that support the development of start-up companies by 
providing management services, office space, etc. incubating institutions in the world of philanthropy 
support start-up foundations and other philanthropic organizations by providing managerial, fiscal and 
other institutional support during the latter’s early years.  
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funding) adopt certain structures and institutional behaviors that make the latter conform 
to  organizational behaviors required by the more powerful organizations (Scott 1987; 
DiMaggio and Powell 1983). The Kenya Community Development Foundation (KCDF) 
was incubated by the Aga Khan Foundation for about four years, while TrustAfrica 
(started as the Special Initiative for Africa (SIA)) was incubated by the Ford Foundation 
at its headquarters in New York for five years. The Uthungulu Community Foundation in 
South Africa had to be incubated by the Zululand Chamber of Business Foundation.  
One reason for incubating new African foundations was because the incubating 
foundations needed to act as fiscal agents for the start-up  foundations during their 
formative years, when they were not yet registered as foundations and could not accept 
donor funds in their own name.39 More importantly, though, Ford also used incubation to 
train the fledgling foundations in the practical skills they needed to manage themselves as 
formal bureaucratic institutions according to generally accepted principles of foundation 
management. Incubation was therefore used as a tool to foster and reinforce the 
formalization and bureaucratization of the Ford-founded African philanthropic 
institutions. The process for establishing TrustAfrica provides a good example of how 
Ford used incubation for institutional isomorphism. A former Ford senior official 
explained TrustAfrica’s incubation in New York: 
[Ford] gave [the selected Executive Director]40 at least a year… in New 
York, [at Ford headquarters]. …They had him move several weeks or a 
month at a time from one department to another to learn. [It] was 
essentially to apprentice [him] in each of the major functions internally in 
the foundation, so he learned how these different units operate. …It was 
his sort of graduate course on foundation management [until] he was ready 
                                                 
39Participant H. Phone conversation with the author, Sept. 11, 2013 
40Ford selected one of its senior Africa Regional Representatives to head the new Africa-wide foundation.  
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to begin to design the institution. … He was given experience and learning 
about the internal workings [of a philanthropic foundation].41  
 
The former Ford official who led the then Special Initiative for Africa (SIA) 
attested to how the incubation process succeeded in ultimately creating 
TrustAfrica in Ford’s image. TrustAfrica was inculcated with the formal aspects 
of organizational development and made to resemble its “parent”,42 the Ford 
Foundation, as much as possible: 
TrustAfrica had a five-year incubation period (five years is a long time) 
during which we were based in the Ford Foundation…as a [Ford] project. 
… That already created a very organic umbilical cord… and [a] 
sentimental value attachment [to Ford]. …Which means then that the 
modus operandi of the new foundation, its policies, its manuals, its 
procedures, its grantmaking style, its nomenclature, … all of that, 
consciously, and largely unconsciously, tended to reflect its parent's 
systems and approaches….[Ford’s] footprint… was strong, largely 
because (and it’s understandable) if you set up a foundation and you invest 
tens of millions of dollars [in it], you're going to really be very close to it. 
You may even be [over-protective] …43 
 
Ford’s “footprint” on TrustAfrica (a result of the incubation) was so heavy that 
the latter was seen as a subsidiary of the Ford Foundation in Africa. It was seen as a 
foreign organization, rather than an authentic African philanthropic institution. A senior 
official of TrustAfrica explained the situation in which the transplanted African 
institution found itself: 
We were set up by the Ford Foundation so…for a long time we had the 
footprint of the Ford Foundation on us; we had the identity of the Ford 
Foundation. … [In the process], we learned the hard way that [the 
                                                 
41Participant F. Phone interview with the author, June 18, 2013 
42The parent-child relationship has often been invoked to describe the relationship between institutional 
founders and their institutional creations (McIlnay 1998; Slater et al. 2004). Several of the experts 
interviewed for this study (those from the Ford Foundation as well as the Ford-founded African 
philanthropies) described the relationship between the Ford Foundation and its African foundation grantees 
in parent-child terms.  
43Participant C. Phone interview with the author, June 19, 2013 
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founding institution has to] be very careful to ensure that… its footprint, 
thumbprint, identity, DNA… is not too much [on the local institution].44  
 
In the same way that the Ford Foundation incubated TrustAfrica in New York, the 
other institutions that Ford contracted to develop foundations in African countries also 
used incubation as part of their foundation building and organizational development 
processes. A description of how one such incubating organization tried to impose specific 
modes of operation on a new Ford-founded African philanthropy reveals some of the 
isomorphic pressures that the new foundations experienced to make them  conform to 
industry standards: 
The thing about another [organization] midwifing45 [your organization] is 
that they also bring their own baggage about how they think things have to 
be done. And so, once the [incubating] relationship is going on you (the 
new foundation) struggle to say [to the incubating organization] '… That is 
how you do things; but we are a new organization, and this is how we 
want to do it.' There was a lot of that happening at the time, including 
simple things like [the incubating organization] telling us “This is how we 
deal with HR (Human Resources) issues.  [And we would say to them]: 
“This is how we want to deal with HR issues in this new organization”. 46 
 
The incubation process, therefore, pressured the Ford-founded institutions 
to adopt specific institutional norms, values, and ways of working, that 
consolidated the formal institutional structures and systems. Ford’s 
transplantation process was usually inflexible and made little room for the local 
leadership of the new foundations to adapt the foreign-inspired philanthropic 
structures and concepts to the local context and cultures of giving. As one of the 
former Ford senior officials explained:  
                                                 
44Participant C. Phone interview with the author, June 19, 2013 
45This senior African foundation official referred to the incubating institutions that Ford engaged to 
establish or birth its foundation grantees as institutional midwives. 
46Participant H. Phone interview with the author, September 11, 2013 
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That gets us back to the definition that we (Ford) had of philanthropy, … 
too rigidly tied to the Western idea of the endowed foundation, the in-
perpetuity foundation, which is what the Ford Foundation is…So these 
problems are linked. …[We should have] been more flexible and willing 
to countenance lots of different kinds of [philanthropic] structures.47  
 
With varying degrees of resistance,48 the new African foundations adopted 
the institutional structures and practices that the incubating institutions, as well as 
Ford itself, pressed upon them.  In the process, the African foundations’ 
organizational structure and operating procedures ended up being more like those 
of professionalized foundations in America than those of non-donor supported 
informal philanthropic organizations in African countries. In particular, the 
incubation and formalization process (reinforced with the use of foreign 
intermediary organizations as institutional “midwives” and coaches) left the Ford-
founded philanthropies with little connectedness to the informal local cultures of 
giving, and the philanthropic organizational forms that people were familiar with 
and supported. One of the former Ford senior officials interviewed for this study 
wished that Ford’s local philanthropy promotion process had been more flexible, 
and that it had not insisted upon the formal foundation model: 
We could have… [been] much more flexible about the kinds of initiatives 
we were supporting, so they didn't have to be a foundation even…; we 
could have just supported different forms of African philanthropy….49  
 
The inflexibility of Ford’s institutional transplantation process left the 
Ford-founded African philanthropies unable to acquire organizational social 
                                                 
47Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013 
48See Rose Lukalo-Owino’s (2008) account of the establishment of the Kenya Community Development 
Foundation (KCDF) for the contentious relationship that developed between the KCDF and the Ford 
Foundation during the early years of the former’s development. It mostly had to do with the KCDF trying 
to resist the Ford Foundation’s pressures for it to conform to Ford’s US-inspired ideas of philanthropy and 
philanthropic organization.    
49Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013 
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capital, local legitimacy, or trust. One of the former Ford Foundation Africa 
Regional Representatives explained that the endogenous informal philanthropic 
institutions are what Africans rely on, participate in, and trust: 
The bulk of African philanthropy is at the community level. I don't know 
many Africans that have been to school or who got a school uniform or 
who had to go to university who didn't depend in a sense on a community 
mobilization effort. So, I think that what works on the continent are the 
rotating credit and savings [associations]… burial associations, and so on. 
…At the local level they are working. They continue to work, and people 
depend on them, they rely on them, they keep them alive, they keep using 
them, they keep modifying them, they keep morphing.50 
 
One of the important ways that Ford strengthened its institutional transplantation 
in African countries was, therefore, by using incubation as a foundation-building 
mechanism to ensure conformity with the formal standards of organizational 
development. However, as the Ford-founded philanthropies conformed in form 
and function to formal bureaucratic structures and standards, they became 
incompatible with the local giving cultures.  
Study Tours of American Community Foundations 
Besides incubating the new foundations to inculcate in them the required 
formal organizational features, one of the other methods that the Ford Foundation 
employed to try to promote the American-inspired foundation model to African 
elites was to organize study tours of community foundations in the United States. 
One of the institution-building support provided during the Africa Philanthropy 
Initiative (API) was to help local elites, new executives, and board members of 
the new African foundations to learn about the American philanthropic 
                                                 
50Participant I. Phone interview with the author, October 1, 2013 
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foundation, especially the community foundation model.51Some of these leaders 
received scholarships and fellowships to tour the United States to observe and 
learn about community foundations first-hand (Aina 2013).52 The idea was that 
the African elites would be able to apply the lessons learned in the US to the 
administration of the up and coming philanthropic institutions in their own 
countries in Africa. The training that the new African foundation leaders and 
executives received from touring American foundations did help them to 
strengthen the management and governance of their philanthropic institutions 
based on what they had observed in the US. They had to meet required standards 
to not only make them acceptable in the foundation field, but also to become 
attractive to other international donors as well.53 This, however, reinforced their 
resemblance to American foundations, but their dissemblance to homegrown 
indigenous African philanthropic organizational structures. 
Capacity-Building Initiatives and Infrastructure Organizations 
 
 Ford also used capacity-building workshops and peer-learning initiatives and 
networks to ensure that its African foundation grantees acquired the requisite formal 
                                                 
51Hager et al. (2004:160), drawing from organizational ecology theory, have stated that when a new 
organizational form is established in a place where few such organizational forms exist, the new 
organizational form suffers what they call “the liability of newness”. They argue, based on neo-institutional 
and social capital theory, that the negative effects of the liability of newness are mitigated when the new 
organizations’ leaders “connect” with others in the relevant field.  
52The Southern Africa Grantmakers Association (SAGA), established in 1996 by Ford and CS Mott to lead 
a community foundation building pilot program in South Africa, received $80, 000 (grant #09851463) in 
1998 as “partial support for a study tour of US community foundations” (The Ford Foundation 2000 
Annual Tax Return Form 990-PF). The US-based Aspen Institute, Inc. received the other portion of the 
grant ($63, 250) to help organize the study tour.  
53Aksartova (2009) found that international donors in Russia employed several means, including 
conferences and workshops, to impose institutional ideas that they wanted their grantees to adopt and 
practice. Though this often appeared to be a case of mimetic isomorphism where new foundations simply 
emulated ideas from established ones, it was also a form of coercive isomorphism (Powell and DiMaggio 
1983) because grantees often did not have alternatives and knew that there was a price to pay (in terms of 
lost funding) for noncompliance.  
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organizational skills and generally accepted principles and behaviors. They were to 
provide capacity-building resources and training to help the Ford-founded institutions to 
become efficient philanthropic institutions, comparable to their counterparts in the US. In 
1998 and 2005 Ford launched two major international initiatives --- the Africa 
Philanthropy Initiative (API) and the International Initiative to Strengthen Philanthropy 
(IISP) --- to consolidate and strengthen its foundation grantees in African and other 
developing countries respectively. The five major objectives that both the API and  the 
IISP sought to achieve were (1) managerial effectiveness; (2) governance effectiveness; 
(3) grantmaking effectiveness; (4) resource mobilization effectiveness; and (5) 
endowment-building effectiveness.  These will be analyzed in the next chapter to assess 
the effectiveness of Ford’s approach and initiatives in terms of these dimensions of 
foundation effectiveness.  
Aksartova (2009) found that the workshops and capacity-building training that 
international donors funded for their grantees in developing countries facilitated 
institutional isomorphism and, thus, fostered institutional homogenization. According to 
her, many of the donor-founded/funded organizations often end up more akin to their 
counterparts abroad than their homegrown and locally-funded counterparts and are 
accountable upward to their funders. They often have little accountability or linkages to 
their local institutional and philanthropic environment since they do not need to mobilize 
any resources locally.  
In an attempt to provide ongoing capacity-building to its foundation grantees in 
African countries, Ford also transplanted philanthropy infrastructure organizations as part 
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of its philanthropy transplantation process in African countries.54 In Kenya, for example, 
the Ford Foundation (through the intermediary of the UK-based Charities Aid 
Foundation)55 created the Ufadhili Trust (also known as the Center for Philanthropy and 
Social Responsibility) 56in 2001. Ufadhili’s purpose was to “strengthen the infrastructure 
of local philanthropy and build a philanthropic culture in Eastern Africa” (The Ford 
Foundation 2002 Annual tax Return Form 990-F). Ford also funded the creation of the 
East Africa Association of Grantmakers (EAAG) as an umbrella organization to 
“strengthen philanthropy” in the East African region. The East Africa Philanthropy 
Learning Group, another of Ford’s networking and peer learning efforts in East Africa, 
brought together Ford-founded and non-Ford-founded philanthropic institutions in that 
sub-region to share ideas.57 The infrastructure/support and umbrella organizations were 
generally expected to help build and provide on-going support to the new foundations 
that Ford had established. They were expected to help make the institutional environment 
in the relevant African countries more accommodating of, and enabling for, the formal 
Ford-founded institutions; as well as the other formally organized local philanthropic 
institutions. Overall, they were expected to help develop and strengthen the civil society 
and philanthropic sectors in African countries.  
                                                 
54Johnson et al. (2004) cited the lack of philanthropic infrastructure organizations as one of the factors 
militating against the development of institutional philanthropy in many developing countries. But these, 
like the foundations, were also modeled on philanthropy infrastructure organizations in the US, with little 
connection to local philanthropic cultures.  
55The Ford Foundation 2000 Annual Tax Return Form 990-PF Grant #10002014; grant to CAF “to 
establish the East Africa Centre for the Promotion of Philanthropy and Social Responsibility”. Charities 
Aid Foundation (UK) later opened local offices in Kenya and South Africa, named its Kenya affiliate 
Allavida, and continued to receive grants from the Ford Foundation to promote philanthropy in Eastern and 
Southern Africa. One such grant, made in 2003 (grant #10300423), was “to build foundations and advance 
the field of philanthropy in East Africa”.  
56The Ford Foundation 2002 Annual Tax Return Form 990-PF Grant #10350501  
57Participant B. Phone interview with the author, April 17, 2013 & Participant R. Phone interview with the 
author, March 27, 2013 
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However, much like the Southern Africa Grantmakers Association (SAGA),58the 
Ford-founded umbrella and support organizations that were transplanted in African 
countries did not (or were unable to) carry out their functions as expected (Ngondi-
Houghton 2005). Individual foundations such as the KCDF found themselves in a 
situation where they had to try to balance their own specific struggles for survival with 
the work that needed to be done to create a more trusting and enabling local environment 
for institutional philanthropy to put down roots, to grow, and to thrive in their respective 
countries.59   
Conclusion 
Having chosen to use the formal American-inspired foundation model to 
attain its local resource mobilization goal in African countries, Ford’s approach to 
promoting local philanthropy consisted of using experts and organizational 
development mechanisms and initiatives to build, inculcate, and consolidate the 
necessary formal structures and organizational values and behaviors into its 
foundation grantees; to make them efficient and effective at their functions. 
Chapter II dealt with the Ford Foundation’s transplantation approach to 
philanthropy promotion in African countries, which is the independent variable. It 
focused on the institutional transplantation process that Ford employed to try to 
accomplish its goal of catalyzing the mobilization of local philanthropic resources 
in African countries.  
                                                 
58Created by Ford and other American private foundations in their usual top-down fashion, SAGA was not 
locally-demanded and lacked local embeddedness. It was, therefore, unable to garner the financial and 
moral support of local people and institutions; and collapsed around 2006.    
59Participant H. Phone interview with the author, September 11, 2013 
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The chapter briefly placed the Ford Foundation in its historical context in 
the 1930s and described how, in the 1950s, the foundation went from being a 
small midwestern foundation focused on local issues, to a global philanthropic 
actor in international development. I described how the foundation’s choice to 
transplant the American-inspired foundation model in African countries60 was 
undergirded by the globalizing and boundary-spanning thinking of the 1990s that 
encouraged the minimization of local contexts and differences among countries. I 
analyzed the main institution-building (and isomorphic) techniques that Ford 
employed to transplant and institutionalize its foundation grantees in African 
countries; showing how Ford’s approach to local philanthropy promotion 
produced formal and bureaucratized foundations that were different from, and out 
of synch with, the existing African cultures of giving and informal structures for 
social exchange.  
Overall, chapter II showed that Ford’s philanthropy-promotion program in 
African countries was essentially foundation-building; which was shaped by 
isomorphic mechanisms that did not make allowance for local elites to adapt the 
Ford-founded philanthropic institutions to the local socio-cultural and socio-
economic environments. The chapter argued that Ford ended up building formal 
local intermediaries that were efficient at raising and channeling international 
funds to local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society 
organizations (CSOs). But they were different from, and ill- equipped for 
                                                 
60As opposed, for example, to supporting the existing cultures of giving and philanthropic practices 
74 
connecting with, the predominantly informal institutions in the African 
philanthropic landscape that are critical for effective local resource mobilization.61 
The next chapter, chapter III, tackles the dependent/outcome variable, 
which is the extent of Ford’s effectiveness in accomplishing its philanthropy 
promotion goals (particularly its local resource mobilization goal) through the 
establishment and strengthening of formal American-inspired62 philanthropic 
foundations. The chapter analyzes and assesses the level of effectiveness of the 
foundation’s  philanthropy promotion program in African countries; focusing on 
its local resource mobilization effectiveness, as measured by the effectiveness of 
the Ford-founded/funded philanthropic foundations.63 The outcome of Ford’s  two 
international capacity-building initiatives (the API and IISP) as determined by its 
African foundation grantees under study (who were beneficiaries of the 
initiatives) will provide evidence for assessing the outcome of the Ford 
Foundation’s philanthropy promotion effort in African countries in the 1990s with 
respect to local resource mobilization.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
61I define effective local resource mobilization as the ability of a Ford-founded African philanthropic 
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62As opposed to informal and non-professionalized African-style philanthropic models.  
63As pointed out in Chapter I, this study determines the effectiveness of Ford’s philanthropy promotion 
program in African countries by looking at the effectiveness of the local philanthropies that it established 
for the purpose of implementing its philanthropy agenda in African countries.   
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Chapter III: Ford’s Success at Formalization, Failure at Local Resource 
Mobilization 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter II dealt with the independent variable --- namely the Ford Foundation’s 
approach to local philanthropy promotion in African countries. The chapter focused on 
the transplantation process and the institution-building techniques that Ford employed to 
transfer the formal features of American-inspired foundation philanthropy to African 
countries. That chapter argued that Ford’s very decision to transplant the American-
inspired grantmaking philanthropic foundation model in African countries; and the 
isomorphic processes that it employed in the transplantation process, produced 
philanthropic institutions that were formal in form and function; different and 
disconnected from the informal philanthropic institutions and practices prevalent in 
African countries.  
Chapter III now tackles the dependent/outcome variable --- the extent of Ford’s 
effectiveness in achieving its objective of boosting philanthropy and local resource 
mobilization in African countries through the creation of, and support for, American-
inspired grantmaking philanthropic foundations. The empirical evidence for determining 
Ford’s effectiveness (especially in building its foundation grantees’ capacity for, and 
effectiveness at, local resource mobilization) is provided by the three Ford-founded 
African philanthropies which participated in the Africa Philanthropy Initiative (API) and 
the International Initiative to Strengthen Philanthropy (IISP).1 I assess their effectiveness 
along the relevant dimensions of foundation effectiveness identified in Chapter I.  
                                                 
1Of the three African philanthropies under study, only the Kenya Community Development Foundation had 
participated in the API. The other two, the African Women’s Development Fund and TrustAfrica had not 
yet been established. All three were beneficiaries of the IISP.  
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Chapter III’s assessment of the three Ford-founded African philanthropies shows 
that the Ford Foundation’s international capacity building initiatives successfully 
consolidated and strengthened the (generic) formal dimensions of foundation 
effectiveness among the selected African foundations. More significantly for the study’s 
argument, this chapter also shows that Ford’s international initiatives failed to provide the 
kind of (context-specific) support that the African foundations needed to build their 
internal capacity, to adapt to the African philanthropic landscape, and to enable them to 
cultivate local funding sources for effective local resource mobilization.  
Following is a brief background as well as the main objectives of the API and the 
IISP. I discuss their main objectives and go on to assess the extent of Ford’s effectiveness 
at inculcating the relevant skills and capacities that its African foundation grantees 
needed to carry out their functions effectively, especially their local resource mobilization 
function. As mentioned elsewhere, the effectiveness of the Ford-founded/funded African 
philanthropies under study is deemed to indicate Ford’s effectiveness in its local 
philanthropy promotion effort in African countries.  
The API and IISP: Brief Background, Goals and Objectives  
The Africa Philanthropy Initiative (API), launched in 1998, was Ford’s attempt in 
the mid-1990s to strengthen the foundations that it had just established in African 
countries, to enable them mobilize local philanthropic resources for financing community 
development and the growth of local civil society (The Ford Foundation 2006; Aina 
2013). The philanthropic institutions that participated in the API were the West Africa 
Rural Foundation (Senegal), the Kenya Community Development Foundation (Kenya), 
the Uthungulu Community Foundation (South Africa), and the Community Development 
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Foundation (Mozambique) (The Ford Foundation 2006).2 According to Gaberman,3 the 
API was “designed to increase knowledge and capacity among five newly created 
African foundations through technical assistance, convenings, peer learning, and 
networking” (Gaberman 2006:1). Among other things, the API’s objectives included 
building the capacity of the new Ford-founded philanthropic institutions in the key areas 
of “governance and management”, “resource mobilization and endowment building”, and 
“grant making;” as well as helping them to “mobilize resources or philanthropic 
contributions for local development.”4  
On its part, the International Initiative to Strengthen Philanthropy (IISP), launched 
in 2005, was billed as Ford’s largest global philanthropic initiative to support and 
reenergize its foundation grantees in developing countries (Hartnell 2006; Raman 2005). 
It was meant to assist 18 foundations in 13 countries and 5 continents “to add to their 
assets and enhance their capacities as grantmaking and social development organizations” 
(The Ford Foundation 2006:3). Ford indicated that “the set of institutions ultimately 
chosen [to participate] would include those where:  
The foundation has played an instrumental role in their establishment or 
development, and where they have reached a stage of organizational 
maturity, but where the resources available for grantmaking are not yet at 
a level to ensure significant impact.5  
                                                 
2The Community Development Foundation (Mozambique) was not a Ford-founded philanthropic 
institution. It was established by Mrs. Graça Machel, the former First Lady of Mozambique, with major 
support from the MacArthur Foundation. It was selected to participate in the API because the MacArthur 
Foundation had collaborated with the Ford Foundation on Ford’s capacity-building initiatives in the United 
States. which allowed MacArthur’s foundation grantee in Mozambique to participate in Ford’s API (The 
Ford Foundation 2006).   
3Barry Gaberman was the Senior Vice-President at Ford when the API and IISP were launched.  
4Participant R. Phone interview with the author on March 27, 2013 
5The Ford Foundation. Inter-Office Memorandum from Linetta Gilbert, Sushma Raman, and Christopher 
Harris (co-chairs of the Philanthropy Learning Group) to Susan V. Berresford (Ford President). 
Unpublished Report, June 20, 2003.  
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Based on those criteria, the African Women’s Development Fund (AWDF), the Kenya 
Community Development Foundation (KCDF), and Trust Africa6 were selected from the 
African continent to participate in the IISP.  
From the beneficiaries’ perspective, the African participants explained 
how they understood the objectives of the IISP. According to the African 
Women’s Development Fund (AWDF), the IISP aimed “to enhance the impact, 
scale and effectiveness of key [Ford-founded/funded] foundations based primarily 
outside the United States” (AWDF 2007-08 Annual Report:22).7 The Kenya 
Community Development Foundation (KCDF) described the IISP as “an eﬀort to 
build the ﬁnancial and programmatic capacities of [Ford]-supported foundations 
to enable them to [become] substantial players” in their countries and areas of 
operation (KCDF 2005 Annual Report:21). The capabilities that Ford set out to 
impart to its African foundation grantees through the two international initiatives, 
therefore, included: (1) management; (2) board/governance; (3) grantmaking; (4) 
resource mobilization (local and international); and (5) endowment-building8 
capacities.9  
                                                 
6The philanthropic institutions that Ford established in African countries in the 2000s tended to be pan-
African, located in one country but responsible for making grants to nonprofit and civil society 
organizations throughout the continent. They included the AWDF (2001) in Ghana; TrustAfrica (2006) in 
Senegal; and Akiba Uhaki (2006) in Kenya. Even the West Africa Rural Foundation which Ford 
established in the early 1990s was mandated to serve Senegal (where it was located) as well as the 
neighboring Francophone countries.  
7African Women’s Development Fund (AWDF) 2007-08 Annual Report. Available online at  
http://awdf.org/wp-content/uploads/ANNUAL_REPORT_2007-2008_.pdf  Accessed June 4, 2018 
8Endowment-building effectiveness assumes local resource mobilization effectiveness as most international 
funders and other types of institutional donors rarely contribute towards endowment funds. Ford offered 
endowment challenge grants to its foundation grantees but expected them to make the match by mobilizing 
local resources.  
9These coincide with the dimensions of foundation effectiveness identified in the literature in 
Chapter I.  
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The technical assistance that the Ford Foundation provided as part of the 
API consisted of core institutional development support to help the new 
foundations acquire the managerial, governance, and grantmaking capabilities that 
they so badly needed in their early years to function according to acceptable 
international standards. The core support also helped to build the African 
foundations’ absorptive capacity to handle large sums of grant money. Their 
ability to manage large sums of money efficiently eventually made them attractive 
to other international donors looking for such intermediaries to help them reach 
local community development organizations. A senior official of one of the Ford-
founded philanthropic institutions under study described the long-term 
institutional development support that Ford (unlike other donors) so generously 
provided: 
There are few donors who put money in core costs. [My organization] was 
lucky because for nearly nine or ten years since its formation10 the Ford 
Foundation was one of the [few] organizations that committed to 
supporting core costs for the organization, including board development, 
to make sure that we had good systems and structures to be able to spur 
[the organization] to greater growth and development.11  
 
As a follow-up to the API, the IISP focused on, and tried to shored up, Ford’s on-
going capacity-building support to the selected philanthropies in the areas of 
increased grantmaking, local resource mobilization and endowment-building. 
 
 
 
                                                 
10The API was started when Ford had just established this foundation.   
11Participant S. Face-to-face interview with author, July 15, 2013 
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The IISP as a ‘Second Bounce’ to Boost Local Resource Mobilization 
Ford described the IISP as a “second bounce” 12 in its philanthropy 
promotion effort in developing countries, through which the foundation was 
attempting to take a second look at the philanthropic foundations that it had 
established in developing countries in the late 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s. The 
IISP was “to fast track a little bit the kind of growth…that Ford had hoped to see 
earlier, but that… hadn't happened.”13 This initiative was to go beyond the API to 
put a selected group of Ford’s foundation grantees in developing countries on 
their way to mobilizing more resources locally, building bigger endowment funds, 
increasing their grantmaking, and becoming game-changers in their countries. As 
one former Ford senior official put it: “With the foundations that had been around 
for a long time, [the IISP] was to help boost their resources to get them to the next 
level, and to just recharge them, revitalize them”.14 
Strengthening the ability of the IISP participants to build and increase their 
endowment funds with locally mobilized resources was, therefore, an important goal of 
the IISP. The following statement by a former Ford senior official underscores the 
importance of local resource mobilization:   
We all believed, not only that philanthropy was important, but that 
…indigenizing15 philanthropy was important, whether we were talking 
about Africa, Asia, Latin America, or the Middle East. This is because 
most organizations don't want to be dependent on foreign resources 
                                                 
12The Ford Foundation. Inter-Office Memorandum from Linetta Gilbert, Sushma Raman, and Christopher 
Harris (co-chairs of the Philanthropy Learning Group) to Susan V. Berresford (Ford President) 
Unpublished Report, June 20, 2003.  
13Participant K. Phone interview with the author, June 26, 2013 
14Participant Q. Phone interview with the author, Sept. 18, 2013 
15“Indigenization” as used here meant building local foundations that will be supported financially by local 
people; it did not mean supporting the already existing indigenous forms of charitable giving.  
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forever… So, generating more financial independence for civil society on 
the ground in Africa and elsewhere was one of our strategic objectives...16   
 
Raman (2005) 17summarized the objectives of the IISP and Ford’s hopes for 
building its foundation grantees’ capacity for increased local resource 
mobilization for greater  socio-economic impact:  
The initiative seeks to increase the impact of these local institutions by 
helping participants to strengthen governance structures, augment 
endowments, mobilize local resources, and enhance grantmaking 
programmes. In developing this network of foundations, primarily outside 
the US, the [Ford] Foundation hopes to build the local capacity and 
legitimacy required to achieve lasting positive change on important issues 
of poverty and equity (Raman 2005).  
 
What is clear from the above is that Ford aimed at using the API and the 
IISP to build its foundation grantees’ effectiveness, including that of local 
resource mobilization. However, the assessment of these initiatives shows that, in 
practice, the initiatives were successful in other areas, but failed to build the 
latter’s capacity for local resource mobilization.  
Assessment of the Ford Foundation’s Effectiveness    
 
One unique thing about Ford was its long-term commitment to the institutional 
development of its African foundation grantees.18 Ford’s technical assistance and 
capacity building support to its foundation grantees under study succeeded in helping 
them to develop into efficient philanthropic intermediaries with strong management, 
governance, and grantmaking capabilities.19 Ford’s institutional support to the KCDF, for 
                                                 
16Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013 
17Sushma Raman was the former Ford program officer who managed the implementation of the IISP during 
the first part of the program’s life-cycle.  
18In a way, the API and IISP were part of this commitment. 
19The KCDF, AWDF and TrustAfrica were unanimous in their praise for, and gratitude to, the Ford 
Foundation for providing their institutions with the long-term organizational development support that had 
helped them to be the strong organizations that they had become. However, when asked about their 
82 
example, is illustrative of the institutional support that the foundation provided to the 
Ford-founded/funded philanthropies; and contributed to their managerial and board 
effectiveness: 
The Ford Foundation …provided the KCDF with institutional 
development support, [with] having a strong and good board, and [made] 
sure [the KCDF] [was] able to recruit a qualified CEO conversant and 
relevant with the issues, to lead the organization. For a while Ford … paid 
for certain costs of the core team; [it] met the board costs and … supported 
the CEO and some of the management staff costs. I … believe that that 
was the most important contribution Ford put in.20 
 
By 2010, when it ended its support for philanthropy-promotion and foundation-building 
in African (and other developing) countries, Ford’s transplantation processes and its 
capacity-building initiatives had succeeded in building African foundations that 
functioned much like their counterparts in the United States in terms of the formal 
characteristics of organizational development and behavior, including managerial, 
(international) fundraising and board effectiveness.  
Board Effectiveness 
The three Ford-founded philanthropies all had well constituted boards of 
directors, thanks to support and training from the Ford Foundation. By providing them 
with consultants and capacity-building support, Ford helped them to constitute governing 
boards that met acceptable organizational standards. For example, unlike the Akuapem 
Community Foundation (Akuapem CF) whose governing body was selected based on 
place of origin, ethnic identity, and stature in the traditional hierarchy, the KCDF selected 
its board members based on formal expertise and skills, as well as educational and 
                                                 
capacity for local resource mobilization, they admitted that despite the capacity building support they 
received during the initiatives, they were still very weak in that area.  
20Participant S. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 15, 2013 
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professional qualifications. The Akuapem CF is a homegrown Ghanaian philanthropic 
foundation, that was initiated and established by the people of the Akuapem Traditional 
Area in the Eastern Region of Ghana without international seed money or funding. Its 
governing body was made up of a group of elders and patrons (including traditional rulers 
from the area of operation).  
The KCDF was also mindful of sectoral diversity, including considerations for 
gender, regional balance, race and religion. A senior official of the KCDF described how 
the first governing board of the foundation was constituted: 
They (the board members) were from all forms of sectors. Some were in 
Business, [others in] Development. Some were doctors, teachers, and 
others were from the insurance and banking sectors. That mix was very 
carefully calculated. It was calculated that way because it was intended 
that in the future KCDF would be looking for local financial support from 
those kinds of sectors or actors in those sectors. And so, it was natural that 
once they were included in the board at that time, they would provide 
value in terms of networks, in terms of linkages, in terms of insights on 
how it would be possible to actually raise money from those kinds of 
institutions.21 
 
As the first CEO of the KCDF explained in the 2005 Annual Report: “We were 
very aware of the high public expectation of organizations handling grant funds 
and we wanted to keep high levels of governance right from the outset” (KCDF 
2005 Annual Report: 9). The KCDF has since maintained a professional board 
well-suited to the formal philanthropic institution that it is.   
As mentioned in Chapter II, TrustAfrica (as the then Special Initiative for Africa)  
had to go through several years of incubation at the Ford headquarters in New York. 
During that process, Ford built and structured TrustAfrica as a formal philanthropic 
institution with a formal governing board. This was made up of Africans (men and 
                                                 
21Participant S. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 15, 2013 
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women) from various parts of the continent, from various sectors, and with various types 
of relevant expertise. On its part, because the African Women’s Development Fund 
(AWDF) was a women’s organization championing women’s rights and gender equality, 
its governing body was gender-based and was made up of accomplished women from 
various African countries.  
All in all, through the incubation process and the capacity-building training 
provided during the API and the IISP, as well as the resultant coercive and mimetic 
isomorphism,22 the Ford Foundation successfully transferred the formal skills of board 
development to all the Ford-founded philanthropies under study. A former senior official 
of the Ford Foundation explained how Ford’s board development support to its 
foundation grantees worked: “There was technical assistance. They (Ford’s foundation 
grantees) were given consultants …that helped them to develop…their governance 
structures, to strengthen their boards.”23 
These formally constituted boards not only supported the good governance of the 
KCDF, the AWDF and TrustAfrica, they also enhanced the credibility of these 
organizations, making them attractive to other international donors. In other words, the 
effective governance structures that Ford helped its foundation grantees to put in place 
also served to boost fundraising from international sources, as other international funders 
felt comfortable partnering with them and using them as intermediaries for channeling 
grants (regranting) to communities of the funders’ choice. But unlike its effect on 
fundraising from international sources, board effectiveness had little effect on local 
                                                 
22The coercive isomorphism came from the incubation that many Ford-founded philanthropies had to 
submit to, while the mimetic isomorphism resulted from the networking and peer-learning sessions 
(including the API and IISP) that they all benefitted from.  
23Participant R. Phone interview with the author, March 27, 2013 
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resource mobilization. This is seen from how little each of the foundations under study 
raised locally as a percentage of total revenue, despite their good governance structures 
(see Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5).  
Managerial Effectiveness 
 
Just as the Ford Foundation provided its African foundation grantees with 
resources for board development as well as other types of institutional capacity-building 
and strengthening, it also provided resources for hiring seasoned professionals as 
Executive Directors and CEOs to manage the transplanted African philanthropies. Ford’s 
long-term core support for institutional development (which included money for paying 
the salaries and emoluments of the foundations’ managers and staff) made it possible for 
its foundation grantees to attract highly qualified executives and staff. An examination of 
the qualifications of the CEOs, executive directors, and program officers of the Ford-
founded/funded African foundations revealed that they were all highly educated and had 
a lot of experience as leaders in the civil society and philanthropic sector in their 
respective countries, and on the continent. For example, the founding CEO of the KCDF, 
Monica Mutuku, was a seasoned development practitioner with years of experience in the 
Kenyan NGO sector. Her successor, Janet Mawiyoo, also had a lot of experience in the 
development and nonprofit world, having worked in her native Kenya as well as in 
Tanzania.24 In the case of TrustAfrica, Ford designated one of its own seasoned senior 
officials to become the first Executive Director. All of the foundations under study were, 
therefore, run by competent CEOs and Executive Directors, whose hiring was facilitated 
and (mostly) paid for by the Ford Foundation.  
                                                 
24Participant H. Phone interview with the author on September 11, 2013 
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Through the API’s and the IISP’s networking, peer-learning, and capacity 
building programs (as well as the site visits to community foundations in the United 
States as mentioned in Chapter II) the Ford Foundation helped the managers of the Ford-
founded philanthropies to acquire the specifics of foundation management. Ford was, 
therefore, able to successfully transfer (through formal training) the skills and 
competencies needed to strengthen the managerial effectiveness of its three African 
foundation grantees under study --- TrustAfrica, KCDF, and AWDF. The good 
governance and effective management systems that Ford helped its African foundation 
grantees to build (as discussed in the previous sections) contributed to effective 
grantmaking.  
Grantmaking Effectiveness 
Grantmaking was a priority among the Ford-founded/funded African 
philanthropies soon after they were established. The local elites who worked with 
Ford to establish them were initially interested in the opportunity for them to 
channel resources from Ford (and other international donors) to local 
communities and identified vulnerable groups (such as women and youth) in their 
countries (Lukalo-Owino 2008).25 Though local resource mobilization had been 
identified as a critical component of any strategy for their long-term financial 
sustainability, they all decided to focus first on grantmaking. Due, partly, to the 
history of corruption in African countries, the Ford-founded African 
philanthropies determined that before attempting to ask people (and corporations) 
to support them locally, it was best to first give the local communities and 
                                                 
25Also, Participant K. Phone interview with author on June 26, 2013 
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constituencies something. It was hoped that channeling grants efficiently to local 
communities would establish some mutual trust between the foundations and their 
constituents. The rationale was that giving money away (in countries where 
money is usually being stolen by public authorities) would help the African 
foundations gain the confidence of the local populations; become visible and 
establish the credibility that they needed to be able to tackle local resource 
mobilization.26 As the first CEO of the KCDF explained: “Our main option at that 
point was to immediately embark on grant making” (KCDF 2005 Annual Report: 
9). Grantmaking skills were, therefore, one of the first competencies that Ford 
imparted to its foundation grantees through its capacity-building efforts, mainly 
the API and the IISP.  
Grantmaking skills, being institutional skills, are formal and easily 
transmitted through training. Ford was therefore successful at transferring them 
through the API, the IISP, and other Ford-sponsored peer-learning and 
networking structures. The AWDF, the KCDF, and TrustAfrica formed 
partnerships with local organizations (grantees) through which they solicited 
feedback to help them make their grants more effectively.  
Donor-created and/or funded philanthropic institutions such as 
TrustAfrica, KCDF and AWDF that have well-established grantmaking skills and 
capabilities (based on their connections with local grant-seeking communities) 27 
tend to be seen as reputable, credible and authentic by international funders (even 
                                                 
26Participant P. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 17, 2013 
27The relationship that the Ford-founded/funded philanthropies had with their local constituents was geared 
towards developing the latter as effective grant seekers and community project implementers; not as local 
donors.   
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if locals do not necessarily view them that way). International funders looking for 
viable and trusted intermediaries (partners) through which to get their funding to 
local communities sought out the Ford-founded/funded philanthropies, among 
others; a testament to their effectiveness as grant makers.  
Moreover, the Ford-founded/funded philanthropies (like other donor-
founded organizations) are usually easier for international funders to relate to, and 
partner with, than philanthropic institutions created by local people (without the 
isomorphic influence of international donors). A senior official of one of the 
Ford-founded African foundations under study described how their institution’s 
effectiveness at grantmaking and other bureaucratic functions attracted 
international partnerships and funding to it: 
Most of our funding up to now has really come from foreign institutions 
because they want to do some work in Africa, but they don't have physical 
presence in the continent. They like what we are doing, they believe in our 
systems… and so they seem really comfortable...to come and get their 
programs supported through [our foundation].28 
 
The same official described how international donors would offer grants without being 
asked:  
We actually have donors [that] have come to us and said: ‘Here are some 
resources for the work that you want to do’…. Most [international donors] 
want to work with us ... The majority of them have budgets that are bigger 
than ours and so all they want is... an association [with us].29 
 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show the millions of dollars that two of the Ford-
founded/funded philanthropies under study successfully gave away (or channeled) 
                                                 
28Participant G. Phone interview with the author, March 28, 2013 
29Participant G. Phone interview with the author, March 28, 2013 
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as grants to women’s organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and 
civil society organizations (CSOs) in various African countries.  
Almost all of the grant money was raised from international donors (for 
regranting) as is shown in Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5. In fact, the three Ford-
founded/funded African philanthropies became so successful at channeling grants 
money to local organizations that they began to feel almost overwhelmed with the 
demands for local partnerships from international donors. Officials of the Ford-
founded institutions under study expressed concern about the risk of mission drift 
associated with acting as intermediaries and channeling pass-through grants to 
carry out donors’ projects. As one of them explained:  
We …actually find ourselves really inundated by some of these requests 
from outside to an extent that it might really kind of take us away from our 
core business...When you have groups that come with the money and they 
are supporting you, your priorities will kind of shift. And I mean, honestly, 
… that is what is happening, not just with [the Ford-founded 
philanthropies] but with a number of groups [in African countries] that 
depend on funding from outside…. That is [how] [foreign funding] can 
influence some of the programming .30 
 
In sum, as far as grantmaking effectiveness is concerned, the Ford Foundation 
was highly effective at transferring the grantmaking knowledge and skills that its 
foundation grantees needed to become successful grant makers. Ford’s success is 
seen in the grantmaking effectiveness of its foundation grantees, and how much 
attention and funds the AWDF, TrustAfrica and the KCDF have attracted from 
international donors, relative to funds mobilized from local sources.  
 
 
                                                 
30Participant G. Phone interview with the author, March 28, 2013 
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Resource Mobilization Effectiveness31  
One of Ford’s rationales for establishing philanthropic foundations in developing 
countries was to stimulate the mobilization of local resources. Local resource 
mobilization was not only expected to raise money for self-reliant community-driven 
development in the selected countries; it was also expected to become an avenue for 
community mobilization, building organizational social capital, and strengthening civil 
society.32 As Ford explained:   
To be rooted in community, a foundation’s resources must at least in part 
come from that community.…A primary objective was for grantee 
foundations to diversify their funding sources — facilitating broader 
accountability and community participation. In this conceptualization, 
fundraising is not only a means of building the institution’s budget but 
also a way to build social capital within the community, strengthening the 
institution’s relationships and reputation (The Ford Foundation 2006:16). 
 
It was, therefore, important for Ford to ensure that the philanthropic foundations 
that it had established in African countries acquired the necessary skills and competencies 
to carry out effective resource mobilization (both international and local), but especially 
local. As part of the capacity building support of the API, Ford funded training in 
resource mobilization for its foundation grantees. In 2003, for example, Ford funded 
Resource Alliance, Inc., a US-based organization, to implement “a program of research 
and training in fundraising for NGOs in Eastern Africa,” including the Ford-founded 
philanthropies (The Ford Foundation 2003 Annual Report: 99). Also, as part of the IISP, 
                                                 
31As mentioned in Chapter I, resource mobilization in contexts outside the United States has an 
international and local dimension. This study therefore distinguishes between funds raised from 
international sources and those mobilized from local sources, since local resource mobilization is the focus 
of the study. 
32Organizational social capital acquired through community mobilization and constituency-building are 
deemed to be prerequisites for boosting local resource mobilization. See Hager et al. (2004) and Schneider 
(2009) 
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Ford brought in experts in strategic communication to take the participants through 
principles of fundraising and donor relations.   
Success at Transferring International Fundraising Skills 
As a result of the trainings in formal proposal writing and fundraising that Ford 
provided its foundation grantees through the API and the IISP, as well as the peer-
learning and networking opportunities that were always part of these initiatives, its three 
African foundation grantees under study became very effective and successful at securing 
funding from international donors.33 The Ford Foundation remained their main long-term 
funder until 2010, when it ended its foundation-building and philanthropy promotion 
program in developing countries. And due to their relationship with Ford, their 
grantmaking effectiveness, as well as their management, and board effectiveness (as 
described above), the Ford-founded African foundations became attractive as 
intermediaries for pass-through grants from international donors looking to benefit from 
their local expertise. This increased the amounts of money that they raised from 
international donors, though most of it was restricted for specific projects of the donors’ 
choosing.  
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show the millions of dollars that the African Women’s 
Development Fund (AWDF) and TrustAfrica succeeded in raising from external sources 
during the stated years. From 2004-2010, the AWDF raised a total of $30,398,218; 
almost 98% of which was from international sources. Likewise, from 2006 to 2010, 
                                                 
33The Ford-founded/funded African foundations indicated that the proposal writing and other formal 
fundraising skills that they learned from the API and IISP were more suitable for raising money from 
international sources than for mobilizing resources from local individuals and groups. However, the formal 
skills were useful for soliciting funds from some local institutional donors such as banks.  
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TrustAfrica raised almost a hundred percent of its resources from international sources.34 
It was in 2006 that TrustAfrica became a full-fledged foundation after its incubation at 
the Ford headquarters. It was in 2010 that the Ford Foundation ended its philanthropy 
promotion and foundation-building program in developing countries. The Kenyan 
Community Development Foundation (KCDF) was no different. Having benefitted from 
the API as well as the IISP, it acquired the skills and developed the credibility to equally 
attract almost 98% of its funding from international sources.   
Ford’s Inability to Catalyze Local Resource Mobilization  
Unlike its effectiveness in helping the three African foundations under study to 
successfully raise relatively huge sums of international funds as shown above, Ford was 
unsuccessful in providing them with the adaptive capacity that they needed to be able to 
build local donor bases and constituencies; to make them attractive to local donors. 
Despite their objective of supporting the participating foundations to mobilize the bulk of 
their resources locally, the API and IISP were structured more for the transfer of formal 
skills. They, therefore, reinforced and strengthened the participating foundations along 
the formal dimensions of effectiveness discussed earlier. Ford did not (or could not) 
provide local resource mobilization support to its transplants in the predominantly 
informal contexts of their various countries. Local resource mobilization, being 
dependent on each participating foundation’s local socio-cultural and socio-economic 
environment and context, was beyond the reach of formal standardized strategies and 
                                                 
34The Ford Foundation set up TrustAfrica with $30 million to be distributed to it over ten years.  
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skills training modeled on successful initiatives from the US.35 A former Ford consultant 
described the limitations of the initiative when it came to local resource mobilization:  
You couldn't do a session on … [local] fund mobilization to suit 
everybody. And ...probably fund mobilization was one of the weakest 
parts [of the IISP] because everyone needed different types of strategies 
according to…[where and why] they were trying to raise local money.36  
 
The officials of the three Ford-founded African philanthropies who participated in 
this study stated that the resource mobilization skills and techniques that were imparted to 
them through the API and IISP were often “Western-oriented”, more suited for use in 
developed economies such as the US, than for use in their own developing countries and 
informal local contexts. One of them described the capacity-building trainings thus: 
The things they talked about were very Western-oriented... But it is not 
peculiar to Ford. In the philanthropic world (the work I have done up to 
now) … more than half of the things are… tailored to suit the developed 
countries, and I don't fault them. That is what they know; that is what 
they've experienced; that's what has worked for them.37 
 
A former Ford consultant underscored the unsuitability of the formal fundraising 
trainings for local resource mobilization; and described how local donors cared little for 
the types of formal resource mobilization skills that international donors like Ford 
instilled in their grantees in developing countries:  
One of the things that I found so interesting, working in the field [in Sub-
Saharan Africa] for a number of years now, …is that everyone (African 
NGO leaders and development practitioners included) is so conditioned to 
talking about logical frameworks and all that kind of thing. But that 
crowds out everything one might...think of creatively; about what 
resources one could mobilize locally. … All around the [developing] 
                                                 
35The API and the IISP were modeled on Ford’s two previous successful capacity building initiatives for 
Ford-funded philanthropies in America. These were the Leadership Program (LP) and the Rural 
Development and Community Foundation Initiative (RDCFI) (The Ford Foundation 2006) 
36Participant K. Phone interview with the author, June 26, 2013 
37Participant U. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 18, 2013 
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world ... there really has been a big cultural shift to stop producing log 
frames because local donors don't want to see them.38   
 
The skills and strategies that organizations needed to raise money from private 
foundations were generic, formulaic and easy: 
A lot of [organizations] [will continue to seek] international funding as 
long as it is easier to get the money, easier to write proposals...It is easier 
to write grant proposals for private foundations [than it is to solicit 
donations from local sources]. [You don't have] to answer a lot of difficult 
questions... It is really easy.39 
 
In contrast, unlike the ease of writing proposals to secure international 
funding, what is needed to mobilize resources from local individuals and groups 
is more complex: 
Fundraising locally uses a completely different set of tools and strategies 
and messages. ...To look someone in the eye from your own country or 
community and say, 'trust me to do the right thing with your money', is a 
different kind of dynamic; and it really kind of requires an entrepreneurial 
spirit and a vision. 40 
 
Having an ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ and ‘vision’ are qualities that are also needed to embed 
transplanted philanthropic institutions in the local cultures of giving and espouse 
organizational values that make sense to prospective donors in African countries to 
facilitate local resource mobilization. Scholars have found that transplants’ successful 
performance in host countries depends on the extent to which the recipient population is 
able to stamp their own ideas and meaning on the new concept.  
This is corroborated by a senior official of one of the Ford-founded/funded 
African philanthropies under study who explained that raising money from local 
individuals in African countries was indeed more complicated. Among other things, it is 
                                                 
38Participant K. Phone interview with the author, June 26, 2013 
39Participant K. Phone interview with the author, June 26, 2013 
40Participant K. Phone interview with the author, June 26, 2013 
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based on place of origin; and needs knowledge and skills beyond proposal writing and 
other formal fundraising strategies borrowed from developed economy contexts and 
thinking. He explained that: 
In most cases [individual donors in this African country] …want to know 
that that child, or that woman, or that young person [you are supporting] is 
from their village, or that the community where they come from is 
benefitting from what you are doing. And you [have to] demonstrate to 
them and say: "Where do you come from?" "I come from the Western part 
of [the country]." "Here are twenty or thirty local community initiatives 
that we (this foundation) are working with." And [hopefully] … one of 
them will relate to their village.41 
 
Local resource mobilization, therefore, called for context-specific culturally-
sensitive capacity-building support. Notwithstanding this need for local acculturation, 
Ford’s long-term institutional development and capacity building support did not include 
resources for its foundation grantees to secure the services of staff with experience in the 
complex area of local resource mobilization. As the major funders of the African 
foundations were Ford and other international and institutional donors, proposal writing 
was the main fundraising tool. Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 do show that the formal 
fundraising approach worked well for fundraising from international and institutional 
donors. By 2010 the Ford-founded/funded philanthropies had succeeded in raising large 
sums of international money.  
Conversely, the tables also show that during the period under study Ford’s 
foundation grantees mobilized few of their resources locally. Neither the API nor the IISP 
were capable of imparting the kind of socio-cultural knowledge, “entrepreneurial spirit”, 
and grounding that the Ford-founded transplanted philanthropies needed to be effective at 
carrying out their local resource mobilization functions. The next section provides a 
                                                 
41Participant S. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 15, 2013 
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focused assessment of the local resource mobilization readiness and effectiveness of the 
three Ford-founded/funded philanthropies under study. 
The Ford-Founded Philanthropies’ Failure to Tap into Local Resources 
Almost two decades after Ford established them and tried to build their capacity 
for local resource mobilization effectiveness (through the API and IISP), the Ford-
founded/funded African foundations under study were still not tapping into resources 
from within their respective countries or within the African continent; as had been 
expected of them. Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 show that during the stated years the AWDF, 
TrustAfrica, and the KCDF each mobilized less than 3% of their funding from local 
sources. A senior official of one of the African foundations described the state (and 
status) of the transplanted African philanthropies42 with respect to local resource 
mobilization: 
Basically… we have reached a stage where African foundations cannot 
only be receiving [resources] from the developed countries; but must tap 
into their own. … This should have happened like yesterday and it still 
hasn't happened; and the need is [even] greater today than it was 
yesterday. So how do we tap into our own [resources]? What do we need 
to put in place [to be able to tap into local resources]? What resources can 
they (the Ford Foundation and other international funders) give us [for that 
purpose]? We need the resources…the support.43 
 
A senior official of another Ford-founded/funded African foundation described 
how (despite the API and the IISP) they still had little understanding of how to tap 
into local resources to ensure their long-term financial sustainability: 
We still need to get a better understanding of resource mobilization 
opportunities on the continent… as well as the [actual] practice of 
mobilizing resources locally... So that African foundations like 
                                                 
42By 2013 when this interview was conducted 
43Participant N. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 18, 2013 
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TrustAfrica, KCDF, Southern African Trust and…AWDF, can all become 
a lot more resource sustainable and mobilize resources within Africa...44 
 
The comment below from another senior official of one of the African Ford-
founded philanthropies described how their foundation received queries from the 
public for its heavy dependence on outside money, despite the effort it had made 
to cast itself as an authentic “in Africa, by Africans, for Africans” philanthropic 
institution:  
There is money in the continent; the challenge is how to tap into that 
money …The question of funding [from local sources] [is] still a 
challenge... [Though] we look African, we talk African, we do everything 
in an African manner, money is still largely from outside.  [So] people say 
[to us]: "Oh... you are in Africa, you are led by Africans, but your money 
comes from outside…?” 45 
 
By all accounts, then, at the time Ford ended its foundation-building and 
philanthropy-promotion program in developing countries in 2010, all the three Ford-
founded philanthropies under study were still highly dependent on the Ford Foundation 
and other international donors for almost 100% of their resources.  
Lack of Capacity for Local Resource Mobilization 
In terms of capacity for local resource mobilization, all the three Ford-founded 
African philanthropic institutions --- AWDF, TrustAfrica, and KCDF --- had few internal 
institutional structures in place dedicated to local fund development and local resource 
mobilization by the time Ford brought its philanthropy promotion program in developing 
countries to an end in 2010. There was little support from the Ford Foundation (and the 
other international donors) to tackle the more complex task of helping its foreign 
philanthropic transplants to build the internal capacity needed to carry out local fund 
                                                 
44Participant C. Phone interview with the author, June 20, 2013.  
45Participant G. Phone interview with the author, March 28, 2013 
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development; as well as local resource mobilization in the African (philanthropic) 
institutional environment. An official of one of the Ford-founded philanthropies 
explained the organization’s predicament regarding its capacity for local resource 
mobilization:  
Internally one of the challenges we have found with local resource 
mobilization (whether you are dealing with individuals, with companies, 
or with families) is that you need dedicated capacity within [the 
foundation], and that's a big challenge. …We realized that we needed a 
good database; that we needed to invest in software; that we needed to 
invest in individuals.46 In fact, this year47 we moved to have one person to 
work with me on corporate fundraising; and then retained a different 
person on institutional fundraising; so that we now have dedicated 
capacity on both.48 But these are not the normal typical positions that you 
can convince a donor to pay for. It [has been] a challenge institutionally to 
develop the capacity to follow through [with the development of local] 
philanthropic giving. …49 
 
Moreover, the ease of raising large amounts of international money (as opposed to the 
complexity of raising local money in the predominantly informal environment of African 
countries) encouraged the transplanted philanthropies to focus on mobilizing 
international funding as long as that money was available to them.50 A senior official of 
one of the African philanthropies knowledgeable about the Ford Foundation’s strategies 
in developing countries summarized Ford’s failure with regards to helping its foundation 
grantees to build their capacity for local resource mobilization: 
                                                 
46This would be equivalent to local constituency-building and the cultivation of local donor bases 
472013 when this interview was conducted. This is three years after the Ford Foundation, under President 
Ubiñas, stopped funding Ford’s global philanthropy promotion program. It took this long (and the cessation 
of Ford funding) for this organization (and the other Ford-founded/funded African philanthropies) to realize 
that they needed to have the internal capacity and dedicated staff to mobilize local resources.  
48They still had no staff responsible for developing and attracting local individual donors 
49Participant H. Phone interview with the author, September 11, 2013 
50Participant G. Phone interview with the author, March 28, 2013. Also, Participant K. Phone interview 
with the author, June 26, 2013 
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[There was] very little on building or strengthening the [local] resource 
mobilization capacities of these organizations, whether they were 
philanthropic organizations like TrustAfrica or … NGOs.51 
 
Ceased Ford Funding and Local Resource Mobilization  
 
One outcome of Ford’s abrupt ending of the IISP along with its 
philanthropy promotion program in developing countries in 2010 was that it 
forced some of its African foundation grantees to give very serious consideration 
to diversifying their funding sources. It was after these foundations went through 
the “traumatic”52 experience of losing their founder and largest funder (Ford) that 
some of them53 began to take serious steps towards developing structures for 
mobilizing local resources. At that point they felt compelled to begin investing in 
their internal capacity for the mobilization and management of local resources. 
For example, it was after 2010 that the KCDF hired staff specifically for local 
resource mobilization.54  
Even then, the KCDF and the AWDF did not go far enough with local 
resource mobilization, as they continued to depend heavily on other international 
donors who stepped in to fill the gap that had been created by the Ford 
                                                 
51Participant C. Phone interview with author, June 19, 2013.  
52This is how one of the senior officials of the Ford-founded/funded philanthropies described how her 
organization experienced Ford’s abrupt cessation of funding.  
53In 2013 when the interviews were conducted TrustAfrica was the one African IISP participant that was 
making little effort to mobilize local resources after the initiative was terminated. That was because it still 
had access to funds from the $30 million that Ford had committed to giving it at its establishment. The 
other two IISP participants (the AWDF and the KCDF) were acutely aware of the dangers of depending on 
a few international funders for the bulk of their resources and were trying various strategies for cultivating 
local donors and for building their endowment funds as best they could.  
54 Participant H. Phone interview with the author, Sept. 11, 2013. Significantly, the new hires for local 
resource mobilization were to work on raising money from local corporations and institutions. No staff was 
hired as yet to focus on soliciting donations from local individuals; despite the fact that one of the aims of 
Ford’s local philanthropy promotion program (the establishment of foundations such as the KCDF and 
TrustAfrica) in African countries was to encourage local African philanthropy, for individuals to give in a 
big way for public purposes; for community mobilization and the strengthening of civic participation.  
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Foundation (and other international funders that also ended their support by 
2010).55 In fact, the year Ford ended its funding support, the KCDF increased its 
grantmaking budget as a result of increased support from other international 
donors. As the KCDF’s board chairman mentioned in the 2010-11 Annual Report:  
The direct impact [of the 2008 financial crisis] on KCDF was that a 
number of traditional funders who have been supporting KCDF from its 
inception had to phase out their support...56 The investments made over the 
years in strengthening the systems and structures in KCDF have paid 
dividends as new funders find KCDF an attractive partner to work with. 
This led to a … budget increase of 63% making it possible for the 
foundation to widen its reach to more communities (KCDF 2010 Annual 
Report:2).  
 
The KCDF and the other African IISP participants effectively continued to receive the 
bulk of their support (notably funds for regranting) from other international funders that 
were looking for efficient and credible local partners. The Ford-founded/funded African 
foundations (having benefited from the formal training of the API and IISP) were among 
the best candidates for such partnerships with international donors. With so much 
international funding available for regranting, local resource mobilization continued to be 
a challenge for the Ford-founded/funded African philanthropies.  
Besides local resource mobilization, endowment-building was the other area 
where Ford’s foundation-building and local philanthropy promotion effort in African 
countries faced challenges. Endowment-building was dependent to a large degree on 
local resource mobilization which turned out to be problematic. With some support from 
the Ford Foundation, the Ford-founded philanthropies were expected to build endowment 
                                                 
55This was referred to as ‘serial dependency’ by a KCDF staff writing in the foundation’s 2005-06 Annual 
Report, p. 26 
56The Ford Foundation, which had been the KCDF’s largest funder since its establishment, was the major 
funder pulling out around this time.  
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funds from local money, as was the practice in the US. The next section addresses the 
endowment-building effectiveness of the three Ford-founded/funded African 
philanthropies under study ---AWDF, KCDF and TrustAfrica.  
Endowment-Building Effectiveness 
Ford had set out to replicate itself by attempting to build endowed 
philanthropic foundations in African countries.57 Endowment-building was an 
integral part of the institutional model that Ford propagated in the selected 
African countries. It was Ford’s main tactic for supporting the long-term financial 
sustainability of its foundation-grantees in these countries. Endowment-building 
was, therefore, high on the objectives of both the API and the IISP.58 In preparing 
for the launching of the IISP, Ford had stated that its role in the initiative would 
include “participating in, perhaps leading a campaign to increase substantially the 
endowments of these foundations.”59 However, during the actual implementation 
of the IISP, Ford only offered its African foundation grantees matching grants to 
challenge them to mobilize local resources for their endowment funds.60 The fact 
                                                 
57Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013 
58Endowment-building had also been central in the foundation’s initiatives for US-based foundation 
grantees.  
59The Ford Foundation. Inter-Office Memorandum from Linetta Gilbert, Sushma Raman, and Christopher 
Harris (co-chairs of the Philanthropy Learning Group) to Susan V. Berresford (Ford President). 
Unpublished Report, June 20, 2003.  
60According to Ngondi-Houghton (2005) and Lukalo-Owino (2008), one of the reasons why the Kenyan 
NGO elites went along with Ford’s idea of establishing a community foundation (even though they did not 
understand the concept at the time) was Ford’s promise that it would provide the Kenya Community 
Development Foundation (KCDF) with grants to build an endowment fund. The attractiveness of the idea 
was that the proposed endowment fund would provide a permanent source of funding for grantmaking and, 
therefore, would make frequent fundraising from local individuals unnecessary. However, to the 
disappointment of the Kenyans, Ford’s endowment grants were not given outright, but were structured as 
challenge grants. This meant that the KCDF was required to raise a stipulated matching amount from local 
sources before Ford would release the promised amount. Among other things, the misunderstanding over 
the promise of an endowment grant (that turned out to be a challenge grant) soured the relationship between 
the KCDF and its founder, the Ford Foundation (Lukalo-Owino 2008).  
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that its foundation grantees in Africa and other parts of the developing world were 
having serious problems with local resource mobilization was not taken into 
account. Ford had successfully utilized matching grants to promote endowment-
building among foundations in the US and expected them to work just as 
successfully in Kenya, Ghana, Senegal, and the African continent in general.  
Out of the three Ford-founded/funded philanthropies under study, only the Kenya 
Community Development Foundation (KCDF) had, by 2010, succeeded in building a 
small endowment fund61. Whereas Ford prioritized the building of endowment funds as a 
critical component of foundations and assumed that all its foundation grantees would 
need to build one, not all of its African foundation grantees saw endowment-building as a 
priority in their local context and under their circumstances. The African Women’s 
Development Fund (AWDF) and TrustAfrica, for instance, took the endowment-building 
support, but did not build endowment funds as expected. TrustAfrica maintained a 
reserve fund62 rather than an endowment fund, while AWDF eventually diverted the IISP 
endowment grant towards a different (and what they considered to be a more appropriate 
and urgent) need. It chose to expand its grantmaking program instead. According to one 
of the senior officials of the AWDF:  
Ford gave us the [endowment challenge grant] of $3 million of which we 
had to raise $1.5 million. … For most endowments you are not allowed 
to…spend the capital, you know…But we said we were going to spend it 
immediately; it's not money that we were going to invest. Because we 
were able to raise this money,63 we could scale up a certain area of work 
                                                 
61At $5.42 million (US) by 2010, according to the  KCDF 2010-11 Annual Report. As endowments go, this 
is a relatively small endowment fund. This amount includes what belonged to local Kenyan communities 
(and families) that had built their own endowment funds (equivalent to donor-advised funds) and placed 
them with KCDF to manage. The KCDF counted all those funds under its care as part of its own 
endowment fund.  
62A reserve fund had fewer restrictions than an endowment fund.  
63At first Ford insisted that the endowment-building challenge grant be matched with only funds raised 
from local sources. But eventually it relented based on the African foundations’ local resource mobilization 
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that we have been doing. So, for example, the huge amount of money we 
raised built our grantmaking program to almost double the size of what it 
was. So that money made a significant impact on the work that we are 
currently doing. And so, we said we would spend [the endowment grant] 
down immediately; it would not be confined [as in] the American 
endowment model. 64 
 
The fact that only the KCDF had an endowment fund resembling what Ford 
expected is an indication that the AWDF and TrustAfrica had been less than 
effective (from the start) at endowment-building, in spite of Ford’s support 
through the IISP. The Kenyan foundation’s relatively more successful experience 
with endowment-building will provide our empirical evidence and illustrate the 
extent of Ford’s effectiveness at promoting endowment-building effectiveness 
among its African foundation grantees.  
Ford, the KCDF, Challenge Grants and Endowment-Building 
Lukalo-Owino (2008) recounts how, after Ford staff from the United 
States traveled to Kenya to explain the concept of the endowed grantmaking 
foundation to Kenyan NGO leaders and elites, the latter agreed that the proposed 
local community foundation would eventually be able to raise enough local 
resources for its work, and for an endowment fund as well. They reasoned that 
since Kenyans were accustomed to contributing to harambees65 and other local 
forms of fundraising, they would be just as happy to make contributions to the 
transplanted Ford-founded philanthropic institution. They, however, quickly 
                                                 
challenges and accepted matches raised from international donors. The AWDF therefore raised the bulk of 
its $1.5 million match from other international donors.  
64Participant P. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 18, 2013 
65A senior staff of the KCDF described harambee thus: “People raised money within the community to 
send children to school, particularly universities; and that is how many Kenyans in the early days managed 
to go to Europe and America to study. People raised money for air-tickets and for the students’ upkeep 
abroad. ...The same concept is replicated in funerals, in weddings, in all other social initiatives...in the 
communities.” Participant S. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 15, 2013 
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found out that they had been mistaken about the ease with which local Kenyans 
would take to the transplanted foundation model as a vehicle for their charitable 
giving for community development (Lukalo-Owino 2008). 
Just like the AWDF and TrustAfrica, endowment-building proved to be an 
onerous task for the KCDF. In its 2005 Annual Report, the foundation’s board 
chair observed, “The biggest challenge facing KCDF after 10 years of its 
progressive establishment is the creation of an endowment fund to meet its 
running and project costs”. He noted also that “the foundation still has a challenge 
to build an endowment fund big enough that its yields will be suﬃcient to run its 
secretariat (which reaches out to communities country wide)” (KCDF 2005 
Annual Report p. 5).   
To support its endowment building, Ford offered the KCDF an 
endowment challenge grant of $650, 000 (The Ford Foundation 2006) for which 
the latter had to raise local funds to the tune of $162, 500 (25% of the amount) 
over four years (Lukalo-Owino 2008).66 When the KCDF asked individuals and 
local companies to contribute to the endowment fund, it was met with resistance. 
They were accustomed to giving through the harambee system, not through the 
new philanthropic organization promoting endowment funds: 
The Ford Foundation had provided a matching endowment grant of US 
$650, 000 --- about fifty million shillings at the time. …The Management 
Committee67 came up with an asset development strategy but met a lot of 
resistance on the ground when it tried to implement it. People were used to 
                                                 
66Ford had originally wanted the KCDF to raise 50% of the challenge grant to qualify for the endowment 
grant but relented and reduced the match to 25% when KCDF pleaded that, as a new and unfamiliar 
philanthropic institution in the country, it would be a difficult task to raise such a huge amount from local 
sources in only four years (Lukalo-Owino (2008: 40).  
67While the KCDF was being incubated by the Aga Khan Foundation a Management Committee governed 
the organization until it came into its own in 2001 and instituted a Board of Directors.  
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giving to causes… through the harambee system, but they would not buy 
into the concept of giving for [an endowment fund] (Lukalo-Owino 
2008:40).  
 
Ford had previously employed challenge grants successfully to encourage the 
participating foundations in its US-based philanthropic initiatives (the Leadership 
Program (LP) and the Rural Development and Community Foundation Initiative 
(RDCFI)) to boost their endowment funds. They all succeeded in increasing their asset 
base, thanks to Ford’s challenge grants. 68 Ford, therefore, believed that its foundation 
grantees in African countries would also be able to use the matching grants strategy to 
attract local resources for their endowment-building.  
The matching/challenge grants that Ford offered to the African 
foundations as an incentive for endowment-building attracted few local donors. 
The senior staff of the foundations under study listed some of the local realities 
that made it difficult for them to convince local donors to contribute towards 
endowment-building, the matching grants notwithstanding. For example, the few 
local donors who were willing to make contributions to the KCDF refused to give 
to the endowment fund; they would prefer to give towards grantmaking to solve 
serious immediate problems. Looking at the local context and the current socio-
economic problems at hand such as unemployment, food insecurity, and poverty 
it felt inappropriate to talk about an endowment fund. A senior official of the 
KCDF recounted the difficulty they had trying to ask people for contributions 
towards the endowment fund: 
                                                 
68The American foundations that had participated in the LP and the RDCFI were each able to mobilize 
local resources to raise their assets from an average of $3-$5 million when the initiatives began, to at least 
$10 million at the end, with the help of the Ford Foundation challenge grants (Ford Foundation 2006).  
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First of all, … we still have people who are unemployed; we still have 
very low incomes and very high inflation rates. Children need to go to 
school, families need to eat, food security is a challenge, and youth need 
employment skills... All these things are needed today. …And upon all 
that [we have to say to] somebody that, ‘I want you to give me ten 
shillings …to keep…somewhere forever in order to help you in the 
future?’ They can’t understand what you are talking about …Because you 
can't tell somebody, ‘give me some money to keep in my bank to spend 
next year’; while they are starving.69 
 
The endowment-building problem expressed above was corroborated by Hodgson 
(2013):  
Selling the concept of endowments [to local populations] … was 
…difficult. In times of dire poverty, how could it be justifiable to lock 
money up in perpetuity, spending only the income it earned? And in an 
environment of distrust of institutions, … how could people be convinced 
to place their faith not only in the current leadership of an institution, but 
that of the future too? (Hodgson 2013:371) 
 
Like the individuals, local Kenyan corporations showed little interest in 
the idea that the Ford Foundation would match their donation if they contributed 
to the KCDF endowment fund:  
When you tell companies…to contribute to you because somebody is 
going to match the money they contribute, [they] don't see why they 
should give you money to put into a fund that is to be invested. They will 
rather give you money to be used immediately… The people we were 
talking to were not willing generally to contribute towards endowments, 
even if their contribution would allow us to get a match from Ford. They 
just did not believe in that strategy.70 
 
Nevertheless, the KCDF managed to raise the total matching amount over the 
four-year period to meet the challenge71, amidst some disagreements with the 
                                                 
69Participant S. Face-to-face interview with author, July 15, 2013 
70Participant H. Phone interview with the author, September 11, 2013 
71The KCDF eventually received a huge donation from another international funder (the Bernard van Leer 
Foundation) to help it make the match, to enable it to qualify for the endowment grant from Ford 
(Participant R. Phone interview with the author, March 27, 2013). Initially Ford tried to reject that match 
because it was not all from local sources but eventually relented, considering the difficulties that KCDF 
was encountering trying to raise local money.  
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Ford Foundation. By the end of the 2010-11 fiscal year, with support from Ford’s 
matching grants, KCDF’s endowment fund stood at $ 5.42 Million, of which 78% 
belonged to KCDF, the remaining 22% being funds that Kenyan communities and 
families established with the KCDF (KCDF 2010-11 Annual Report:1).   
The KCDF succeeded in its endowment-building, where its two West-
African counterparts failed, because KCDF quickly learned from its initial 
mistake of trying to use the matching grant in the way that Ford had intended 
(based on its US experience). It had initially asked people to contribute to its own 
endowment fund, with the promise that Ford would give the KCDF extra money 
if they gave. When the KCDF found that people would not contribute to its 
endowment fund (regardless of the matching grant) it decided to attract local 
contributions to endowment-building through a strategy that took account of local 
giving values and practices and made sense to the local communities. Rather than 
persist in trying to build its own endowment fund (that few would contribute to) 
the KCDF decided to offer Ford’s matching grants to the local communities to 
entice them to set up community endowment funds for their own communities’ 
benefit, not KCDF’s or the general Kenyan public. For every shilling that 
communities contributed to their own endowment fund, KCDF gave them a 
shilling (from the Ford matching grant). Though KCDF would manage the 
investment of the community funds, the returns on the investment would be 
controlled by the contributing communities for their own development projects.  
The KCDF’s creative endowment-building strategy worked, as it was 
easier to convince people to build endowment funds for the sustainable 
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development of their own specific communities of origin, than it was to talk them 
into contributing towards the KCDF’s endowment for the future development of 
Kenyan communities in general. However, in principle, since the funds had to be 
lodged with the KCDF for investing, the latter counted the community and legacy 
funds as part of its endowment fund. By adapting its strategies to suit the local 
context, therefore, KCDF was able to build an endowment fund (albeit a small 
one) where its counterparts failed.  
Given that of all Ford’s foundation grantees in African countries only the KCDF 
was able to build an endowment fund by 2010, I conclude that Ford failed to meet its 
objective of building endowed grantmaking foundations in African countries. By using 
the challenge/matching grant as a tactic for catalyzing endowment-building among its 
African foundation grantees, Ford may have eventually accomplished its goal of 
leveraging its resources.72 However, it did not accomplish its goal of stimulating 
substantial local philanthropic giving to its local foundation grantees for community 
mobilization, and for their own long-term financial sustainability. Restricted as they were 
to endowment-building, Ford’s challenge grants did not promote local giving to its 
foundation grantees; as it turned off many potential local donors who believed that the 
idea of putting their donations away for years amidst current dire need was senseless.73 
In general, therefore, Ford’s attempt to promote endowment-building as an 
essential component of foundation-building and local philanthropy development 
in African countries failed. As pointed out elsewhere, endowment-building 
                                                 
72Scholars such as Frumkin (2006) have described matching/challenge grants as one of the tactics that 
foundations employ to leverage their resources in order to make their money go farther.  
73Participant H. Phone interview with author, Sept. 11, 2013 and Participant S. Face-to-face interview with 
author, July 15, 2013 
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effectiveness is closely associated with local resource mobilization effectiveness; 
so, once the Ford-founded philanthropies had challenges developing local funding 
bases and mobilizing local resources, they automatically also had challenges 
building viable endowment funds to meet Ford’s requirements. More importantly, 
Ford’s insistence on endowment-building was without regard to the socio-
economic context and circumstances of the relevant African countries in the 
1990s and early 2000s. It was an example of the Ford Foundation’s top-down 
philanthropy promotion strategies, as well as the disconnect between the 
institutional philanthropy model that it transplanted in African countries and the 
local philanthropic landscape.  
Conclusion 
Chapter III dealt with the Dependent/Outcome Variable. Using the dimensions of 
foundation effectiveness identified in Chapter I, I assessed the Ford Foundation’s 
effectiveness in attaining its philanthropy promotion and foundation-building goals in 
African countries in the 1990s and 2000s; notably its goal of catalyzing large-scale local 
giving through its formal philanthropies. The dimensions included managerial, 
governance, grantmaking, resource mobilization (local and international), and 
endowment-building effectiveness.   
The analysis showed that whereas Ford was able to successfully equip its 
foundation grantees under study with the requisite personnel, skills, and competencies for 
managerial, board, grantmaking and international fundraising effectiveness, it was 
unsuccessful at helping to prepare them for local fund development and local resource 
mobilization; as well as endowment-building. This was illustrated with tables showing 
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that all the three Ford-founded/funded philanthropies under study (which it established 
and/or funded to catalyze local giving for self-reliant development) were very successful 
at attracting “pass-through” international funding for regranting; but raised very few of 
their resources from local sources. By 2010, therefore, when Ford ended its philanthropy 
promotion program in developing countries, its African foundation grantees were highly 
dependent on the foundation and other international donors for the bulk of their funding.  
Chapter III concluded that the Ford Foundation ultimately failed in its attempt to 
use the formal American-inspired endowed philanthropic foundation model to catalyze 
the mobilization of bulk philanthropic resources in the (different and predominantly 
informal) institutional context of African countries. I showed that Ford used the API and 
the IISP (modeled on previous Ford initiatives in the US) to successfully transfer the 
formal organizational skills necessary for running the formal philanthropic institutions 
that it transplanted in African countries; but that the two Ford capacity-building  
initiatives were not designed to help the transplants adapt to the informal local 
philanthropic landscape and contexts of African countries.  
The next chapter explains why the Ford Foundation failed in its attempt to use the 
American-inspired philanthropic foundation model to catalyze large-scale local 
philanthropic giving in African countries in the 1990s and early 2000s.  
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Chapter IV: Why Ford Failed to Meet its Local Resource Mobilization Objective 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous empirical chapters described and analyzed what the Ford 
Foundation did to implement its philanthropy promotion and foundation-building 
program in African countries. In particular, Chapter III analyzed the extent of Ford’s 
effectiveness in achieving its local philanthropy promotion goal in African countries by 
examining the effectiveness of its foundation grantees --- the KCDF, AWDF and 
TrustAfrica --- at various functions, including local resource mobilization. The criteria 
that I used to judge the success and financial sustainability of the Ford-founded/funded 
African foundations were not limited to the extent to which the transplanted institutions 
possessed a good governance structure, good grantmaking programs, or how much 
impact they were having on the lives of the local communities to which they channeled 
international resources.1 My criteria included whether or not these foundations were able 
to mobilize the bulk of their resources (more than 50% of total revenue) from local 
sources.  
In that sense, the mobilization of local resources being at the core of their 
founding, I treat the inability of the Ford-founded African philanthropies to attract at least 
50% of their total revenue from local sources as a failure.2 By extension, since Ford’s 
objective was to build African foundations that would attract substantial local support for 
community-driven development, the Ford-founded philanthropies’ ineffectiveness at 
                                                 
1Some scholars, including Golub (2000), assess the success of NGOs and CSOs in developing countries by 
their programs’ impact on recipients, regardless of their dependency on foreign funding. I argue that 
without the local resource mobilization element, donor-founded philanthropic institutions, such as those 
that Ford founded in Africa, would be no different from NGOs.  
2In actual fact, as demonstrated in Chapter III, they raised less than 3% of their resources from local sources 
during the period under study.  
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local resource mobilization reflects Ford’s failure to meet its own philanthropy promotion 
objective of catalyzing the mobilization of substantial local philanthropic resources in 
African countries. The present chapter draws upon the evidence provided by Ford’s 
philanthropy promotion strategies and tactics (discussed in chapter II) as well as the 
effectiveness (or otherwise) of these on the local resource mobilization efforts of its 
African foundation grantees (as shown in chapter III) to explain why the foundation 
failed to achieve its local resource mobilization goal in African countries.  
After transplanting the foreign model of philanthropic organization, there was still 
a chance for Ford to mitigate the transplantation shock to enhance the possibility of 
adaptation and local embeddedness in the African philanthropic landscape. That would 
have most probably made the transplanted philanthropic form attractive to the local 
populace. Instead, as discussed in chapter II, Ford assumed that what worked for the US-
based foundations (in an environment where foundation philanthropy was part of the 
fabric of philanthropy) would equally work for foundations located in African countries 
(where foundation philanthropy was a foreign concept). This chapter draws on the 
evidence to explain, for example, how and why Ford’s failure to take contextual 
differences between the US and African countries into account in its philanthropy-
promotion strategies and tactics contributed to the foundation’s failure to catalyze local 
philanthropy in African countries as it had set out to do.  
To highlight the contextual differences and the institutional and philanthropic 
incongruence that accounted for Ford’s failure, I contrast the political economy from 
which the modern philanthropic foundation emerged in the United States with that of the 
African institutional landscape upon which it was imposed. I also juxtapose the 
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prevailing values and practices of African cultures of giving with those undergirding the 
foundation form of institutional philanthropy. The institutional and socio-cultural 
mismatch between the two contexts and systems of philanthropy then provides the back 
drop for the analysis of the other factors that led to or contributed towards Ford’s failure 
to achieve its philanthropy promotion goal in African countries.  
The first and overarching factor that explains Ford’s failure was its exportation of 
the American-inspired institutional philanthropy model as its vehicle for promoting and 
stimulating large-scale local African philanthropy.  
The Exportation of American Foundation Philanthropy 
The Ford Foundation’s very act of exporting the American-inspired foundation 
philanthropy model to African countries was the primary source of its failure to achieve 
its goal of promoting locally-supported and financially self-sustaining institutional 
philanthropy in those countries. Since the informal institutions of one country or culture 
cannot successfully undergird formal concepts and institutions borrowed from another 
country or context (North 1994), Ford’s transplanted formal philanthropic foundations 
could not find meaningful moral and/or financial support in the predominantly informal 
(and very different) African philanthropic landscape. According to a former Ford senior 
official Ford’s conception of philanthropy vis-à-vis the concept of  philanthropy in 
African countries was a big challenge to local resource mobilization: “One big challenge 
was what we (Ford) meant by philanthropy”.3 
The Ford-founded philanthropies’ lack of social embeddedness and local 
rootedness in African giving cultures (one of the reasons for their unattractiveness 
                                                 
3Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013 
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to local people as giving mechanisms) was blamed on Ford’s fixation with the 
(foreign) philanthropic foundation model. A number of former Ford senior 
officials stated that had Ford not been so bent on transplanting the American-
inspired endowed foundation model in African countries, and had it been flexible 
and supported existing indigenous philanthropic organizational forms, the 
resulting organizations might have been grounded in the local giving cultures and 
faced fewer challenges attracting financial support from local constituents. One of 
the former Ford senior officials explained it this way: 
It's certainly because we (Ford) put the emphasis on endowed staffed 
substantial foundations; institutions … which cost money --- offices, 
salaries, overheads and everything else … That puts more demands than 
had [the philanthropic organizations] been less formal, less expensive, 
more flexible entities of different kinds. …We could have done more to 
address the [local resource mobilization issue] upfront by being much 
more flexible about the kinds of initiatives that we were supporting. So 
[that] they didn't have to be a foundation even. We could have just 
supported different forms of African philanthropy. 4 
 
The same former Ford senior official acknowledged the tough situation in which Ford 
had placed its foundation grantees with respect to local resource mobilization, 
transplanting them as it did in areas with no history of such philanthropic institutions and 
no grounding in local civil society. Expecting its exotic philanthropic seedlings to grow 
and bear fruit in the unfamiliar African soil in which it had transplanted them was a tall 
order: 
It's tough...when you have a new institution, which doesn't have a track 
record, which isn't strongly located in its own civil society, where there 
isn't very much money, anyway… It is a very tough task to get [such 
institutions] to raise substantial resources from their local environment. It 
sounds great on paper, but it’s just very difficult to do.5 
 
                                                 
4Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013 
5Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013 
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Another former Ford senior official also acknowledged that Ford’s creation of 
foundations in African countries based on an American model was problematic:  
The mistakes of some of the kinds of foundations that got created on the 
ground was [due to the fact] that [Ford was] trying to model things that 
worked in the United States but won't necessarily work in … Africa. 
…When I came to [work at] the Ford Foundation… there were already 
some experimental Ford grants that had been made for [the establishment 
of a number of community foundations]. And for me that was problematic, 
because I did feel that this was a model that was being… picked up from 
somewhere and brought somewhere else.6  
 
The inflexibility of Ford’s transplantation process made it even more 
difficult to adapt the form and functions of the Ford-founded/funded 
philanthropies to the local philanthropic landscape and the social values that 
would have made them more acceptable and adoptable to local donors: 
Had we (Ford) been more flexible… and willing to countenance lots of 
different kinds of [philanthropic organizational] structures, with different 
cost bases, it would have been easier to approach the question of local 
resource generation.7 
 
The main factor that worked against Ford’s attempt to promote large-scale local 
philanthropic resource mobilization in African countries was, therefore, the foundation’s 
exportation of the American-inspired philanthropic foundation form to the very different 
African philanthropic environment for the purpose. The next sub-section explains how 
Ford’s “heavy footprint” on its foundation grantees negatively impacted their local 
identity and chances of attracting local support.  
Negative Effects of Isomorphism on Local Foundations’ Identity 
The fact that Ford’s foundation grantees were incubated and trained (as part of the 
transplantation process) to operate and function like their foreign counterparts made them 
                                                 
6Participant I. Phone interview with the author, October 1, 2013 
7Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013 
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to be perceived as foreign entities by the local populace.8 This meant (1) that their local 
constituents had difficulty identifying9 with them; and (2) that they were expected to be 
well-endowed with foreign money and not need local contributions. Their image as 
foreign institutions made them unattractive to local donors; ultimately jeopardizing 
Ford’s achievement of its local resource mobilization objective in African countries.  
The case of TrustAfrica, which was incubated by Ford for several years, is illustrative. A 
senior official of the foundation explained how TrustAfrica had to struggle to get out 
from under Ford’s shadow so as to be able to establish its own identity:  
We were set up by the Ford Foundation, so for a long time we had the 
footprint, the thumbprint… of the Ford Foundation on us. We struggled. 
People [would say to us]: ‘Oh TrustAfrica, you mean the Ford Foundation, 
right?’ …Over the last seven years we've worked very hard…to a point 
where we now have our own identity. We are [no longer] simply an 
extension of the identity of our parent, the Ford Foundation.10 
 
However, the more serious consequence of institutional isomorphism and 
the identity ‘crisis’ that confronted Ford’s African foundation grantees was their 
lack of rootedness in the local soil. As “free-floating” (Ottaway 2000:81) 
organizations, they were disconnected from the prevalent African giving cultures 
and the values that motivate giving in those cultures. A senior official of one of 
the Ford-founded philanthropies described this situation --- of foundations in 
Africa imprinted with foreign identities, unreflective of African culture, and 
sustained by foreign funding --- as a stumbling block to the development of 
institutional philanthropy in Africa, and, thus, to local resource mobilization:  
                                                 
8Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013 
9In general, people tend to give to organizations with which they can identify; and, in particular, African 
giving is often influenced by the identity of both the giver and the receiving individual or organization.  
10Participant C. Phone interview with the author, June 19, 2013 
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How do these organizations truly emerge as African foundations, as 
independent [institutions], not just in financial terms but also in identity 
terms? [How do they emerge as] …foundations rooted in Africa, reflective 
of African reality, and reflective of African culture…? What is African 
about us [Ford-founded philanthropies]? [We should be] able to say that 
we are African because … most of our money comes from Africa; and 
…[that] we are organically connected to African issues. … [But we 
cannot]…Philanthropic institutions abroad can help grow the field [in 
Africa] [but they should] not leave their identities and footprints all over 
the place.11 
 
Ford’s heavy ‘footprint’ on its foundation grantees (a result of the inflexible 
transplantation process and the use of institutional isomorphism) reinforced the 
transplants’ foreignness in the eyes of local people and complicated local adaptation. 
Social embeddedness is a prerequisite for attracting local donors to consider using the 
Ford-founded philanthropic institutions as channels for charitable giving.   
Negative Local Reactions to the Imposition of the Foundation Form  
In some African countries, the new foundations were met with skepticism and 
suspicion. In Kenya and South Africa, for instance, some people’s initial reaction to 
Ford’s establishment of community foundations was that of anger, as recalled by a former 
Ford consultant: 
When I started working in Kenya… on this (philanthropy promotion) 
agenda there were a lot of people who were angry and… hurt about the 
whole community foundation thing. It was really quite divisive, and in 
South Africa it was the same. You get people that say the word 
'community foundation', and they spit the words out ... It was a bit like 
things had been shoved down people's throats.12 
A former Ford senior official corroborated the suspicion that Ford’s foundation grantees 
elicited in some African countries: 
All we (Ford) wanted to do [was] plant the seed (of institutional 
philanthropy) and move out; let it be African-driven, African-owned. But 
                                                 
11Participant C. Phone interview with the author, June 19, 2013 
12Participant K. Phone interview with author, June 26, 2013 
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there was a lot of suspicion at the beginning. ...People thought KCDF was 
a foreign institution and, even within the board, there were …times of very 
intense tension….13 
 
A senior staff of one of the Ford-founded philanthropies confirmed the public suspicion 
that met his organization’s establishment, attributing it to the public’s lack of knowledge 
about the imposed philanthropic model:  
For me the suspicions were natural, particularly … because the concept of 
endowed foundations had never been an African thing. Other than the few 
[foreign ones] we knew -- Aga Khan, Rockefeller, Ford Foundation -- we 
didn't know any … African organization that was endowed. So, people 
were curious about whether or not this project was doomed to fail.14 
 
The negative reactions and suspicions indicated a certain level of local (elite) 
discontent at the imposition of the foreign philanthropic form on their countries 
(and giving cultures). This did not augur well for the large-scale local giving that 
Ford was hoping would come to its foundation grantees.  
Easy Transfer of the Formal, Difficulty Impacting the Informal  
A related obstacle to Ford’s local philanthropy promotion efforts in African 
countries was the virtual impossibility of an external actor impacting the complex moral, 
religious, socio-economic, socio-cultural and political factors that shape and influence 
charitable giving in any context, including African countries. Managerial, governance, 
and grantmaking effectiveness (as well as international fundraising skills), being formal 
organizational skills and functions, are independent of the agency of local populations 
and are, for the most part, easily inculcated through formal capacity-building training and 
facilitated by cash transfers/grants. In contrast, local (philanthropic) resource 
                                                 
13Participant R. Phone interview with the author, March 27, 2013. Lukalo-Owino (2008) has documented 
the contentious relationship between Ford and the KCDF Board in the early years.  
14Participant S. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 15, 2013 
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mobilization and endowment-building effectiveness depend on the local giving cultures 
and the various forms of local philanthropic organization15.  
Also, by its very nature the context-specific capacity-building that the 
transplanted foundations needed to be effective at local resource mobilization could not 
be transferred at networking and peer-learning sessions, in the same way that other types 
of expertise could. Raising money from individuals and groups in African countries had 
to do with informal norms, beliefs and values, which, according to scholars such as North 
(1990) and others, are not easily transferable across socio-cultural lines. Ford’s ability to 
transfer the formal attributes of foundation effectiveness, and its inability to influence the 
informal African giving cultures in favor of its foundation grantees, constituted an 
obstacle to the local resource mobilization effectiveness of the latter. This is another 
instance of how Ford’s transplantation of the foundation model (and the ensuing 
incompatibility between that model and the informal African philanthropic terrain) 
undermined the foundation’s objective of catalyzing large-scale local African giving via 
its foundation grantees.  
The above problems notwithstanding, the issue was not just that there were 
significant differences between the American institutional framework from which the 
philanthropic foundation form emerged and the African context in which it was 
transplanted. It was that Ford failed to take the contextual differences into account in 
devising and implementing its philanthropy-promotion strategies and capacity-building 
initiatives.    
 
 
                                                 
15People’s cultures, values, and habits are informal by nature (North 1990) 
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Failure to Take Contextual Differences into Account 
 
Being a socio-cultural as well as a socio-economic and political construct 
charitable giving is highly context-dependent and people-dependent. Aside from the 
mistake it made trying to use a foreign philanthropic form to promote local philanthropy 
in African countries, Ford’s failure to factor in the contextual differences between the 
American and African institutional landscapes was another big reason for its failure to 
achieve its local resource mobilization agenda in African countries. One former Ford 
senior official interviewed for this study acknowledged the importance of contextual 
differences in the development of local philanthropy; and the fact that Ford had not been 
‘sensitive’ enough to those differences in its philanthropy promotion strategy:  
There you [have] the problem of culture; culture and context. Just because 
something worked in Poland doesn't mean it will work in South Africa or 
vice versa. Probably we (Ford) should have been a bit more sensitive…to 
that fact.16 
 
Some of the contextual differences that Ford ignored, but which impaired local giving to 
the Ford-founded African philanthropies, were the differences in the social division of 
labor, as well as the socio-economic and socio-cultural environment. These included the 
differences between formal (foundation) philanthropy, on the one hand, and the informal 
philanthropy widely practiced in African cultures, on the other.  
Differences in the Social Division of Labor  
The social division of labor between the public and private sectors 
determines the role of philanthropy. Where the public sector is expected to (and 
does) provide most social services to citizens, individuals contribute little to 
philanthropy. In contrast, where the provision of social services is the purview of 
                                                 
16Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013 
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the private nonprofit sector, individuals are inclined to make charitable 
contributions to that sector.17 Unlike the United States where the socio-political 
culture has increasingly tried to limit the role of government in social and 
economic development, and has allocated that function to the private (for-profit 
and nonprofit) sector (Karl and Katz 1981; Prewitt 1999), the social division of 
labor in many African countries has tended to place the responsibility for social 
and economic development mainly on the public sector. 18 In many African 
countries, where the government has long been the provider of basic services, 
there is typically a strong feeling that this responsibility remain the state’s, despite 
enormous cutbacks in governments’ provision of such services (Johnson et al. 
2004:11).  
Individuals, as well as traditional African philanthropic associations and 
organizations described in previous chapters (such as harambees, Hometown 
Associations, and Rotating Savings and Credit Organizations) do mobilize private 
resources for mutual aid and the development of their communities of residence 
or communities of origin. However, they do so as a coping mechanism in the 
absence of government action,19 not that they see it as their philanthropic 
responsibility. One former Ford senior official described the mentality of many of 
the individuals from whom the Ford-founded philanthropies tried to raise money: 
[The Ford-founded philanthropies] found that the competitive advantage 
was with writing proposals [for international money], vis-à-vis going out 
there and getting [individuals] to give them money. Because at times [the 
                                                 
17See for example Anheier and Salamon (2006) on the social origins of the nonprofit sector in various 
countries 
18In reality the private nonprofit sector in the United States receives the bulk of its resources for social 
development from the public sector (see Salamon 1987) 
19This is also referred to as “government-failure”.  
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people they approached] wondered: ‘Why should I give you money? 
Government is the one that's supposed to do this’.20 
 
This is in contrast to the US institutional environment and culture, where 
individuals and corporations are more willing to give to formal/professionalized 
philanthropies for public purposes because (among other things) it is the norm to 
do so.21  
Therefore, Ford’s building of foundations in African countries with the 
expectation that they would be able to attract local resources from individuals and 
corporations (just like in the US), without considering the differences in the 
political economy of the two contexts, was a mistake; one that hampered local 
giving to Ford’s foundation grantees. In most African countries where 
governments are expected to provide the bulk of social services, people tend to 
give to their place of worship and/or their hometown association, etc. to mitigate 
government failure, but tend not to give to professionalized philanthropic 
institutions that purport to do public work that the government is expected to 
perform in the first place.  
Socio-Economic Contextual Differences 
Ford also failed to factor in the fundamental dissimilarity between the US 
economy out of which the modern philanthropic foundation emerged and continues to 
thrive and the economies of the African countries in which it transplanted the foundation 
model. This failure to take cognizance of the socio-economic differences between the US 
                                                 
20Participant R. Phone interview with the author, Mar. 27, 2013 
21According to Giving USA individuals contribute the largest amount to the philanthropic sector year in, 
year out.  
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and the host countries contributed to the foundation’s failure to achieve its local resource 
mobilization goal in those countries.22 
The emergence of modern endowed private foundations during the 20th 
century, such as the Russell Sage Foundation (1907), the Carnegie Corporation of 
New York (1911), the Rockefeller Foundation (1913), and the Ford Foundation 
(1936), coincided with the industrialization of the American economy and the 
enormous private wealth that business tycoons like John D. Rockefeller and 
Andrew Carnegie accumulated (Nielsen 1985; Berman 1983; Schramm 2006).  
When Frederick Goff created the first modern community foundation in 
Cleveland, Ohio, in 1914, it was to provide an efficient and effective mechanism 
for pooling the resources of Cleveland’s wealthy philanthropists, including their 
bequests, into a permanently endowed fund whose proceeds would be distributed 
and used for public purposes.  
The foundation model (independent private foundations as well as 
community foundations), therefore, emerged in the United States thanks to the 
development of the capitalist free market economic environment in the 19th and 
20th centuries. That economic environment not only produced great wealth and 
facilitated the accumulation of that wealth by individuals (Karl and Katz 1981; 
Prewitt 1999), but it also created the need for efficient organizations to distribute 
that wealth for public purposes. According to Schramm: 
                                                 
22Current studies tend to cast the existing socio-economic characteristics of non-US contexts as deficiencies 
that need to be fixed to make way for the development of the imposed foundation model. They basically 
fault the host countries for not being like the US, for not having the necessary structures to provide the kind 
of financial resources that the US-inspired foundation model needs to function effectively. Unlike those 
studies, this dissertation posits that the existing conditions reflect those countries’ political economy and 
culture, which external development actors should take into account before intervening with the 
transplantation of foreign institutions.   
124 
[The American private foundation] arose as an institutional response to the 
rapid social, economic, and cultural changes of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Before this, charitable endowments in the United 
States had operated largely at the local level and had focused on specific 
issues. Such an approach to charity and philanthropy, however, was not 
immune to the broad forces reshaping the country. These broad forces 
included a widespread and accelerating tendency toward organization, 
professionalization, and hierarchy. …The evolving process of democratic 
capitalism thus necessitated the creation of the private foundation to bring 
a new approach to the changing needs and demands of society and apply 
the enormous wealth being created (Schramm 2006: 368). 
 
The modern philanthropic foundation’s emergence in America was thus demand-
driven, as it developed to solve the problem that excessively wealthy individuals 
faced, namely their need for efficient professionalized institutions to redistribute 
their immense wealth for the purpose of ameliorating the human condition.   
In contrast, the creation of philanthropic foundations in African countries 
by Ford (and other major American foundations) in the 1990s was supply-driven, 
initiated by the external actors, and not demanded by local wealthy people 
looking to redistribute their wealth for public purposes. In fact, Ford transplanted 
the foundation model in African countries at a time when those economies were 
characterized by declining earnings from exports, stunted economic growth, and 
debt crises (Hyden 2006; van de Walle 2007). The Economist (2000) went as far 
as to describe the African continent during this period as “hopeless”. 23 
Given their need for huge amounts of money and resources to function, 
Ford’s creation of professionalized foundations in African countries was without 
regard to the local socio-economic conditions of the selected African countries. 
One could say that, under the circumstances, Ford’s African foundation grantees 
                                                 
23May 13th 2000 edition 
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were doomed to dependency on international donors, with few chances of ever 
being able to garner locally the huge amounts of money they require for 
operations, grantmaking, and endowment-building. In trying to replicate the 
endowed foundation model in Africa, Ford failed to consider the professional 
foundation’s need to be undergirded by wealth. It did not account for the fact that 
professionalized foundations imposed on developing economies (such as those in 
most of Africa) would have trouble asking local individuals and corporations 
(unfamiliar with them) to provide the substantial sums of money that such 
institutions would necessarily need to function. A former Ford senior official 
acknowledged that Ford should have considered the model’s requirement for huge 
sums of money before deciding to use it to promote institutional philanthropy in 
African countries: 
To be effective [endowed grantmaking] foundations have to be quite large, 
not huge, but they have to have millions of dollars to give away…. 
Building an endowed grantmaking foundation… requires a lot of money... 
Most of these [African foundations that Ford built had no money and] 
were almost entirely funded by Ford … It was a mistake made by the Ford 
Foundation from the start. We should have done that differently.24 
 
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the distressed economies of African countries in 
the 1990s and early 2000s, many had a middle class (Ngondi-Houghton 2005) and 
pockets of wealth in the hands of individuals (especially in countries like South Africa, 
Nigeria and Kenya). Ford could have used its convening power to bring some of these 
major wealth holders to the table to seek their support for its philanthropy-promotion 
program in African countries. Ford’s failure to involve (sensitize) African HNWI25 and 
                                                 
24Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013 
25High Net Worth Individuals 
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philanthropists shows that the foundation approached its philanthropy promotion task in 
African countries the same way it did in the US, without being concerned about where 
and how its foundation grantees would seek the huge amounts of money needed for their 
operations, grantmaking, and endowments-building. One of the former Ford senior 
officials interviewed for this study acknowledged that it was a mistake for Ford not to 
have reached out to African HNWIs for their buy-in and support, to enhance the success 
of its local resource mobilization objective in African countries: 
We didn't think about leveraging money from large private donors in 
Africa…Business people --- the kind of…superrich that are now launching 
their own foundations in South Africa and elsewhere --- weren't really on 
[the foundation’s] radar screen in the mid-2000s ... But, of course, they 
have a lot of money…[And] as far as I know they are not giving it to 
[local] foundations; they are spending it themselves [as operating 
foundations]. So… that was another mistake [not to have involved the 
wealthy African business people].26 
 
Had Ford taken account of the state of the African socio-economic environment 
(and the huge monetary requirements of the American endowed foundation 
model) it very well may have built upon and helped upscale the local forms of 
philanthropic organization --- self-organized, small-scale, and non-
professionalized, with minimal overhead costs, and easier for local constituents to 
support (Ottaway 2000).   
As it is, the very transplantation of the American-inspired foundation 
model without regard to the economic conditions in the selected African countries 
was a recipe for financial dependency. This partly explains why Ford’s foundation 
grantees failed to attract the kind of large-scale local resources they needed to 
become financially self-reliant and self-sustaining as Ford had set them up to be.  
                                                 
26Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013 
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Differences in Socio-Cultural Context and Philanthropic Landscapes 
 
Just as it had failed to take account of the socio-economic differences, Ford also 
failed to consider the socio-cultural differences, with particular reference to its formal 
concept of philanthropy, and that held in many African cultures. The very fact that the 
foundation chose to use an American philanthropic organizational model as its means for 
orienting African giving practices towards large-scale formal giving implied Ford’s 
prioritization of the formal organizational values of the foundation model over the values 
of the informal African ways of organized giving. Chen et al. (2013) explain how 
organizational forms often express particular values: 
All organizations reflect, enact, and propagate values. These values both 
shape and are shaped by the social worlds in which organizations are 
embedded. That is, values influence how organizations and their field, 
consisting of other organizations…operate (Chen et al. 2013:858) 
 
In this case, the inherent mismatch between the values of the formal American 
foundation philanthropy model and those of the home-grown ways of 
philanthropic organization in African countries made Ford’s transplanted 
philanthropies unattractive to many Africans as appropriate channels for their 
charitable giving. I posit that Ford failed to achieve its local resource mobilization 
objective in African countries partly because its transplants espoused logics and 
values that were at cross purposes with many of those underpinning Africans’ 
giving practices.  
For instance, the Ford-founded philanthropies under study (KCDF, 
TrustAfrica, and AWDF) espoused institutional logics and philanthropic values 
that included bureaucratic rules, division of labor, hierarchy, efficiency and 
effectiveness, universalistic over personalistic treatment (Chen et al. 2013), and a 
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detachment from the grant recipient (as relationships created through grantmaking 
are professional rather than personal). Other values that they enacted included 
unidirectional giving (as opposed to reciprocal giving) to unfamiliar people 
“across the board,”27 and instrumentality.28 
In contrast, the prevalent forms of giving in African societies and the values they 
engender (close social bonds, kinship, interpersonal reciprocal relationships, etc.) are 
closer to being expressive than instrumental. African giving cultures, mostly informal, 
enact values which depend on familiarity, repeated interactions and closeness. Charitable 
giving in those settings is used for strengthening personal, family, and communal 
relationships, the development of one’s own community, patron-client networks, and 
other social bonds (Hyden 2006). A senior official of one of the Ford-founded African 
foundations explained the peculiarity of African giving: 
We give to our brothers and sisters and our uncles and relatives; and give 
to funerals and to weddings. But when you tell us there's a child 
somewhere whom we know nothing about, who needs to go to school, we 
tell you: ‘I don't know that one; I can't give you [money for that]’... We 
(the Ford-founded African foundations) are asking ourselves what the… 
enablers of organized [local] giving are. For example, how can we make 
citizens of Kenya responsive to the need to give across the board and 
break that barrier of ‘the person I know’?29 
 
Ford neglected to take these contextual differences into account in its effort to promote 
formal charitable giving in African countries. It tried to promote philanthropy for the 
benefit of the wider public; in cultures where (as described above) many donors will 
                                                 
27Participant S. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 15, 2013 
28Scholars of philanthropy, such as Frumkin (2006), differentiate between instrumental giving and 
expressive giving. Instrumental giving is giving that goes towards specific projects and objectives for 
public purposes; whereas expressive giving, as the name suggests, is when the donor uses her giving as a 
form of self-expression or to reinforce certain values that mean a lot to them, even if this does not result in 
specific measurable public works. Expressive giving focuses on what the giver gets out of their giving in 
the form of “psychic rewards” (Frumkin 2006).  
29Participant S. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 15, 2013 
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generally only give to people they know or communities to which they are already 
affiliated. 
Besides, unlike the prevailing African cultures of giving and philanthropic 
organizations which are self-regulating/enforcing and do not need a government-created 
formal “enabling environment” to function adequately, the Ford-founded philanthropies 
needed such an environment, as the model functions that way in the US. While the 
absence of a government-enacted regulatory, legal, and fiscal framework for charitable 
giving has been cited as an obstacle to the development of formal philanthropic 
institutions in many African countries, this absence is a testament to the informal (no-
need-for-government-intervention) nature of the prevailing indigenous African ways of 
giving that Ford failed to take into account in its intervention strategy. A senior official of 
one of the Ford-founded/funded African philanthropies underscored this: 
Do you need regulation [to encourage] an African to continue giving? If 
you go to Ghana today do you need a written law to encourage the African 
in Ghana to continue giving? But it has been difficult [for us formal 
foundations to attract local giving]. Is it about the law? Is it about the 
policies? Is it about regulation? Or is it [because] being African we [tend 
to] give in particular ways? 30 
 
The personalized informal nature of giving in many Africans societies was 
incompatible with, and unsupportive of, the impersonal and anonymized giving 
associated with the formal institutional philanthropy of the Ford-founded/funded 
African foundations. Ford’s failure to catalyze large-scale local giving through its 
African foundation grantees was, therefore, not only due to its imposition of the 
foreign philanthropic institutional form, but also due to its failure to anticipate the 
philanthropic incongruence from the contextual differences between the US and 
                                                 
30Participant S. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 15, 2013 
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African countries. A former Ford senior official stated that Ford should have been 
more sensitive to the local context. As he put it: 
The [philanthropy promotion] program could be criticized as not having 
been sensitive enough to [the diversity of philanthropic forms across 
Africa]. Simply wanting to set up mini African versions of the Ford 
Foundation was probably doomed, [as] they have no legitimacy or [local] 
support base… [It] is a fair criticism of some [of Ford’s foundation 
grantees] … such as TrustAfrica which… has struggled … to raise money 
within Africa, even though that was its specific objective.31 
 
Had Ford taken the contextual differences between the US and the host 
African countries into account in devising its local philanthropy promotion 
strategies and capacity building tactics, it might have been more flexible and been 
more prepared to help build the latter’s capacity for accessing the local resources 
available in their countries. As the same former Ford senior official as above 
acknowledged:  
There is money available, particularly in countries like South Africa, 
Nigeria and Kenya… The problem isn't an absolute scarcity of resources. 
The problem is, how do you unlock them? And… that's an important 
distinction to make.32 
 
That has indeed been the problem. And I contend that the Ford-founded 
philanthropies failed to unlock the available local resources because Ford 
transplanted them in the “tropical” African climate but did not take account of the 
contextual challenges to prepare them appropriately for putting down deep 
enough roots to tap into local resources.  
 
 
                                                 
31Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013 
32Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013 
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Fall Back on Experience with Capacity-Building in the USA 
A variant of Ford’s failure to take contextual differences into account in its local 
philanthropy promotion effort in Africa is the foundation’s use of capacity-building 
tactics that it had used successfully in the United States to boost resource mobilization, 
but which did not work as well for its African foundation grantees. One such capacity 
building tactic was networking and peer-learning.  
Peer-Learning and Networking as Capacity Building Mechanisms 
Because Ford had employed networks and peer-learning successfully in previous 
initiatives in the United States, it assumed that putting foundations from different 
developing countries together in a peer-learning network would produce similar 
outcomes; but it did not. Unlike their American counterparts who were familiar with 
foundations and were operating in a country where foundations have a long history, many 
of the foundation officials in developing countries knew little about foundations. They, 
therefore, had little relevant knowledge to share with one another, especially when it 
came to tackling the thorny issue of local resource mobilization. After participating in the 
peer-learning meetings, they would return to their countries still “lost”. According to a 
senior official of one of the African foundations under study, the peer-learning structure 
of the capacity building training was not very helpful with local resource mobilization 
back in her country: 
It’s true that those meetings (the networking and peer-learning sessions) 
helped you learn good tips; but you still have to come back to your 
organization and figure out: ‘Now, which bit can I adopt?’ …That's why 
they say that you can support people with training, but when they come 
back [home] they are still lost as before.33 
 
                                                 
33Participant H. Phone interview with the author, September 11, 2013 
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What Ford’s foundation grantees needed was context-specific support tailored to 
each country’s local environment and giving cultures. If Ford had asked them 
what they needed with respect to capacity building for local resource 
mobilization, they would have requested for an “accompanying consultant” to 
work with them in-country, over time, in their local context. As one of them 
explained:  
I am saying that I don't think Ford had a good [handle on] the whole thing 
(IISP). If there was an overall clear strategy, maybe they (Ford) would 
have known that there's the need to ‘accompany’ [participating] 
countries… May be somebody would have figured out that [the context in 
each African country] requires an ‘accompanying’ person34… to help us 
do a plan, meet the board, meet the staff, and help us come up with 
something, and then support us to implement it.35 
 
In other words, the participating Ford-founded philanthropies would have 
benefitted more (in terms of local resource mobilization) had the initiatives not been 
limited to peer-learning exercises based on Ford’s experience in the US and had included 
more targeted concrete capacity-building support based on participants’ local 
circumstances. A senior African foundation official talked about how support for local 
resource mobilization needs to go beyond knowledge-sharing meetings:  
There is room for [sharing ideas and learning] about what somebody from 
Brazil has done... That should happen once in a while. But there is also a 
place for [a] targeted action plan which [one] will [need to] work on from 
[ones] home country as opposed to [attending workshops in other 
countries] ...There are things that need to happen to enable the board to 
support me in that process, to help me develop the staff, and change the 
                                                 
34What the African foundation officials called “accompaniment” James (1994:23-25) calls “organizational 
development consultancy.” James explains that “the value of an Organizational Development (OD) 
specialist lies in helping organizations to identify what combination of system, structure, style and 
environmental factor is limiting performance and in assisting the organization to select the right mix of 
tools, methods and strategies to bring about the required changes or create a climate in which the 
organization is enabled to respond to future changes”  
35Participant H. Phone interview with the author, September 11, 2013 
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situation in Kenya… Like [a consultant] working with me to customize a 
support mechanism from where I am now, in my context as it is now.36 
 
Incidentally, the African foundations were not alone in finding fault with the 
networking structure. Former Ford Foundation senior officials also saw (in hindsight) the 
limitations of the peer-learning focus of the foundation’s capacity building initiatives, 
especially with respect to local resource mobilization. One of them stated that the 
networking structure did not work out as well as envisioned:  
It didn't work. Other things worked, but this just didn't. Again, I think it 
was naïve. I was thinking, well, if we get these folks together as a learning 
group the more experienced ones can share with the newer ones their 
experience of management…, fundraising, and resource mobilization…. 
In some cases that did happen, not as powerfully as I had hoped. And as I 
said, it was much more complicated than that.37 
 
Another former Ford senior official acknowledged that Ford’s lumping of foundations 
from different geographical and cultural backgrounds into “inorganic” networks had been 
ineffective:  
There was something… artificial about the networks…[The participating 
African foundations] came to these [meetings] because they felt they had 
to…; …I am not sure they felt … part of an organic network... I think it 
was like: ‘We have to do this because Ford is the funder and we have to be 
polite, but I am not really that interested in meeting the Brazilian Human 
Rights Fund, … or a group from Thailand. I am much more interested in 
meeting people in my own milieu, whether it’s in West Africa or South 
Africa.’ So...it was a bit romantic [for] Ford … to put quite so much 
money and effort into building a network of groups who weren't naturally 
of a network.38 
 
Ford’s use of networking/peer-learning as the main capacity-building tool in both 
the API and the IISP limited its effectiveness in building its African foundation 
grantees’ capacities for “tilling the soil” for local resource mobilization.   
                                                 
36Participant H. Phone interview with the author, September 11, 2013 
37Participant F. Phone interview with the author, Feb. 8, 2013  
38Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013 
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Inadequate Support for Local Resource Mobilization 
Because Ford focused on networking/knowledge-sharing among its foundation 
grantees and neglected to address their specific local needs, it failed to provide the 
context-specific support that they needed to be effective at local resource mobilization. 
One consequence of not paying attention to local contextual issues was Ford’s 
assumption that its foundation grantees would be able to mobilize the bulk of their 
resources locally with little more than challenge/matching grants.39 According to a former 
Ford senior official familiar with the philanthropy promotion program, Ford had left it to 
the individual foundations to prepare themselves for their local resource mobilization 
tasks: 
We (Ford) certainly encouraged them to [take steps to mobilize local 
resources], but I am not sure that there was a plan [to provide them with 
context-specific support]. It was left up to individual organizations to 
decide how they approached the task and how much energy they put into 
it.40 
 
A senior official from another major American foundation interviewed for this 
study, however, criticized assumptions that donor-founded philanthropies in 
developing countries would know what to do on their own with regards to local 
resource mobilization:  
Matching grants are great, but not without other support that helps the 
(local) foundations learn how to approach people… There is a whole set of 
skills, the planning that has to happen, and resources that the [local 
foundation] needs, to be able to…prioritize, in order to build an internal 
apparatus, to seek [local] support. But not just to get the money but also 
[to] do the stewardship, so that…trust can be built. …If you have a lot of 
individual contributions coming in, it’s a very different process. And so, 
we (American foundation-builders) can't just assume that foundations [in 
                                                 
39Challenge grants encourage charitable giving in situations where donors are already inclined to give to an 
organization They do not work where people have no interest in giving in the first place.  
40Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, Mar. 1, 2013 
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developing countries] know all this. And… that's been… one of the 
problems.41 
 
Failure to Provide Context-Specific Support 
What Ford had overlooked was that because the transplanted African foundations 
were operating in environments with very little history of professionalized philanthropy, 
they would need context-specific support to help them explore their local institutional 
environment and come up with appropriate strategies. Oftentimes, the officials of the 
Ford-founded African philanthropies felt helpless trying to figure these things out by 
themselves. As one of them explained: 
You [are asked] to figure it out yourself and sometimes you don't even 
know well what to ask. … You are supposed to figure out something 
which you yourself don't know. So, we had a lot of false starts. 
…Eventually, overtime, we figured out our way ourselves, but it's been 
hard.42 
 
A senior official of another Ford-founded African institution similarly expressed 
the need for, and the lack of, context-specific support for local resource 
mobilization: 
They (Ford and the other external founders/funders) should have… said: 
‘…We are going to give you this [money] for two years, but in the third 
year we've got to start working with you on how you will start raising 
resources from within the continent [of Africa].’ … I have said this over 
the years… looking at the frustrations and the challenges: we need 
resources, we need the thinking, the support, our hands to be held.43 
 
It was not just the African foundations which complained in this regard. A former 
Ford senior official also acknowledged Ford’s failure to provide the requisite support for 
local resource mobilization:  
                                                 
41Participant D. Phone interview with the author, May 30, 2013 
42Participant H. Phone interview with the author, September 11, 2013 
43Participant N. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 18, 2013 
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The basic idea for setting up the [local] foundations was that if these 
foundations are successful then the dependence of Africa on external aid 
would come down. …The theory of change has to be that not only should 
we (Ford])set up foundations, but we should also really provide them with 
what they need to become sustainable, to become fully independent…It's 
not enough to say [that] we've created a foundation… [The Ford-founded 
philanthropies] have been struggling…because the Ford Foundation did 
not prepare them to become financially sustainable.44 
 
The same former Ford senior official elaborated on the human and material 
resources that Ford ought to have provided to support its foundation grantees to 
build the internal capacity for cultivating local donor relationships, mobilizing, 
managing, and accounting for local funds:  
For an organization to be financially secure, to mobilize resources 
properly … they need the capacity, they need to be prepared… And that 
means that they need to have the staff, … the communication materials, … 
the physical information technology infrastructure and all of that. … And 
they also need to have a good sense of their [local philanthropic] 
landscape and a good understanding of where the money will come from. 
…Ford…was largely programmatic [in its approach] … [There was] very 
little on building or strengthening the [local] resource mobilization 
capacities of [its grantees], whether they were philanthropic organizations 
like TrustAfrica or NGOs.45 
 
The officials of the African foundations under study corroborated, also spelling 
out their need for internal capacity for local resource mobilization, and the 
challenges they faced getting support for that:  
Internally one of the challenges we found with [local resource 
mobilization] --- whether you are dealing with individuals, with 
companies, or with families --- is that you need dedicated [internal] 
capacity. And that's a big challenge because… nobody46  gives you money 
to do stuff like that. We realized we needed a good data base to allow us to 
know who gave us last year, and when did they give us, and to remind 
them this year. We realized we needed to invest in software, we needed to 
                                                 
44Participant C. Phone interview with the author, June 19, 2013 
45Participant C. Phone interview with the author, June 19, 2013 
46Whereas there was unanimous praise from the Ford-founded philanthropies under study for what Ford 
had done for them in terms of institutional support (other than local resource mobilization) there was a 
tendency to not be too critical of the Ford Foundation by name. 
137 
invest in individuals… It [has been] a challenge institutionally to develop 
the capacity to follow through with [local] philanthropic giving. Growing 
local philanthropy is not something anybody is giving you money for and 
yet it requires a lot of time.47 
 
A senior official of another African foundation also expressed frustration with 
Ford’s capacity- building initiatives that were unaccompanied by concrete support 
to build the necessary internal capacity: 
There was definitely some capacity building work around [resource 
mobilization] in terms of strengthening our awareness and understanding 
of how these processes are managed and things like that. But the point I 
am making is that…which comes first? You understand? Which comes 
first? … Is it talking about strategic communication when you can't afford 
a communications officer in the organization; … When you don't have the 
money to pay for that?48 
 
Just like many other international funders, Ford talked about the need for its 
foundation grantees to mobilize local resources but did not invest enough to make it 
actually happen. The fact that Ford supported the hiring of other core staff but failed to 
support the hiring of staff dedicated to local resource mobilization showed that, despite 
its rhetoric, the Ford Foundation did not prioritize local resource mobilization. A former 
Ford senior official summarized donors’ attitude (including Ford’s) towards providing 
support for local resource mobilization: 
Donors are not inherently interested in the fundraising capacity of their 
grantees. They talk about it, they want the grantees to diversify their donor 
base…, but when you look at the structure of the grants they give…there's 
practically no room to enable the grantee to build the capacity and the 
infrastructure it needs to successfully…mobilize [local] resources. 
…Resource mobilization has always been a very tricky thing. …It’s 
almost like the other side of the coin that [donors] don't seem to 
understand. They understand the need for it, but they are…focused on 
                                                 
47Participant H. Phone interview with the author, September 11, 201 
48Participant P. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 17, 2013 
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project support and organizational development in areas other than [local] 
fundraising. The Ford Foundation was no different.49 
In that regard, a senior official of another major American private foundation noted that 
international funders building foundations in developing countries ought to factor in the 
cost associated with helping the local philanthropies to develop the needed internal 
capacity for local resource mobilization: 
There's a lot of things that [newly-established foundations in African 
countries] need to know; therefore, [international] foundations … 
supporting the development of local foundations...and wanting them to 
diversify and start tapping into local resources… have to understand that 
there's a cost associated with building that capacity. [They have to] be 
willing to subsidize that for a while… If you don't get that as an outside 
(international) funder…then you are setting [the local foundations] up to 
fail basically.50 
 
Asked if Ford had a responsibility as founder to strengthen its African foundation 
grantees’ capacity for local resource mobilization, a former Ford senior official 
answered that Ford did have a responsibility; and ought to have given much more 
thought “at the front end” to preparing its grantees for that function:  
[The problematic nature of local resource mobilization] doesn't release 
Ford of any responsibility... I think [that] there could have been more, and 
better thought given at the front end to [support the local foundations]. … 
If I were to redesign [the philanthropy promotion program] I would spend 
a lot more effort finding very good [local] sources of advice and guidance 
and training for the people involved [with local resource mobilization]; 
recognizing that it is simply a difficult problem. That won't make the 
problem go away but… we could have done more work to help find 
solutions.51  
 
In its attempt to cultivate and grow institutional philanthropy in Africa Ford failed 
to provide the appropriate tools and resources for tilling and fertilizing the local terrain. 
                                                 
49Participant C. Phone interview with author, June 19, 2013 
50Participant D. Phone interview with the author, May 30, 2013 
51Participant F. Phone interview with the author, Feb. 8, 2013 
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Tilling the land to the right depth and adding organic manure (rather than using imported 
fertilizer) was needed to facilitate the transplants’ adaptation to the local soil. It was 
particularly needed for the development of root systems capable of tapping into available 
local nutrients/resources. Ford’s failure to prioritize support for the development of local 
resource mobilization within the local environment of its African foundation grantees, 
therefore, contributed to its failure to meet its (philanthropic) resource mobilization 
objective in African countries.  
Failure to Publicize the New Philanthropic Institutions  
Due to the lack of familiarity with and knowledge about professionalized 
foundations in African countries, few in the local populace could identify with them as 
channels for charitable giving. This lack of information exacerbated the suspicions 
discussed in previous sections. This situation notwithstanding, the Ford Foundation did 
not invest in a public awareness and education strategy to help create local understanding, 
to get local buy-in and support for the new philanthropic form it was promoting in 
African countries. 52 A senior official of one of the African foundations under study 
attributed Kenyans’ suspicions not just to the fact that the foundation form was imposed 
from the outside, but also to the failure to familiarize the local people with the new 
philanthropic form: 
What I know is that every time an organization is created by somebody for 
a community53 it is natural that everybody wonders 'So what is the 
intention?' Because the intention (behind KCDF’s establishment) was not 
extensively sold [to the Kenyan populace]. …Only a few people who were 
familiar with Ford and familiar with the concept of community 
foundations were aware of what was happening.54, 
 
                                                 
52Participant R. Phone interview with the author, March 27, 2013 
53Read “imposed by outsiders” 
54Participant S. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 15, 2013 
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In Kenya, Ford did work with only a small number of local elites to build the 
KCDF (Lukalo-Owino 2008). It was assumed that Kenyans already gave towards public 
causes through mechanisms such as harambees and would readily support the new 
foundations. The fact that the American-inspired foundation form was completely 
different from the harambee system as well as the other indigenous African forms of 
giving, and that there would be the need for a public campaign, was hardly considered. 
Asked why Ford did not invest in a public awareness campaign as part of its philanthropy 
promotion strategy in African countries, a former Ford senior official stated that public 
awareness creation had not been a priority when the foundations were established. He 
explained that Ford’s focus had been to strengthen the foundations themselves; adding 
that ultimately it was the responsibility of the Ford-founded/funded philanthropies 
themselves to create that awareness in their respective countries: 
When you … do programming you …understand how you prioritize, 
where you put your resources. [Of what use is it to] fund public awareness 
while the [philanthropic] institutions are not yet on the ground?... 
[Besides] who should be working on public and community awareness? 
The [local] institutions themselves.55  
 
Just as it had left it to the African foundations to tackle local resource 
mobilization by themselves, Ford also left it to them to raise public awareness 
about foundation philanthropy in their countries. 56 The KCDF’s experience with 
the ‘liability of newness’ illustrates the effect of imposing a foreign form of 
philanthropy on a developing country without any form of public awareness 
raising:  
                                                 
55Participant R. Phone interview with the author, March 27, 2013 
56The African foundations complained of not receiving enough unrestricted funding to carry out such public 
awareness and field-building tasks on their own.  
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When you (Ford) start an organization and you say ‘We want it to operate 
in this [particular] way, we want it to raise money locally, we want you to 
build an endowment’…People will ask: ‘If there's no other example like 
that in Kenya, why do you think we'll succeed?... We are starting an 
organization from scratch...’57 
 
Ford’s failure to include support for public communication as part of its philanthropy 
promotion strategy in African countries was a shortcoming that affected the local 
people’s knowledge and awareness about its foundation grantees. This in turn fostered 
the skepticism and suspicions discussed above and jeopardized the latter’s local resource 
mobilization effectiveness. I contend that the absence of public awareness-raising to gain 
local acceptance and buy-in in African countries made local financial support for Ford’s 
foundation grantees even more difficult and posed an obstacle to the achievement of 
Ford’s own local resource mobilization goal.   
Availability of International Funds as a Disincentive 
The easy availability of international funding made it possible for the Ford-
founded philanthropies to operate and function as grant makers without having to 
mobilize local funds in any serious way. One of the first things that philanthropic 
foundations are supposed to determine before they even incorporate and start their 
operations is where they intend to find the resources to carry out their grantmaking or 
operational programs. In its zeal to build foundations in developing countries, the Ford 
Foundation downplayed the need for the elites in the targeted African countries (with 
whom it worked to start the foundations) to show upfront that the envisioned foundations 
would be able to attract and mobilize local resources. By providing the seed money for 
start-up costs and supplying the resources for operational costs and grantmaking, Ford 
                                                 
57Participant S. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 15, 2013 
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allowed its foundation grantees to initially decouple their operations and grantmaking 
from the need to mobilize local resources. 
This decoupling is seen in the fact that rather than start with local resource 
mobilization (to support their operations and grantmaking), Ford’s foundation grantees 
(with no local money at all) started out with grantmaking to channel funds from Ford and 
other international donors to local communities. They reasoned that grantmaking would 
give them visibility and build their credibility to facilitate local resource mobilization 
later.58The assertion that international funding stymied local resource mobilization is 
borne out by the fact that it was only after Ford’s support ended abruptly around 2010 
that the KCDF (and also the AWDF) took a serious look at local resource mobilization. A 
senior official of the KCDF explained: 
KCDF was lucky that for nearly seven or nine years since its formation 
Ford was one of the organizations that committed to supporting core costs 
for the organization… But since their support came to an end we had to 
now diversify [our funding sources] and are looking at different ways of 
making sure that we sustain an extremely efficient team.59 
 
This diversification of funding sources, however, still involved attracting more 
foreign funding from donors other than Ford.  
Making Hay While the Sun Was Still Shining 
The relative ease of raising international funding allowed the Ford-
founded/funded philanthropies to get by without doing the hard work needed to 
cultivate and mobilize local funds. With their lack of local roots, the incongruence 
between them and local cultures of giving, and their lack of internal capacity to 
raise local money, the Ford-founded/funded philanthropies (like other donor-
                                                 
58Participant P. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 17, 2013 
59Participant S. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 15, 2013 
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founded organizations) found it easier to attract international funding. There was 
little incentive to struggle for local resources. A senior official of one of the Ford-
founded African philanthropies explained their strategy of using international 
funding to address today’s pressing problems while trying to figure out how to 
mobilize local resources for long-term sustainability: 
Although we have a long-term plan for our self-sustainability, we are… 
aware that our host communities need help today; children need to go to 
school, families need to eat... All these things are needed today, and so our 
fundraising from elsewhere (international donors) …is to help us to 
continue to deliver solutions to these challenges.60 
 
Incidentally, besides the relative ease of raising money from international donors, 
there seemed to have also been a tacit agenda to focus on attracting foreign funding 
(while this was still available to them). The huge amounts raised internationally would 
help them achieve their development goals faster than hard-to-get local philanthropic 
resources. The foundations under study therefore actively pursued and took advantage of 
the availability of foreign money to carry out their grantmaking programs, while giving 
themselves time to figure out how best to tackle the mobilization of local resources under 
their difficult circumstances. A former Ford senior official familiar with the phenomenon 
explained this tacit agenda: 
The [Ford-founded/funded philanthropies] and all these African NGOs are 
not fools.61 They are playing a game; they are playing a game with the 
international donors. At times international donors do not know; it's only 
the Africans within them that know. And they know that if they don't use 
the international donors they will not have the resources to develop … 
[while they strengthen] the…traditions of giving within… their 
countries.62   
 
                                                 
60Participant S. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 15, 2013 
61Meaning that they are very much aware of the need to develop local sources of funding for their long-
term sustainability. 
62Participant R. Phone interview with the author, March 27, 2013 
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Indeed, scholars have found that resource dependent organizations respond to 
institutional pressures and try to cope with environmental uncertainty with a variety of 
tactics, including acquiescence, defiance, and manipulation (Oliver 1991).  
The Ford-founded philanthropies, therefore, exercised their agency by choosing to 
focus their energies (during their first decade or two) on mobilizing international 
resources to build their organizations and strengthen their grantmaking programs. They 
hoped to be able to fulfill their local resource mobilization functions (and thus advance 
Ford’s philanthropy promotion agenda) with time, after gaining trust as grant makers. 
Once their identity as grant makers took hold, however, it became difficult for them to 
present themselves to the public as seekers of local funding. The AWDF’s experience is 
common to the other two Ford-founded institutions under study: 
We've raised the visibility of the organization within Africa. People are 
aware of the AWDF; they've seen the change that AWDF is making. The 
challenge for us is now how to translate that capital into encouraging 
people to give [us donations]. People very much see us as an organization 
that gives... funds. The challenge for us now is to turn that huge capital 
that we have in terms of networks63 to say… ‘If you think the AWDF [is] 
doing a good job, then give’.64 
 
Ultimately, TrustAfrica (with $30 million from Ford65 and support from 
other international funders) is the best example of how international funding 
became a disincentive for the Ford-founded philanthropies to seek local resources. 
One senior official explained why the foundation had not prioritized local 
resource mobilization:    
                                                 
63The networks that the AWDF, TrustAfrica, and KCDF developed were networks of grantee organizations 
(recipients) to facilitate their grantmaking effectiveness. They were yet to be successful at developing 
networks for boosting local resource mobilization (local donors).  
64Participant P. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 17, 2013 
65This was to be disbursed over 10 years  
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To be honest with you … [local resource mobilization] hasn't been a 
priority for TrustAfrica, simply because… TrustAfrica …is like a kid that 
was born rich …The issue is not so much the difficulty in terms of [local] 
fundraising. I just think that we haven't prioritized that, simply because we 
have enjoyed...wealth that has come to us from elsewhere...66 
 
In a perverse way, therefore, one of the factors that stymied the local resource 
mobilization goal of Ford’s philanthropy promotion program in African countries 
was the foundation’s long-term financial commitment to its foundation grantees, 
especially TrustAfrica. Equally problematic was the ready availability of funding 
from other international donors eager to use the Ford-founded/funded 
philanthropies as conduits for their pass-through grants.  
Underestimation of the Complexity of Philanthropy Promotion  
Finally, Ford’s failure to achieve its local resource mobilization goal in African 
countries was due, in large part, to the fact that it underestimated the complexity of 
exporting (philanthropic) institutional forms across borders. Ford failed to realize that 
philanthropy promotion outside the US would take more than grantmaking. And that it 
would not only need to help its new foundations to set up managerial, governance, and 
grantmaking structures; but more importantly, it would need to help “plough the field” to 
make the African soil more receptive to the exotic philanthropic seedlings that it was 
trying to propagate.   
Ford’s underestimation of the work that needed to be done is evidenced by the 
many times that former Ford senior officials stated that they had not thought things 
through well enough with regards to the local resource mobilization needs of the African 
foundations. They had also not thought through the design and implementation of the 
                                                 
66Participant G. Phone interview with the author, March 28, 2013 
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capacity-building programs with respect to the local context. The confusion at the 
launching of the International Initiative to Strengthen Philanthropy (IISP), in Budapest, 
Hungary, illustrates this. The participating foundations, including the three African 
participants, pushed back at the lack of clarity surrounding the initiative, especially with 
regards to support for local resource mobilization. A former Ford senior official 
described what happened in Budapest and how Ford had failed to anticipate the pertinent 
issues before the launching of the IISP: 
The first meeting we had...was at the European Foundation Center in 
Budapest…where a lot of the confusion that we (Ford) hadn't anticipated 
came to the surface... There was plenty of storming...and a large part of it, 
although not all, was [because]...there was ambiguity about expectations. 
What did Ford expect of them? What could they expect of Ford?... So, 
there was some very good push back; there was some tough questioning... 
about how to figure out how this was all going to work, because there 
were things that we hadn't thought through all the way.67  
 
A former Ford consultant described Ford’s simplistic thinking with respect to its capacity 
building strategies and tactics for the foundations it established outside the US. 
According to him, Ford believed that all it needed to do was to put them in peer-groups 
and give them matching grants and they would flourish: 
Ford operated under the assumption that if you brought nice good people 
together in a room, magic would happen. …There was a belief that if you 
… gave people endowment [grants], if you gave them peer-learning, if 
you gave them technical assistance, those foundations would develop. 
…The Ford Foundation didn't think through well enough what it was 
trying to do. 68 
 
The statements above from a former Ford senior official and a former Ford 
consultant underscore the fact that Ford approached the task of trying to influence 
                                                 
67Participant F. Phone interview with the author, June 18, 2013 
68Participant E. Phone interview with the author, April 30, 2013 
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and institutionalize giving behaviors in contexts outside the US without much 
thought about the challenges it should have anticipated.   
Moreover, by leaving the issue of local resource mobilization to the transplanted 
foundations to figure out on their own in the ‘unsupportive’ institutional environments in 
which it had transplanted them, Ford underestimated the complex (and costly) context-
specific work that was required to help its “free-floating” foundations (Ottaway 2000:81) 
to put down roots in the local African soil. Given that growing roots in the local soil is a 
prerequisite for effectively tapping into local resources, Ford’s underestimation of its task 
(and its subsequent failure to provide context-specific support for its foundation grantees) 
undermined the attainment of its local philanthropy promotion goal in African countries.  
Conclusion 
This chapter outlined and analyzed the major factors that contributed to 
Ford’s failure to meet its philanthropy promotion objective of helping to mobilize 
large-scale private resources in African countries for the public good; through the 
establishment of foundations. The fundamental contributory factor to Ford’s 
failure was the foundation’s imposition of the American-inspired formal 
foundation model on African countries characterized by different institutional 
frameworks and predominantly informal philanthropic landscapes. The inherent 
incongruence between the values of the American-inspired formal foundation 
model and the informal African cultures of giving made the transplants 
unattractive to local donors.  
Ford’s failure to take the contextual differences into account (and to tailor 
its capacity-building strategies and tactics to the various African contexts) was 
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another major contributing factor to its foundation grantees’ (and ultimately its 
own) lack of local resource mobilization effectiveness. Due to its neglect of 
contextual differences, Ford employed some of the same strategies that it had 
successfully used in previous initiatives in the US, expecting them to be just as 
successful in African countries.  
Ford’s long-term commitment to fund its foundation grantees for extended 
periods of time (sometimes for 10 years) provided a financial cushion that 
allowed the latter to avoid engaging in the very difficult task of trying to mobilize 
substantial local resources while the Ford funding was still available. The 
chapter’s final explanation was the fact that (lulled by its experience in the US 
institutional and philanthropic environment) the Ford Foundation underestimated 
the enormity of exporting and trying to promote institutional philanthropy in 
contexts outside the US. Ford was, therefore, ill-prepared to provide the kind of 
support and internal capacity that its African foundation grantees required to have 
a real good chance at local resource mobilization in the African contexts.  
Drawing from the theoretical perspectives from Chapter I and the two 
empirical chapters, Chapter IV provided a socio-cultural explanation for the local 
resource mobilization ineffectiveness of Ford’s philanthropic transplants in 
African countries. Together, the above factors stymied the Ford-founded 
philanthropies’ ability (and desire) to do the required work to adapt to the local 
environment, develop local roots, and cultivate the appropriate local relationships 
for resource mobilization within their countries, in particular; and the African 
continent, in general. As pointed out above, Ford’s foundation grantees’ failure at 
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local resource mobilization reflected Ford’s own failure, as these foundations 
were the mechanism through which it had sought to accomplish its own 
philanthropy agenda in Africa. The next chapter concludes the dissertation and 
makes recommendations for policy and practice.    
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Chapter V: Conclusion and Broader Implications 
I introduced this dissertation with an agricultural analogy, not only 
because Africa’s development (and the well-being of its people) is linked to 
agriculture, but also, because many of the former Ford Foundation officials (as 
well as others) who participated in the study used agricultural metaphors to 
describe the foundation’s attempt to grow local philanthropy in Sub-Saharan 
African countries. In their mind the act of building foundations in Africa was akin 
to planting a field.1 It is therefore appropriate to begin the concluding chapter with 
an update of the agricultural analogy.  
The analogy described an international donor who had set out to promote 
sustainable improved local horticulture in African countries to stimulate bumper 
crop harvests and food security. To achieve this objective the international donor 
exported an exotic variety of fruit tree from the temperate zones of North America 
to the tropical climate of sub-Saharan Africa. Many of the transplanted tree crops 
died and the few that survived the transplantation shock had difficulty drawing 
upon nutrients from the local environment and only survived because the 
international donor continued to support them with foreign-sourced chemical 
fertilizers. Two decades later the international donor had failed to achieve its 
objective of promoting sustainable improved local horticulture and bumper 
                                                 
1One former Ford Africa Representative explained that the building of community foundations in African 
countries in the 1990s was an idea whose time had come because “the time was ripe, and the ground was 
fertile.” Another described what it would take for philanthropic foundations to grow and flourish in Africa: 
“… It’s like growing corn or cassava or any plant. If the soil is not fertile enough, it’s not going to happen; 
… if the rains don't come, it’s not going to happen; …and if there are predators, you know, the crows or 
animals that come to eat the seeds even before they have a chance to germinate, it’s not going to happen. 
So, when I look at the environment [of institutional philanthropy in Africa] I use that metaphor of farming”. 
He went on to explain that the rain represented local financial resources needed to fund the sustainable 
growth of formal foundations on the continent.    
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harvests in the targeted African countries. My quest was to find out why, despite 
its well-intentioned efforts, the international donor (the Ford Foundation) failed to 
achieve its goal.  
In the final analysis, the international donor failed to achieve its goal 
because (to continue the horticultural analogy) the temperate fruit trees that it 
transplanted to bring about the improvement were incompatible with the climatic 
conditions, the rainfall patterns, and the soil type in the tropics. In particular, they 
lacked the root systems necessary to draw organic nourishment from the local 
African soil. They also lacked what they needed to be able to adapt to the local 
terrain.  
The above analogy, in a nutshell, recaps the story of the Ford Foundation’s 
philanthropy promotion program in African countries. With this as the subject of 
inquiry, I set out to investigate the challenges associated with international 
development actors’ attempts to boost development in countries of the global 
South via the transplantation of institutional models from developed economies. 
In particular, this dissertation explains why Ford’s attempt to use the American-
inspired philanthropic foundation form to catalyze large-scale local resource 
mobilization in African countries failed to produce the desired results.  
Given the newness of the foundation concept in African countries (among other 
institutional problems that dogged the transplanted foundations) Ford needed to have 
used a more “bottom-up” grantmaking style and helped to engage resource people 
knowledgeable about African cultures of giving and local resource mobilization, rather 
than the international resource institutions it funded to transplant its African foundation 
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grantees. Based on the informal characteristics of African giving cultures (compared to 
the formal giving that Ford was trying to promote), the foundation should have used 
capacity-building tactics tailored to the specific context and realities in the African 
countries of interest, rather than the generic philanthropic tactics that it had used 
elsewhere.  
Having imposed a foreign philanthropic model on African societies (where the 
prevalent institutional systems were inherently not structured to provide financial support 
to the American-inspired philanthropic foundation model) Ford should have funded 
activities targeted at “preparing and tilling the African soil” as an important part of its 
philanthropy promotion strategy in African countries. That would have probably 
facilitated its transplants’ adaptation to, and rooting in, the African soil; a prerequisite for 
tapping into and mobilizing local support. Ford did otherwise, as shown by the evidence.  
Summary of Findings 
The data (from the relevant literature and the expert interviews) provide strong 
support for my socio-cultural thesis attributing Ford’s local resource mobilization failure 
to the incongruence between the values and practices associated with the local African 
cultures of giving and those of the transplanted (imposed) American-inspired 
philanthropic institutional model. The analysis and assessment of both the independent 
and dependent variables showed that whereas Ford was successful at building and 
strengthening its African foundation grantees’ organizational development in terms of 
managerial, board, and grantmaking effectiveness, the foundation was unsuccessful at 
using the professionalized philanthropic institutions to catalyze large-scale local formal 
giving. While it was effective at transferring the skills and competencies that its African 
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foundation grantees needed to run as efficient formal philanthropic organizations, the 
foundation failed to provide the requisite resources and appropriate context-specific 
support that the latter needed to build their capacity for local resource mobilization 
effectiveness.  
Consequently, the financial data showed that all three Ford-founded/funded 
African philanthropies under study were highly dependent on Ford and other 
international donors for about 98% of their revenues by 2010, when Ford ended its 
philanthropy promotion program in developing countries. Even though Ford set them up 
to attract the bulk of their resources locally (which would have signified local buy-in, 
ownership, and legitimacy) and to lead self-reliant community-driven development, they 
all turned out to be intermediaries/conduits, mostly regranting funds often restricted by 
international donors’ interests.   
The analysis shows that Ford’s very choice to replicate the American-inspired 
foundation model as its means for promoting local philanthropy in African countries was 
the first flawed act that triggered all the others which (together) caused it to fail in its bid 
to catalyze and boost large-scale local giving through formal philanthropic foundations. 
That choice was undergirded by Ford’s disregard for the socio-economic, political and 
socio-cultural differences between the United States (where the philanthropic foundation 
model emerged organically) and the African countries in which the foundation imposed 
the foreign philanthropic model. The disregard for contextual differences was 
exemplified by Ford’s failure to take the different (informal) nature of African 
philanthropic organization and giving patterns into account in devising its philanthropy 
promotion and foundation-building strategy, including its capacity-building initiatives. 
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The isomorphic nature of its foundation-building (transplantation) process ensured that 
Ford built its African foundations ‘in its own image’, but the process also inherently 
created identity issues for the latter and stymied donations from the local populations (for 
whom authenticity and familiarity between the giver and the recipient were important). 
Ford’s use of capacity-building strategies and tactics that it had successfully employed in 
the US, with the expectation that they would work equally well for its African foundation 
grantees, was another example of the foundation’s disregard for the contextual 
differences between the US and African contexts.  
The most critical finding with respect to the contextual issues is Ford’s disregard 
for the differences in values, organizational logics and practices between formal 
professionalized foundation philanthropy as Ford knew it and the prevalent informal local 
African cultures of giving. The foundation’s staff responsible for its philanthropy 
promotion program in African countries had not taken the time to think through the 
complexities of cross-border institutional transfers before implementing the foundation-
building and the capacity-building initiatives. Had Ford taken these differences into 
account it would have anticipated the enormity and complexity of the task and prioritized 
local resource mobilization by providing the appropriate resources to help its transplanted 
foundation grantees adapt to the local philanthropic soil and climate. As it is, the 
evidence shows that Ford grossly underestimated what it took to export a new form of 
philanthropic institution to another context, and to have it make sense to the host society 
and become locally adoptable in practice. As charitable giving in African countries is 
shaped by and highly dependent on the informal local culture, values, religious beliefs, 
and norms (among other things), Ford’s failure to take the local concepts of philanthropy 
155 
into account in its foundation-building and local philanthropy promotion effort resulted in 
the creation of local foundations that were more akin to their counterparts in the US than 
they were to resource-pooling informal African philanthropies. They were, therefore, 
incompatible with local philanthropic values and practices. That made them unacceptable 
and unattractive to many Africans as vehicles for charitable giving.   
Finally, the evidence shows that Ford’s long-term financial commitment to its 
foundation grantees (as well as the availability of funding from other international 
donors) acted as a disincentive for its African grantees to do the much harder work of 
trying to mobilize the bulk of their resources locally in environments with which they 
were incompatible. The availability of foreign funding allowed the African foundations 
the space to operate and make grants for a decade and more, without needing to take 
serious steps to mobilize local resources as they were supposed to. The fact that the Ford 
Foundation (as the founding institution) had not prepared its African foundation grantees 
adequately for local resource mobilization was a challenge, but it was not fatal to their 
continuous existence as long as international funding (mostly from Ford) was available 
for their operations, grantmaking, and endowment-building.  
With respect to the availability of international funding, the evidence also shows 
that Ford’s African foundation grantees were not just passive conduits for international 
funds. In fact, the Ford-founded African foundations (like other donor-founded 
organizations) saw an opportunity to focus their energies on attracting as much foreign 
funding as possible while these resources were available to them. That was easier than 
stretching the few unrestricted resources available to them to tackle resource mobilization 
in the difficult local terrain in which they had been transplanted. It was easier for them to 
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use the foreign funding to solve major development problems while buying time to figure 
out the best strategies for attracting sustainable local support in their particular context.  
Overall, the evidence shows that Ford failed ultimately to achieve its local 
resource mobilization goal in African countries because the formal American-
inspired foundation model that it transplanted in those countries for the purpose of 
boosting local contributions towards the public good was incongruent with the 
informal African cultures of giving that were supposed to provide the local 
support to the former. The situation could have been ameliorated if Ford had 
recognized the incongruence between its foundation grantees and the African 
philanthropic terrain and taken the necessary steps to mitigate the latter’s 
challenges through context-specific support for local resource mobilization. 
Instead, Ford assumed that its experience in the United States would be applicable 
to the African institutional and philanthropic context and would work just as 
successfully. The evidence shows that it did not.  
Significance of the Study and Findings 
Theoretical Significance 
The theoretical significance of my subject of inquiry (the exportation of 
institutions from developed industrialized countries to developing countries to speed up 
modernization and development) and the findings of my case study is its importance and 
relevance to different important audiences. It is significant not only to scholars of 
international development, but particularly, to scholars of nonprofit and philanthropic 
studies. As pointed out in the introduction to this study, scholars of international 
development, international relations, comparative law, institutional economics, 
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constitutional law, and civil society have had an ongoing debate over the effectiveness of 
transplanted or borrowed institutional models, usually from developed economies to 
developing economies (Watson 1974; Merry 1988; Katz 1994; Legrand 1997; De Jong 
and Mamadouh 2002; Swidler 2006; Perju 2012).  
One side of the debate has argued that institutions are independent of society, and 
therefore, could be transferred from one context to another and expected to perform 
successfully (Watson 1974). The other side has argued that institutions are not 
independent of society. Instead, they mirror the socio-economic, socio-political and 
socio-cultural environment out of which they emerge, and will fail to perform as expected 
when transferred from their context of origin and transplanted in a completely different 
environment (Legrand 1997). This dissertation’s analysis of the Ford Foundation’s 1990s 
philanthropy promotion and foundation-building program in African countries, by finding 
support for the latter argument, has added to the merit of the “institutions-as-mirrors-of-
society” argument with a case from the field of philanthropy.  
Though major American private foundations (including Ford, the Rockefeller 
Foundation, and the Gates Foundation) have been in the business of transferring 
educational, health, agricultural, socio-cultural and philanthropic institutional models to 
developing and transitional countries over the years (Berman 1983; Arnove 1984; Ogilvie 
1997), there has not been much theoretical discussion or theory-building in the field of 
philanthropy with respect to the performance (or lack thereof) of exported philanthropic 
institutions in recipient countries. What is most significant about this dissertation, 
therefore, is its contribution to the literature on the development of institutional 
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philanthropy in sub-Saharan Africa; and the role of international funders and other 
external actors in that endeavor.  
Thus far the development of institutional philanthropy (and foundation-building) 
in sub-Saharan Africa has received little attention from nonprofit and philanthropy 
scholars, with the few works on the establishment of community foundations in African 
(and other developing) countries being mostly descriptive and laudatory (Malombe 2000; 
Sacks 2000),2 rather than analytical and critical. My in-depth interviews with both former 
Ford officials and officials of the Ford-founded African philanthropies under study 
revealed, for example, that contrary to the current belief that the community foundation 
concept was embraced in developing countries and had near-universal applicability and 
success (Sacks 2000), the imposition of that philanthropic institutional form elicited 
skepticism, anger, frustration, and suspicion among some elites in some African 
countries.  
Finally, the stark differences between the American-inspired formal form of 
philanthropy, on the one hand, and the prevalent informal African ways of philanthropic 
organization and practice, on the other, allowed a demonstration of the incongruence 
between the transplanted philanthropies and the prevailing African cultures of giving. My 
selection of Ford’s African foundation grantees as the sub-units of analysis provided an 
opportunity for this dissertation to contribute to the theoretical discourse on the 
nonperformance of transplanted formal institutions due to the mismatch between the 
formal institutional models of foreign origin and the local informal institutions that 
ultimately fail to support the former (North 1991, 1994). This intellectual discourse is 
                                                 
2These works were usually funded by the Ford Foundation and other major American private foundations 
involved in the propagation of institutional philanthropy abroad.  
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long overdue in the field of Philanthropic Studies. The field is, therefore, all the richer for 
the theoretical insights that this dissertation brings to scholars interested in international 
donors’ efforts to speed up self-reliant and self-directed development in African (and 
other developing) countries through support for the growth of local philanthropy.    
Practical Significance for Development Practitioners 
This dissertation’s significance is not only theoretical, as it is also of practical 
significance to both international development practitioners (including international 
public and private donors) and their local beneficiary institutions and partners in 
development.   
Private Foundations and Other International Donors 
Many American private foundations including the Kellogg, CS Mott, MacArthur, 
Rockefeller Foundations, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, as well as other actors 
such as USAID, the World Bank, and UNDP, all believed in the 1990s that the best way 
to improve aid effectiveness and foster sustainable development in African and other 
developing countries was to propagate the (community) foundation form in these 
countries. Because this philanthropic organizational form had worked in rural America 
and facilitated the mobilization of local resources for community improvement they 
expected it to work just as successfully in contexts outside the United States, with the 
transfer of cash (grants) and technical assistance. International donors’ development 
strategy (especially that of the major American private foundations that were the subject 
of Berman’s inquiry --- Ford, Carnegie and Rockefeller) has been “undergirded by the 
belief in the ability of technical expertise to solve the myriad problems associated with 
societal betterment and Third World Development” (Berman (1983:9). International 
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donors in international development would benefit from my finding that the transfer of 
technical expertise to developing countries without reference to the local socio-cultural 
environment and institutions could spell institutional ineffectiveness in the host countries.  
My findings are of practical significance to international donors as they suggest 
that culture and context do matter (Swidler 2006; Galvan 1997; and Holmén 2010), 
particularly when it comes to socially-constructed institutions such as philanthropy. They 
echo Holmén’s (2010) observations in cautioning international donors against the 
tendency to act in ways that suggest that developing countries need to emulate the 
developed world and adopt institutions and solutions that worked successfully in those 
countries: 
One would expect donors and INGOs not to be only knowledgeable about 
the intricacies of development but also to be sensible about social and 
cultural diversity, and hence to be prepared to allow for a wide range of 
solutions to difficulties encountered. That appears, however, not to be the 
case. Despite a jargon that indicates the opposite, the West (as interpreted 
by Western donors and aid agencies) remains the model others should 
copy (Holmén 2010:27). 
 
International funders would also find useful my finding that exporting formal 
organizational forms (that invariably lack roots in the local socio-cultural 
landscape) to stimulate development in contexts where informal institutions 
prevail can cause the former to under-perform, as Holmén (2010) found earlier: 
There are good reasons to believe that organizations mirror their 
environment more than they reshape it. …Whether society is strong or not 
largely depends upon the strength of its institutions, and where they are 
strong, imported organizational solutions are likely to be captured and 
‘perverted’ or at least to ‘under-perform’. Of course, this can be blamed on 
the ‘inadequate’ context, but that wouldn’t help us much (Holmén 
2010:18).  
 
161 
The overall significance of my research findings to international donors is that it 
draws attention to the fact that exporting institutions from the developed world to 
developing countries to change lives may be counter-productive if there is no 
adaptation to the local context.  
Finally, the findings of this dissertation buttress the idea that development (in all 
areas, including the philanthropic arena) needs to be endogenous, demand-driven, and 
culturally appropriate. If it is supply-driven and imposed from the outside by 
international donors, it is hard for development to be locally-owned, locally-supported, or 
sustainable. My findings, therefore, join others to suggest to international donors that 
they cannot develop others according to their own definition of progress, with their own 
institutional forms. Local people, who are the end of development efforts, need to be the 
means of their own development (Ake 2001). They have to be able to decide the kind of 
development they need and be able to mobilize the resources to pursue their own 
development agenda (Närman 1995). International donors interested in supporting the 
growth of local philanthropy (as well as other forms of development) in developing 
countries would do well to take the local context --- people’s cultures of giving and ways 
of philanthropic organization --- into account.  
Donor-Founded Philanthropies, NGOs, and CSOs 
Ford’s failure to meet its local resource mobilization goals in African countries is 
linked to the local resource mobilization challenges of the Ford-founded philanthropies. 
The findings of this research are, therefore, also significant for the Ford-founded 
philanthropies under study. Not only that, they are for other donor-founded CSOs in 
developing countries. Governments in countries as diverse as Kenya, Ethiopia, India and 
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Russia (to name a few) have enacted laws to regulate the amount of foreign money that 
NGOs and civil society organizations (including philanthropic foundations) can access 
without attracting state scrutiny and stigma. As an example, Russia’s 2012 foreign agent 
law was so stringent that it attracted a lot of outcry (ICNL). Proponents of these laws 
consider donor-founded NGOs and CSOs as instruments of foreign political and cultural 
interference that need to be monitored by host governments. Given the attitude of these 
(and other) governments towards NGOs’ and CSOs’ receipt of foreign funding, the 
survival and long-term sustainability of these organizations are dependent on their ability 
to mobilize the bulk of their resources locally. This dissertation’s findings with respect to 
some of the obstacles to the local resource mobilization efforts of the Ford-founded 
philanthropies could enlighten and help donor-founded/funded CSOs and NGOs in 
developing countries to strategize better, find context-specific solutions, and work to 
ensure their long-term sustainability.    
Relevance/Insights into Other Cases 
The findings from the case study of the Ford Foundation’s effort to support the 
growth of local philanthropy for public purposes in African countries3 can be relevant (1) 
to the development efforts of other international donors who were involved in the same 
endeavor; and (2) other developing parts of the world where these donors have provided 
(and continue to) provide support for the growth of local philanthropy. 
The findings would be applicable to the other American private philanthropies 
(including the Kellogg, CS Mott, and MacArthur Foundations) that also established 
philanthropic foundations in African countries in the 1990s and early 2000s. Ford’s 
                                                 
3While the KCDF was set up as a national foundation, the AWDF and TrustAfrica had a pan-African reach.  
163 
failure to achieve its local resource mobilization and the factors that accounted for that 
state of affairs will be relevant to these other international funders who also used similar 
strategies and tactics.    
Finally, these findings’ relevance goes beyond African countries. They could be 
relevant for other non-Western countries and cultures in Central and Eastern Europe, 
Russia, and Asia, where Western private foundations and other donors have equally 
attempted in the 1990s to export and propagate their own conceptions of civil society and 
philanthropy (Ogilvie 1997; Quigley 2000; Petrescu 2000; Henderson 2003; Aksartova 
2009). All in all, these research findings, centering as they are on the incongruence 
between imposed philanthropic concepts and values from the industrialized West, on the 
one hand, and entrenched local institutional frameworks, on the other, will be of 
relevance to many other non-Western regions of the world.  
Limitations of Research Methodology  
There are a few limitations to my research findings. They would have been 
stronger, with much wider applicability, if I had conducted a multiple case study 
involving some of the other American private foundations that (alongside the Ford 
Foundation) exported and propagated the American-inspired philanthropic form in 
African (and other developing) countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Though the 
single case study of the Ford Foundation has illuminated the phenomenon of interest, an 
analysis of the other donors’ philanthropy promotion efforts and strategies would have 
been better.  
With respect to the dependent/outcome variable, survey data would have 
complemented the qualitative data from the in-depth semi-structured interviews to help 
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capture the local people’s reasons for not giving to the Ford-founded philanthropies in 
African countries. Subject to the availability of resources, surveys in Ghana, Senegal and 
Kenya (and a number of other African countries) would have provided information about 
local peoples’ perception of the incongruence between the formal philanthropy model 
that Ford propagated and the local informal giving cultures and practices. Relying on the 
literature to determine the extent of incongruence was adequate; but the findings would 
have been stronger if I had been able to combine the qualitative data with survey data 
covering local individuals (especially the growing middle class) in the relevant African 
countries. However, the lack of breadth was compensated for with depth from the in-
depth semi-structured open-ended expert interviews.   
Policy Recommendations 
 One of the objectives of this research was to offer recommendations that could  
help improve international donors’ practice in the area of local philanthropy 
strengthening in African (and other non-Western) countries. The policy recommendations 
below could be useful to the major American private foundations (such as the Rockefeller 
and CS Mott Foundations) still involved with the propagation of institutional 
philanthropy in developing countries. Though Ford ended its global philanthropy 
promotion program in 2010, the recommendations could be useful to it as well in its 
general effort to effect social change in non-Western regions of the world. It could also 
decide to help address some of the problems that it unwittingly created in the past. 
Asked how the Ford Foundation could have been more effective in terms of its 
support for local philanthropy in African countries in the 1990s, especially with respect to 
local resource mobilization for public purposes, a number of the former Ford Foundation 
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senior officials and the executives of the Ford-founded African foundations interviewed 
for this study provided answers that form the basis for my recommendations. Some stated 
that Ford should have just supported the existing forms of African philanthropic 
organization since African communities have used them successfully over the ages for 
resource-pooling for the public good. A former Ford senior official suggested that Ford 
could have just provided support to the different forms of indigenous self-organized 
philanthropic associations in African societies: 
We could have just supported different forms of African philanthropy… If 
our goal is to promote philanthropy, and giving, and sharing, in African 
societies it may well be that the endowed foundation is a much less 
important part of the future than we thought it was.4 
 
Others suggested a “marriage” between the desirable attributes of the foreign 
philanthropic form and the local philanthropic structures, values and giving practices. For 
instance, a former Ford senior official who worked in the Africa region, talked about how 
Africans were interested in the coming together of the modern (foreign) and the 
traditional:  
You had Africans who were very interested in this idea of private 
resources going to the public good; and the marriage between a modern 
kind of philanthropy that's really pushing for the public good, that's also 
connected with the vision of [local] giving… A marriage between … 
modern philanthropy and what… works at the local level: that [local] 
people understand self-help, that people understand the need to pool 
resources, that people understand that they need to be independent from 
...outside sources.5 
 
On their part, some of the senior officials of the Ford-founded African 
foundations felt strongly that the future of African philanthropy and African 
philanthropic institutions lay in strengthening the traditional philanthropic 
                                                 
4Participant Y. Phone interview with the author, March 1, 2013 
5Participant I. Phone interview with the author, October 1, 2013 
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institutional forms and landscape to enable them provide the building blocks and 
the foundation upon which modern (authentic) African philanthropic institutions 
can be built. One of them explained at length: 
Our own traditional forms of philanthropy… how do we strengthen those 
institutions…? We need to build the base; and the base is really around the 
cultural foundations, the social, economic, and political [ foundations]… 
Once that is done, we can then think of building… these other 
organizational forms;6  institutions…like TrustAfrica… and others can 
then have a sound foundation. What I am trying to propose is that for us to 
really build strong [philanthropic] institutions [in Africa] we need to link 
them very, very, strongly with our own indigenous traditions and cultures 
which are the foundation… for further [institution] building… We need to 
begin to [build] the bridge between what is usually considered indigenous 
philanthropy and what is considered institutional philanthropy. If we don't 
make that link in the African continent, we will continue to have a 
discrepancy between institutions that are not grounded… and not linked to 
[the local culture]7...I am simply saying that when you look at mobilizing 
[local] resources… that should be linked to… how we [Africans] do 
things. That's my point.8  
 
A senior official of a different African foundation under study talked about the 
establishment of the African Grantmakers’ Network (AGN) as a step forward in that 
direction. He believed that the AGN’s attempt to redirect African institutional 
philanthropy towards the giving traditions of the continent of Africa was the path to the 
future: 
[The AGN] is saying that we are African, and we behave in a peculiar 
way. We give in a certain interesting way and we must build on that 
behavior of the African giver to bind everything else together… [The 
AGN is] saying we must be clear about the African context, which many 
people don't understand… We9 must ride on the Africans' natural behavior 
in giving. [And] we must get Africans to work around all these… issues, 
                                                 
6Adapting and adopting new philanthropic institutional forms such as the American-inspired foundation 
model that Ford propagated.  
7Ottaway (2000) has referred to such institutions as ‘free-floating’ 
8Participant G. Phone interview with the author, March 28, 2013 
9The Ford-founded/funded philanthropic institutions and the other members of the AGN  
167 
on how they give, and their context, and to find African solutions to those 
problems.10  
…If [Africans] only give through funerals [an African philanthropic 
institution ought to be able to] create a program which basically makes 
sure that everybody in that community gets a decent burial. Why not? 
Who will say that's a bad program?... You set up a welfare mechanism 
based on philanthropy so that young people who have no money can get 
married; they can have a wedding. And communities which have nobody, 
have no land, have no one to pay for their funeral expenses, would get 
decent burials.11 
 
The Africa Grantmakers’ Network (AGN) was formed by the Ford-founded/funded 
African philanthropies --- TrustAfrica, the African Women’s Development Fund 
(AWDF), and the Kenya Community Development Foundation (KCDF) as a result of 
their participation in Ford’s International Initiative to Strengthen Philanthropy (IISP). 
They came away from the IISP disappointed that it did not address many of the local 
resource mobilization issues that they experienced in their local African context. They 
felt that only an Africa-centered philanthropy network would address those needs. 
Membership was originally open to only African philanthropic organizations; but was 
later extended to institutions from outside the African continent.  
The idea of “marrying” traditional African philanthropic practices and 
philanthropic values to modern forms of philanthropy has also been the wish of 
scholars of African philanthropy (Odembo and Kisinga 2005; Ngondi-Houghton 
2005; Wilkinson-Maposa et al. 2005). There was consensus that for Africans to be 
able to develop a modernized form of African philanthropy rooted in the 
                                                 
10This is a sentiment that came across in some of the interviews: that external (mostly American) 
philanthropic institutions and infrastructure organizations that knew little about African philanthropy and 
African problems were deeply involved in creating philanthropic institutions on the African continent and 
offering solutions, often based on their American experience. As one African foundation official put it: 
“Everyone is out there …saying ‘we are African this…we are this for Africa, we are the other for Africa...’ 
But they don't live in Africa… The truth of the matter is that it is only us who live and work in Africa who 
know what affects Africa…” (Participant S. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 15, 2013) 
11Participant S. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 15, 2013 
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continent’s cultures of giving (free of foreign influence and direction) they would 
have to be able to mobilize the bulk of the required resources from within the 
African continent. As one of the former Ford senior officials pointed out, when a 
foreign institution invests thousands of dollars into another institution (in Africa 
or elsewhere), it is natural for the former to want to mold and stamp their identity 
on the latter.  
 My recommendations to international funders/donors interested in 
supporting the growth and strengthening of locally-supported philanthropy in 
African countries are two-fold.  The first --- support for organizational syncretism 
and hybridization --- is for any philanthropic or civil society organizations that 
they might decide to support in the future. The second set --- support for 
adaptation to local cultures of giving and providing local populations with 
information to help them make sense of and adopt the foreign philanthropic 
transplants --- is for addressing the major challenges facing the existing Ford-
founded/funded philanthropic institutions with regards to local resource 
mobilization.  
Support for Organizational Syncretism/Hybridization 
Putting it in horticultural terms, my recommendation for the most appropriate 
cultivation of local philanthropy for public purposes in African countries would be to 
graft scions from the temperate variety onto the rootstock of the tropical variety, bringing 
together the good qualities/attributes of both to create an improved hybrid.12 The 
                                                 
12Some scholars describe the philanthropic foundations in African and other developing countries as 
‘hybrids’ or ‘foundation-like’, not because local people have been able to incorporate indigenous giving 
practices and values into their operations, but because they have been unable to operate exactly like their 
counterparts in the US (Sacks 2000).   
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desirable attributes of the imported variety would be grafted onto the local one to take 
advantage of the latter’s durability and hardiness against drought and other negative 
conditions. Developing a hybrid model based on the local rootstock would build on the 
already established healthy root system of the latter. That would make such a model easy 
for everyone so inclined (rich and poor alike) to cultivate. In plain words, I recommend 
that international funders interested in promoting and strengthening local philanthropy in 
African (and other developing) countries acknowledge the local philanthropic 
organizations in place, support the inculcation of desirable ‘semi-formal’ organizational 
attributes such as efficiency and accountability into the prevalent indigenous forms of 
philanthropic organization, and use those culturally appropriate values and practices as 
the basis for social change.  
Some of the interviewees suggested that international funders help to scale 
up indigenous African philanthropic institutions. Based on a careful examination 
of the evidence, I find that simply scaling up indigenous organizations may entail 
an increase in size (due to role differentiation) and the professionalization of 
indigenous philanthropic institutions. That would make them no different from 
the current donor-founded institutions under study --- too big and too costly for 
local communities to maintain through local giving. My recommendation would, 
therefore, be that the hybridized/syncretized philanthropies be kept small, 
volunteer-led, and membership-based. They should be operational (rather than 
grantmaking), and closer to the structure and functions of indigenous 
philanthropies to ensure local ownership and support. Their small size, with 
members tied together by a common bond such as place of origin or other 
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ascriptive value (as in indigenous philanthropic organizations) will provide a 
strong motivation for loyalty and popular participation. The blend of modern 
management and accountability procedures and systems will ensure that they are 
efficient, nimble, and responsive (interpersonal) to the local constituents.  
Though not a perfect example of the type of syncretized organization I 
recommend,  the Akuapem Community Foundation (Akuapem CF) is close to the 
philanthropic rootstock that I recommend that international funders consider 
building upon. The Akuapem CF is a homegrown semi-formal philanthropic 
organization established by area elites and traditional rulers of the Akuapem 
Traditional Area of the Eastern Region of Ghana. It is, therefore, embedded in the 
indigenous governance systems and structures and draws on the values espoused 
by the informal giving cultures of the local area. Based on ethnicity, place of 
origin, or other affiliation, this small volunteer-led membership-based foundation 
raises money and materials, and draws on expertise, from its members, their 
businesses, as well as their social capital and networks, to carry out its programs. 
One of the members (a traditional chief) explained how the Akuapem CF 
functioned effectively as an informal organization: 
Though informal [the Akuapem CF] is effective. When we have our 
regular meetings, we decide on what to do and you can always tell from 
the group who will be best able to mobilize funding or resources for the 
particular activity that we want to engage in. For instance, with our current 
effort to do a library, a member agreed voluntarily to use his own 
resources and those of his firm to do the drawings, and so on up to the 
approval of the drawings. … It’s informal but it’s also done in a way that 
those who have the know-how, the interest or the qualifications will be the 
ones who will be requested to follow up on certain activities.13 
 
                                                 
13Participant T. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 25, 2013 
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With little access to international funding, the Akuapem CF is reliant on 
local resources. Though it raises relatively little money (as compared to the 
donor-founded philanthropies), it takes pride in getting things done from local 
resources. The same member as above commented on the Akuapem CF’s 
independence from foreign sources of funding: 
You will not see much … about foreign participation. In fact, when I 
reviewed the contributors to our programs, I saw about 15-20 names, and I 
didn't see any foreign names at all. It’s neither good nor bad, but what I 
am saying is… that it is homegrown, the membership is essentially people 
who are from the Akuapem area or if not from the Akuapem area, but who 
have lived in the Akuapem area. And most of the sourcing is from local 
funding, not foreign sources.14   
 
The mobilization of local resources for the public good (that is, the good of the 
Akuapem Traditional Area) was a core value and an integral part of the Akuapem 
CF’s establishment and its main strategy for accomplishing its goals: 
The concept was that the membership will make contributions, voluntary 
ones, to keep the organization running. But it was always understood that 
a lot would be sourced in-kind from institutions which could help. Some 
of the members had [worked at] the Bank of Ghana and other public 
institutions so they knew that there were several institutions which had 
resources lying idle.  And there were many institutions which may also be 
able to provide funding as part of their [corporate] social responsibility, 
giving back to society. … Apart from the initial endowment which was 
from the group, the target [has been] to go systematically to a number of 
[local] institutions which have the computers...books... dictionaries… 
which [we]… mobilize and then ...distribute. [We] always had enough of 
those items to give out.15 
 
The Akuapem CF chose to remain small because the leaders figured out 
that a large organization would not be sustainable on local resources alone. Its 
                                                 
14Participant T. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 25, 2013 
15Participant T. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 25, 2013 
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small size makes the organization flexible, and easy to manage efficiently on a 
small budget. The co-founder/volunteer manager of the Akuapem CF explained:  
We didn't go out and build a big administration. We kept it small and 
therefore sustainable. It was a conscious decision [to keep it small]. I 
always had this view that if we had a large organization (which some 
people tend to have) …we will never be viable. And the way this is set up, 
anybody else who picks it up after me should be able to do it. They may 
be a contractor or somebody who has an office and has one desk there for 
the community foundation. They should be able to run it because it is a 
virtual thing… We meet once in a while, but then I am in touch with them 
by Internet. I call them and… we discuss amongst ourselves…We ... know 
exactly what we are doing. We take, and we give. ...We have bank 
accounts, we have financial statements from year to year.  Because we 
fundraise we … have an account for anybody to see how we've used the 
money.16 
 
A former consultant to the Ford Foundation, with a lot of experience working 
with home-grown community philanthropies similar to the Akuapem CF, 
explained how larger was not necessarily better in the world of community 
philanthropy:  
It’s not about building large …infrastructure, it's about being networked 
horizontally…Most of the organizations we17 work with tend to be very 
small and they tend to have very small staff. … Particularly, the more 
local money they have … the smaller the staff they have, because they are 
trying to get the money out of the door to the groups that they … work 
with.18 We [tend to] think that things that are large are good…and it’s 
probably to do with the … development world understanding of scale. 
…What does growth look like for these types of [homegrown 
philanthropic] institutions? At what point is big too big? …What does 
scale look like? Is that really what we are looking for? Is financial growth 
the best growth or does that kind of destroy the spirit of what we are trying 
to instill here?... [There] are dangers of becoming too big and then 
becoming farther away from your constituents.19  
 
                                                 
16Participant O. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 22, 2013 
17The Global Fund for Community Foundations 
18McCarthy (1988) found that local people in some Asian countries were reluctant to contribute to 
professionalized philanthropies because they did not want their money to be used for overheads and high 
salaries for staff.  
19Participant K. Phone interview with the author, June 26, 2013 
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The Akuapem CF --- homegrown, small, membership-based, built on traditional 
African values, and largely locally- supported --- illustrates quite well the type of 
philanthropic organization/association I recommend international funders support 
and build upon if their objective is to foster local resource mobilization and self-
reliant and participatory development. It is a perfect example of the kind of 
grounded local ‘rootstock’ philanthropy that international funders could help 
hybridize with the transfer of desirable formal skills (the scion).   
For instance, all that the Akuapem CF needs to become the type of 
hybridized organization I recommend is the adoption of a formal system of 
management and accountability to make the philanthropic association more 
efficient and effective in its local fund mobilization and program implementation 
(while remaining small, associational, and locally-supported). Unlike the 
transplanted Ford-founded philanthropies, the major challenge facing the 
Akuapem CF was not local resource mobilization per se. Asked if resource 
mobilization had been a challenge one of the members of this local philanthropic 
association answered: 
I wouldn't say so... It depends on what you seek to achieve and [up to this 
point] whatever we have sought to do --- books to be given to the best 
pupils…, books to donate to libraries, etc. --- [we have done]. … What we 
always set our minds to do seems to have been achieved.20 
 
Just like most homegrown charitable organizations in African countries, the 
Akuapem CF mobilized more in-kind contributions than cash. 21  
                                                 
20Participant T. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 25, 2013 
21Unlike the Ford-founded (and other donor-founded) philanthropies and CSOs that have to seek thousands 
of dollars in cash to be able to function properly.   
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Instead, the challenge they identified was the loose informality of the 
management structure and the lack of a clear division of labor, which leaves the 
association dependent on a handful of volunteers (and therefore vulnerable). 
According to one of the members, the Akuapem CF could benefit greatly from 
strengthening (and formalizing) its administrative and management structure:  
We've got to find a way of supporting the secretariat of the institution 
better. As it is now it is very…relaxed, very informal… We’ve had this 
institution for the last seven years and we've always felt like we are 
revolving around one family. If the institution is to become a perennial 
one22…then we should not only use people’s time and resources to 
[provide services], but we should also look at how we can strengthen the 
secretariat… There has to be an office, even if it’s somebody’s house...put 
in an air conditioner if need be, buy desks, let the telephones work... It’s  
quite important that we look at strengthening the secretariat…23  
 
This Akuapem CF member also explained how the foundation’s local resource 
mobilization efforts could be improved with some clear division of labor among 
the members:  
We have to also strengthen our resource mobilization mechanism by 
formalizing it… If we [allow it to remain] very informal as to who is 
going to be doing what, then not much can be done [going forward]… I 
will [suggest that] we institutionalize some of our functions by saying 'Ok 
this person will be lead for things to do with infrastructure if schools are to 
be renovated or buildings are to be repainted’. Then we could also have 
those who will be more involved in sourcing for books and computers; and 
then a lead person for health-related things. And [all these roles] will be 
[pre-agreed] like subcommittees of the whole who will be involved in 
doing things. 24 
 
The data showed that the Ford Foundation was more effective at 
transferring formal management and governance skills to African philanthropic 
organizations than it was at supporting their local resource mobilization efforts. 
                                                 
22Sustainable for the long-term 
23Participant T. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 25, 2013 
24Participant T. Face-to-face interview with the author, July 25, 2013 
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Formal skills transfer to homegrown philanthropic associations would the best use 
of its resources and produce the best outcomes in terms of local philanthropy 
support. Self-organized philanthropic organizations like the Akuapem CF are 
grounded in the local cultures of giving and are therefore already good at local 
resource mobilization. All they need is a certain level of formalization (not 
professionalization) in their administrative functions.  
My recommendation is that international funders such as the Ford 
Foundation support the hybridization of such homegrown informal philanthropies 
by funding their acquisition of formal skills that the latter deem desirable and 
necessary for their efficiency and effectiveness; while staying small, 
associational/membership-based, participatory, and culturally rooted.    
In sum, rather than transplant formal American-inspired professionalized 
philanthropic foundations onto African countries, Ford and other international 
funders would do well to support locally-initiated and locally embedded 
philanthropic organizations like the Akuapem CF to acquire the formal 
managerial and other skills that their volunteer leaders and managers need to 
make their already well-rooted philanthropic associations more effective, 
efficient, and accountable. 
The rest of my recommendations target the existing “free-floating” Ford-
founded/funded philanthropies. How could the Ford Foundation and other 
international funders help them to do better in terms of overcoming the challenges 
associated with the incongruence between them and the local cultures of giving in 
which they were transplanted? 
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Adaptation to the Local Cultures of Giving 
One of the ways in which the KCDF, AWDF, TrustAfrica and others like them 
could eventually adapt to Africans’ ways of giving would be to incorporate some of the 
African values into their strategies for local resource mobilization. For example, they 
could take Africans’ need for reciprocity and the creation of social capital into account, 
considering that prospective donors are not just interested in the public impact of their 
giving, but also the personal and psychic rewards they receive (Frumkin 2006) from the 
beneficiaries of their generosity.  
In practical terms, African philanthropic institutions will need to figure out how to 
provide context-specific and culturally appropriate opportunities for individual donors in 
their countries to give through them for public impact, while at the same time meeting the 
donors’ needs.25 That might eventually change the thinking expressed by some of the 
interviewees in this study that prospective African donors do not see much value in using 
donor-founded/funded African intermediaries as vehicles for their giving.   
Rendering the Foundation Model Meaningful to Local Donors 
Drawing attention to the incongruence between the American-inspired foundation 
philanthropy model in Africa, and Africans’ long-held giving values and practices is not 
to suggest that Africans are stuck in their philanthropic ways and cannot change to adopt 
some of the new ways of giving associated with formal philanthropic foundations. The 
growing middle class in countries such as Ghana, Kenya and South Africa is in a good 
                                                 
25Scholars, such as Burlingame (1993), have argued that there is no such thing as pure altruism behind 
charitable giving; and that altruism and egoism are on a continuum in human giving behaviors. See Dwight 
Burlingame’s “Altruism and Philanthropy: Definitional Issues” Essays on Philanthropy No. 10. 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Center on Philanthropy 
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position to give the kind of support that formal professionalized foundations such as the 
KCDF, TrustAfrica, and AWDF require. As Ngondi-Houghton (2005) pointed out, 
Kenya’s middle class had great wealth and was interested in giving back for the public 
good but did not have the right avenues for doing so.26 With time and the appropriate 
adjustments and adaptations by the donor-founded philanthropic institutions as discussed 
above; and the right kind of knowledge about the latter, Africans could be sensitized and 
convinced to support the imported form of philanthropic institutions alongside their age-
old traditional ways of giving. They do not have to give one up to practice the other. As 
Frumkin (2006) pointed out, scientific philanthropy27 never replaced charity, even in the 
United States. In fact, charity and philanthropy are on a continuum, each one meeting 
different societal needs at different times, as necessary.  
Chen et al. (2013) cite Swidler (2006) to call attention to the idea of culture not as 
fixed and unchangeable, but as a “tool kit” from which people select what they determine 
to be necessary for their progress and development at any particular time. According to 
Chen et al. (2013): 
Swidler argues that culture ‘influences action not by providing the 
ultimate values toward which action is oriented, but by shaping a 
repertoire or ‘tool kit’ of habits, skills, and styles from which people 
construct ‘strategies of action’. Although this tool kit typically supports 
stable patterns of action, people can also selectively draw on this tool kit 
to enable change, including new ways of organizing that combine 
previously unconnected practices (Chen et al. 2013:859) 
 
                                                 
26Available avenues such as harambees were mostly geared towards helping people and communities with 
which local donors are affiliated in one way or the other.   
27‘Scientific philanthropy’ is deemed to get to the roots of social problems for greater and lasting impact; 
whereas charity is deemed to be palliative and only offering temporary relief. But both are important, as 
sometimes ‘charity’ needs to precede ‘philanthropy’ to make the latter effective.  
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I therefore recommend that international funders still interested in strengthening 
local philanthropy in African (and other developing) countries support the donor-
founded/funded philanthropies in the more difficult process of adapting to their 
local environment. It will be equally important to support a strategy for helping 
people to make sense of the transplanted philanthropic values and practices from 
their own socio-cultural standpoint, so as to enable local adoption of the new.  
Need for Public Awareness, Communication, and Learning   
Finally, in order for the Ford-founded/funded philanthropies to be successful at 
getting local people to adopt the new ways of giving as part of their philanthropic 
practice, there would need to be a concerted effort to spread the new concepts and ideas 
in a culturally appropriate manner. As Chen et al (2013) state alternative practices and 
values need to be spread through advocacy by tapping into already accepted logics: 
The spread of particular practices and their associated values is not 
inevitable. Actors, whether individual persons or collectivities such as 
formal organizations, often must advocate alternative practices and values 
by tapping accepted logics…Clashes over bureaucracy’s legitimacy 
underscore the institutional work needed to build acceptance for particular 
organizational forms and their associated values (Chen et al. 2013:860-
861).  
 
The African leaders who worked with the Ford Foundation and the other international 
donors to help establish the American-inspired philanthropies in their countries must 
have realized that though indigenous African philanthropic practices had been 
appropriate for solving the problems of the past, they needed something new to help 
solve the current more complex problems facing the African people. They acknowledged 
that Africans’ philanthropic practices needed to expand and draw on new ideas, as long 
as these are not antithetical to the existing culturally acceptable practices and values. 
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Cultures need to evolve to meet new societal challenges, but that cannot happen without 
communication and learning, as expressed by North (1993): 
The current learning of any generation takes place within the context of 
the perceptions derived from collective learning. Learning…is an 
incremental process filtered by the culture of a society…, but there is no 
guarantee that the cumulative past experience of a society will necessarily 
fit them to solve new problems. Societies that get “stuck” embody belief 
systems and institutions that fail to confront and solve new problems of 
societal complexity (North 1994:364) 
 
Besides ignoring the contextual differences, the Ford Foundation 
neglected the important process of spreading the new ideas of foundation 
philanthropy in African countries. As the local donor-founded philanthropies 
themselves have few flexible/unrestricted resources to undertake this critical task, 
I recommend that international funders (including Ford) that participated in the 
global philanthropy promotion of the 1990s revisit the problem. They should find 
ways to support an advocacy and learning campaign in the relevant African 
countries to speed up their foundation grantees’ local adaptation and acceptance. 
A former Ford consultant summarized the Ford Foundation’s failed attempt to 
propagate new mechanisms for local resource mobilization in African countries 
thus, noting how this needed to have been supported by a bottom-up 
communication strategy: 
In a sense local resource mobilization was … the one that was … [going 
to] be impossible for the Ford Foundation to really have the 
most...[impact]; because that has to come from the ground, it has to be led 
by a rationale or object of communication message that developed 
locally…28 
 
                                                 
28Participant K. Phone interview with the author, June 26, 2013 
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I recommend that the Ford Foundation and the other American private 
foundations that started philanthropy promotion programs in African countries in 
the 1990s fund the development and dissemination of that communication 
strategy and message in the relevant countries. Though mistakes have been made 
in the past, international funders still have a chance to help the foundations that 
they created to adapt to their local environment through a communication strategy 
(among the other support recommended above). There is still a chance to help 
them grow the type of roots that they need to be able to tap into local resources, to 
fulfil the core function and objective of their establishment.  
Future Research  
This qualitative case study has tackled the local resource mobilization issue from 
the angle of international funders imposing their own conception of institutional 
philanthropy on African countries. It dealt with the negative effects of the transplantation 
process on the local resource mobilization capacities of the donor-founded philanthropic 
institutions. This line of research would be advanced with survey data on how local 
populations perceive the donor-founded philanthropies, why they have so far not given 
generously to such institutions, and what it would take for them to consider such 
philanthropic institutions as legitimate and attractive mechanisms for charitable giving 
for the public good. 
Though there has been survey research in selected Southern African countries on 
individual giving habits and practices (Wilkinson-Maposa et al. 2005; Everatt et al. 
2005), they have been focused on informal giving and have not inquired into giving to 
formal philanthropic institutions, many of which are donor-founded (by Ford, Kellogg, 
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CS Mott, to name the most prominent). Resources permitting, such a study would give us 
more certainty about the extent of alienation and incongruence between the donor-
founded philanthropies and their constituents; and whether the situation has improved 
over time. It would also provide more specific ideas about how the issues can be 
addressed and resolved in a context-specific way to facilitate local adaptation and local 
resource mobilization.  
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Chapter VI: Tables 
 
Table 3.1 Grants Awarded by AWDF from 2002-2010 (US dollars) 
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
AWDF $467,895 $369,635 $519,369 $714,100 $2,171,769 $3,009,917 $3,748,475 $2,680,777 $2,503,000 
Source: AWDF Annual Report 2010:131 
Table 3.2 Grants Awarded by TrustAfrica from 2006-2010 (US dollars) 
 
 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 
TrustAfrica $2,144,500 $1,671,186 $1,758,686 $3,141,725 $3,983,893 
Source: TrustAfrica Annual Reports 2006-2010.2 
 
Table 3.3 Resource Mobilization by AWDF from 2005-2010 (US dollars) 
Source: AWDF Annual Reports 2004-2010 
                                                 
1AWDF 2010 Annual Report Available online at http://awdf.org/wp-content/uploads/AWDF_Annual_Report_2010.pdf  
2TrustAfrica’s financial year was from April 1-March 31 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total %  
AWDF Individuals & 
Corporates 
$61,393 $111,063 $112,396 $297,529 $35,066 $52,592 $711,761 2.34 
Foundations $1,468,952 $5,262,964 $5,924, 334 $5,123,281 $5,598,992 $5,136,641 $29,686,457 97.66 
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Table 3.4 Resource Mobilization by TrustAfrica from 2006-2010 (US dollars) 
   2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 Total % 
TrustAfrica3 Local4 
 
Individual5 $18,511 $8,096 $3,260 $3,539 $13,275 $46,681 0.2 
Int’l Corporate & 
Foundation 
Grants 
$3,981,776 $6,550,091 $1,661,362 $6,320,991 $7,068,706 $25,582,926 99.8 
Source: TrustAfrica Annual Reports 2006-2011 
Table 3.5 Resource Mobilization by KCDF from 2004-2010 (in 000’s of Kenyan Shillings6) 
  2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 Total 
Kshs 
% 
KCDF Local 
Donations 
4,165 1,239 n/a 1,345 134,122 2,612 48,756 9,544 2.1 
Grant 
Income7 
34,363 52,589 n/a 77,916 70,366 98,615 102,000,813 435,850 97.9 
Source: KCDF Annual Reports8
                                                 
3TrustAfrica’s financial year goes from April 1-March 31 
4The way TrustAfrica presents its financial report, its local resources are within the individual contributions. The list of corporate agencies and foundations that 
gave to TrustAfrica shows that these were international donors.   
5The list of individual contributors included Ford Foundation staff and TrustAfrica board members, but few local people not associated with TrustAfrica.  
6To give an idea of what this is worth in 2018 dollars, one dollar was equivalent to about 100 Kenyan shillings on May 31, 2018 
7Mostly pass-through restricted funds from international donors for regranting to support programs of the donors’ choosing.  
8The 2006-07 Annual Report was not available to the author, but it most likely would have followed the same pattern: more than 90% of revenues from 
international sources.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A  
Interview Guide 
 
1. Schedule for Interviewees Associated with the Ford Foundation 
International Efforts to Promote Local Resource Mobilization for Philanthropy in Africa: 
Why the Ford Foundation’s Initiatives Failed 
 
Introduction 
Thank you for agreeing to speak with me today about the Ford Foundation’s effort to 
promote institutional philanthropy in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s and 2000s; and the 
impact of its international initiatives (Africa Philanthropy Initiative and International 
Initiative to Strengthen Philanthropy) on the participating African foundations. Please 
review the Study Information Sheet to refresh your memory about the study. I will like to 
record the interview to ensure that I accurately represent your answers and views; the 
recording will not be reviewed by any third party. If you object to being recorded, I will 
rely on my written notes from this interview. Are you willing to allow the interview to be 
recorded?  
 
[NB: The interview will not be recorded unless and until the interviewee indicates his or 
her consent to be recorded. Recording will only start from this point on if the interviewee 
gives consent.] 
 
Thank you again for agreeing to speak with me today. Our interview will consist of a 
series of questions that I am asking every interviewee associated with the Ford 
Foundation, but your responses may lead to follow-up questions unique to your 
interview. Please feel free to refuse to answer any question if, for any reason, you would 
rather not answer it.   
 
Interview Questions  
1. Please state your name and your official position at the Ford Foundation (or your 
association with Ford) when you worked on the global philanthropy promotion 
program?  
 
2. Please tell me about the Ford Foundation’s effort to promote local philanthropy in 
developing countries in general and in Sub-Saharan African countries in particular.  
 
3. Can you explain why the Ford Foundation determined that supporting foundation 
philanthropy in African and other developing countries would further its mission of 
promoting local philanthropy and self-reliant development? 
 
4. How did the Ford Foundation conceptualize philanthropy?  
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5. Can you talk about the Africa Philanthropy Initiative (API) that the Ford Foundation 
implemented in the late 1990s? What were the objectives of the API?  
 
6. What were the strategies that Ford employed to implement the API?  
 
7. How would you rate the success of that initiative in helping participating African 
foundations to boost local resource mobilization? 
  
8. What challenges, if any, were encountered by the Ford Foundation in its attempt to 
boost local philanthropy in African countries through foundation-building and the 
API?  
 
9. What factors led to the Ford Foundation’s decision to launch the IISP in 2005? Was 
the IISP modeled on previous Ford initiatives? How?  
 
10. What role did you play in conceiving, designing, implementing, and/or managing the 
initiative? What were the criteria for inviting grantee foundations to participate?  
 
11. What were the objectives of the IISP? 
 
12. As part of the IISP what specific strategies and mechanisms did the Ford Foundation 
employ to try to help the participating African foundations increase their local 
resource mobilization effectiveness? 
  
13. Did the Ford Foundation seek the input of participating organizations in designing the 
program? To what extent did the Ford Foundation factor local contexts (legal, 
cultural, fiscal, economic and political environments) into fashioning the strategies 
for helping cohorts of participating grant makers from different regions of the world? 
  
14. In your opinion, what were the priorities of the participating African foundations: (1) 
local resource mobilization and autonomy from foreign donors; (2) improving 
governance and administrative structures; (3) grantmaking; (4) endowment-building? 
 
15. Did Ford and its foundation grantees have the same priorities? 
 
16. What challenges (if any) did the Ford Foundation encounter in implementing the 
IISP? 
 
17. Would you say that the IISP was successful in helping the participating African 
foundations to improve their local resource mobilization efforts and reduce their 
dependency on foreign donors? If yes, how? If not, why?  
 
18. The records show that all the foundations that Ford established in African countries, 
including those that participated in the IISP, were mobilizing few local resources by 
the time Ford ended the IISP in 2010. Why do you think they were unable to mobilize 
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local resources so long after their founding, and despite Ford’s capacity-building 
efforts through the API and IISP? 
 
19. Since Ford’s goal was to catalyze local philanthropy for self-reliant development in 
African countries, would you say that professionalized foundation philanthropy based 
on the US model was the best vehicle to accomplish that goal? 
 
20. In hindsight what could the Ford Foundation have done differently?  
 
21. Is there anything else that you would like to add about Ford’s philanthropy promotion 
and foundation-building program in African countries? 
Thank you for participating in this interview. I appreciate your time. 
 
2. Schedule for Senior Staff of Ford-founded African Philanthropies 
 
International Efforts to Promote Local Resource Mobilization for Philanthropy in 
Africa: Why the Ford Foundation’s Initiatives Failed 
 
Introduction 
Thank you for agreeing to speak with me today about the Ford Foundation’s effort to 
promote institutional philanthropy in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s and 2000s; and the 
impact of its international initiatives (Africa Philanthropy Initiative and International 
Initiative to Strengthen Philanthropy) on the participating African foundations. Please 
review the Study Information Sheet to refresh your memory about the study. I will like to 
record the interview to ensure that I accurately represent your answers and views; the 
recording will not be reviewed by any third party. If you object to being recorded, I will 
rely on my written notes from this interview. Are you willing to allow the interview to be 
recorded?  
 
[NB: The interview will not be recorded unless and until the interviewee indicates his or 
her consent to be recorded. Recording will only start from this point on if the interviewee 
gives consent.] 
 
Thank you again for agreeing to speak with me today. Our interview will consist of a 
series of questions that I am asking every interviewee associated with the Ford-founded 
African philanthropic institutions that participated in the IISP, but your responses may 
lead to follow-up questions unique to your interview. Please feel free to refuse to answer 
any question if, for any reason, you would rather not answer it.  
 
Interview Questions  
1. Please state your name and your official position at your foundation. 
 
2. Can you tell me about how your foundation was established? 
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3. How familiar are you with the Africa Philanthropy Initiative (API) and the 
International Initiative to Strengthen Philanthropy (IISP)? Did your organization 
participate in one or both of those initiatives? 
 
4. If your organization participated in the API what were the objectives of the initiative 
and what did your organization expect to get out of it? What were your priorities? 
 
5. Can you tell me the strategies that Ford implemented as part of the Africa 
Philanthropy Initiative? How much input did your organization have in the design and 
implementation of the API?  
 
6. Can you tell me how your organization benefited from the API? 
 
7. From your perspective, to what extent did the API specifically help your 
organization’s local resource mobilization efforts? In other words, to what extent did 
the API help your organization to build its capacity for local resource mobilization 
during or after the initiative?  
 
8. The International Initiative to Strengthen Philanthropy (IISP) was launched in 2005. 
What were the objectives of the IISP?  
 
9. Why do you think your organization was selected to participate in the IISP? What did 
your organization expect to gain from participating in the initiative?  
 
10. What were your organization’s priorities as you participated in the IISP: (1) help with 
effective grantmaking; (2) help with governance structures; (3) help with local 
resource mobilization and reducing dependency on foreign donors; or (4) help with 
endowment-building? 
 
11. What strategies did the Ford Foundation employ to implement the IISP?  
 
12. Did your organization have any input in fashioning these strategies? 
 
13. From your perspective, where did the Ford Foundation place its focus during the 
implementation of the IISP: (1) effective grantmaking; (2) governance structures; (3) 
local resource mobilization; (4) endowment-building? 
 
14. To what extent did the IISP strategies help your organization to increase its 
mobilization of local resources (as a percentage of total revenues)?  
 
15. If your organization did not succeed in increasing local resource mobilization during 
and after its participation in the IISP why, in your opinion, did it not succeed?  
 
16. The literature says that some of the factors working against philanthropic local 
resource mobilization in African countries include the following: 
     1. Disenabling legal, regulatory environment 
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     2. People being too poor to engage in charitable giving 
     3. Lack of tax incentives to encourage giving 
     4. Lack of trust in formal institutions 
Can you tell me, from your experience, if and to what extent these factors have been 
an impediment in your foundation’s effort to mobilize local resources? We will take 
them one by one.  
 
17. Can you tell me what (if any) internal organizational factors or challenges have 
helped or hindered your ability to mobilize local resources (1) before your 
participation in the IISP in 2005; (2) while you were participating in the IISP; and (3) 
after your participation in the IISP? How did the IISP help to address or fail to 
address those challenges? 
 
18. If Ford had asked your foundation to recommend strategies for helping to boost its 
local resource mobilization efforts, what would you have recommended? 
 
19. What could the Ford Foundation have done differently? 
 
20. Is there anything else that you would like to share with me about your organization, 
its participation in the IISP, and the impact of the IISP on its ability to mobilize local 
resources? 
 
21. Is there anything else that you would like to share with me that I did not know to ask? 
Thank you for participating in this interview. I appreciate your time.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 189 
Appendix B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Conceptualization of Foundation Effectiveness in Developing Countries 
 
Dimensions Definition Key Indicators 
Managerial 
effectiveness 
(Lewis 2001) 
-Foundations with qualified 
managers/executives with experience in 
the civil society/nonprofit/NGO sector; 
-Managers who have received training 
on philanthropic foundations; and 
-Ensure the foundation meets sound 
governance, accounting and 
management principles 
-Presence of a qualified Executive 
Director/CEO 
-Presence of qualified staff 
-Preparation and dissemination of 
-Annual Reports & Financial 
Statements 
-Attractiveness of the foundation 
to international donors 
Board 
effectiveness 
(Herman and 
Renz 1999) 
-Foundations with a properly constituted 
governing board made up of 
knowledgeable individuals from a wide 
range of backgrounds relevant to the 
foundations’ mission and vision 
-Existence of a board of 
governors/directors 
-Provision of financial and other 
oversight 
-Board involved in fundraising 
for the foundation 
Grantmaking 
effectiveness 
(Ostrower 2007) 
-Foundations with established 
grantmaking structures and procedures 
-Program officers trained in grantmaking 
-The existence of a grantmaking 
program 
-Support of international donors 
Resource 
Mobilization 
effectiveness 
(Ford 
Foundation 
2006) 
External Fundraising: 
-Foundations with staff trained in 
proposal writing and donor relations 
-Ability to mobilize external/foreign 
donor funds 
-In-house expertise in proposal 
writing and fundraising from 
international funders/donors 
-Amount of money raised from 
international donors as a 
proportion of total revenues 
 Local Resource Mobilization: 
-Ability to attract funds from local 
individuals, corporate bodies, national 
and local government, for operations, 
grantmaking, and endowment building 
-Ability to attract local volunteers (other 
than board members) to support 
foundation activities 
-In-house expertise in local fund 
development and resource 
mobilization 
-Local constituency-building, 
including communication to 
create public awareness on 
foundation philanthropy 
-Development of context-specific 
strategies for local fund 
development 
-Resources mobilized locally as a 
proportion of total revenues 
Endowment 
Building 
effectiveness 
(Fleishman 
2007) 
-Ability to establish, raise funds,  
maintain, and grow an endowment fund 
-Existence of an endowment fund 
-Professional management of the 
endowment fund 
-Creativity in growing the 
endowment fund 
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Appendix C 
African Foundations Analyzed for this Case Study 
 
        
Foundation Level of 
Operation 
Area (s) of 
Operation 
Relationship with 
the Ford 
Foundation 
Structure/Staff Dependence 
on foreign 
donors for 
bulk of 
resources 
Size ***** 
TrustAfrica Pan-African 
(Located in 
Dakar, 
Senegal) 
Advocacy, 
civil society, 
African 
philanthropy 
research 
 Ford-founded Professional 
staff 
Yes $9, 484, 200* 
African 
Women’s 
Development 
Fund (AWDF) 
Pan-African 
(Located in 
Accra, 
Ghana) 
Women’s 
empowerment, 
social justice 
and human 
rights 
Founded by African 
women with seed 
money/grants from 
the Ford Foundation 
and other 
international donors 
Professional 
staff 
Yes $5,710, 000 ** 
Kenya 
Community 
Development 
Foundation 
(KCDF) 
National 
(Kenya) 
Community 
development, 
Social 
services, 
Social justice 
Founded by the Ford 
Foundation in 
collaboration with 
Kenyan elites  
Professional 
Staff 
Yes $5, 411, 016*** 
Akuapem 
Community 
Foundation 
(Akuapem CF) 
Local District 
(The 
Akuapem 
Traditional 
Area in the 
Eastern 
Region of 
Ghana) 
Community 
development, 
Health, 
Environmental 
Protection 
Founded by local 
elites with no 
international 
financial assistance 
Membership 
Association/ 
Part-time staff 
and volunteers 
No $28,774**** 
       
*Total assets taken from 2012-13 Annual Report 
** AWDF total income (most of it restricted for regranting) from 2011 Annual Report. Amounts are already in US dollars 
*** KCDF total income (most of it restricted for regranting) from 2011-12 Annual Report converted from KS 465, 669, 772 at the 
December 31, 2012 rate of .01162 Kenyan shillings to a dollar 
**** Total expenditure for 2012 converted from GHȼ 57, 547 at a rate of GHȼ 2 to a dollar, which was the average prevalent rate in 
2012 
***** By total assets, total grants made, or total expenditure, as available in 2012 
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